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Whether socioeconomic justice belongs within the transitional justice framework is 
still a matter of contention. The thesis responds to the conceptual challenges and 
empirical indeterminacy of these debates by addressing the following questions: 
what is the role of socioeconomic justice and injustice in war and transition, and how 
do post-war societies deal with socioeconomic injustice? Understanding 
socioeconomic justice as redistribution, and looking at post-war justice as a contested 
concept and social practice shaped by the intervention of international forces, the 
thesis analyses socioeconomic injustice and justice claims from the perspective of 
local communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, with a particular focus on Prijedor and 
Zenica. The thesis advances a threefold argument. Firstly, it shows that experiences 
of injustice rooted in the political economy were common during the war and 
continued during the transition process, and that they went beyond interethnic 
violence. In the eyes of local communities, their perception was also aggravated by 
the contrast with their memories of the socialist past, which in turn also shaped their 
conceptions of justice and justice claims. Secondly, the international intervention in 
post-war Bosnia acknowledged experiences of injustice selectively – with varying 
effects in Prijedor and Zenica – and was limited by a narrow understanding of 
socioeconomic justice as reparation, as well as by the priorities driving economic 
reforms. Emerging conceptions of justice and justice claims were thus more 
transformative, forward-looking, and external to the transitional justice framework 
in Zenica compared to Prijedor. Lastly, the thesis shows that social mobilisation for 
redistribution, as witnessed in the 2014 protests, can be interpreted as resulting from 
persisting and unaddressed socioeconomic grievances, and as further exemplifying 
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We fight exclusively for an order based on social justice. 





On 7th February 2014, thousands of citizens took the streets throughout Bosnia, in the 
largest popular mobilisation of the post-war period. They were protesting in 
solidarity with workers from the city of Tuzla, who had been demonstrating for a few 
days already, and had met with violent reaction from the police on February 5th. 
Workers from Tuzla were claiming pay arrears and labour rights, and protesting 
against corrupt, failed privatisations that had left many effectively unemployed. Like 
many other Bosnian cities, Tuzla developed during socialist times thanks to public 
investment in the industrial sector. Post-war deindustrialisation, rising 
unemployment, and lack of political accountability were now fuelling discontent in 
many parts of the country. Ultimately, as the demonstrators pointed out, the protests 
were about social justice: in fact, the protests brought this term to the forefront of 
public debate in Bosnia and Herzegovina for the first time in many years. 2  
Bosnia is mostly known to the outside world for a bitter interethnic conflict. 
Analyses of the causes, conduct and consequences of the war cannot disregard the 
ethnic divisions and the crimes committed in their name. Similarly, justice issues are 
largely understood, and studied by scholars, in relation to the problem of establishing 
                                                          
1 Declaration of the Sarajevo Citizens’ Plenum (#3), 9th February 2014 
<https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/09/declaration-of-the-sarajevo-citizens-
plenum-3/>, last accessed 12 December 2016. 
2 Hereafter BiH (short for Bosna i Hercegovina) or Bosnia. Bosnia is divided in two 
administrative entities, Republica Srpska (also referred to as RS) and the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), plus the autonomous Brčko District. The Federation is itself 
composed of 10 cantons, each with their own government. 
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accountability for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. It was as a 
result of mass violence committed during the Bosnian war (1992-1995) that the first 
international tribunal since the end of World War II was set up. The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was meant to put on trial those 
most responsible for these crimes in the former Yugoslav region. In contrast to the 
protesters’ calls for socioeconomic justice, the field of transitional justice has thus 
been dominated by attempts at establishing retributive justice, as a way of rebuilding 
a post-war Bosnia based on non-violent coexistence among its three ‘constituent 
peoples’.3 Post-war justice came to be identified with courtrooms and the work of 
professionalised NGOs, much more than with social mobilisation or protests.4 
Indeed, street protests could also be seen as a threat to the Dayton settlement that 
succeeded in taking the country out of interethnic violence. In February 2014, some 
(including international officials) worried about a potentially violent escalation, and 
politicians spread fears of ethnic clashes. Yet, the protests’ call for social justice was 
civic and anti-nationalist in nature, and this seemed to puzzle international observers 
and the international community in Sarajevo. 
This thesis will show that understanding the 2014 protests requires different 
categories of analysis and conceptual frameworks than those usually adopted to 
analyse post-war justice issues. It will show that we can trace the protests’ origins 
back to the Bosnian war, to wartime events and to the post-war transition, but in a 
different way than is usually understood by scholars and external observers. In this 
thesis, post-war justice issues are understood as encompassing socioeconomic 
redistribution, alongside cultural recognition and political representation (Fraser 
1995, 2003, 2009). The research presented over the coming chapters aims at 
uncovering aspects of post-war justice processes related to redistribution that have 
remained marginal in the practice and study of transitional justice.  
                                                          
3 The Bosnian Constitution, included as Annex 4 of the General Framework for Peace 
Agreement that ended the war in 1995, recognises Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs as the 
Republic’s ‘constituent peoples’ among which institutional power-sharing arrangements are 
set up. 
4 Although protests were organised regularly by victim groups, unsatisfied with the work of 
the ICTY and wanting to expand legal accountability for wartime events to international 
organisations (see Nettelfield 2010).  
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While established approaches for studying transitional justice, commonly 
part of peacebuilding processes, have focused on the importance of accountability for 
violations of International Humanitarian Law, over the past decade scholars have 
begun to grapple with the question of how we can conceptualise and achieve social 
and economic justice for societies in transition (Arbour 2007). Evolving from earlier 
concerns with reparations as the main economic tool of transitional justice 
programmes, the literature is now increasingly concerned with the role of economic 
violence and crimes in shaping war experiences, and with adapting transitional 
justice theories and approaches with a view to incorporating these violations (see 
especially Lambourne 2009, 2014; Laplante 2014; Sharp 2014). The field of transitional 
justice still suffers, however, from a lack of studies that put in relation its limitations 
with those of the broader transformation processes within which it is embedded, such 
as peacebuilding (as already pointed out by Sriram 2007 and Nagy 2008; see also 
Baker and Obradović-Wochnik 2016). Most importantly, the thesis discusses how 
processes of post-war economic restructuring bear significant relevance for 
socioeconomic justice. In doing so it also draws on and contribute to studies focusing 
on the social implications of the international intervention, in its different forms, and 
its interaction with local actors going beyond the organised civil society sector (Jansen 
2006; Gilbert 2008; Autesserre 2014; and see also Nettelfield and Wagner 2014 for a 
different take on international intervention).  
 
 
Research question and thesis argument  
 The thesis addresses the role of socioeconomic justice and injustice in war and 
transition. It does so by looking closely at the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
specifically at experiences of socioeconomic injustice, conceptions of justice and 
justice claims deriving from them, and at resulting instances of social mobilisation. 
Embedded in the answer given to this question is a conception of socioeconomic 
justice as redistribution, which draws on the work of Nancy Fraser (1995, 2003, 2005, 
2009). The thesis understands post-war justice as a contested concept and practice, 
and analyses experiences, memories, and justice claims from the perspective of 
affected local communities. Given the specific conditions of the Bosnian context, the 
thesis also situates socioeconomic justice within the post-war and post-socialist 
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transition, and takes into account the role of the international intervention in shaping 
processes of dealing with the past. Throughout the argument, we can see how justice 
processes result from the interaction of the interpretations and perceptions of those 
taking part in such processes, and the contextual or external elements defining the 
conditions within which they act.  
While the literature debates if and how socioeconomic issues should be part 
of transitional justice, in practice transitional justice programmes have rarely 
addressed them comprehensively. In the Bosnian case, the thesis argues, the 
international intervention in the justice sphere is limited by a narrow understanding 
of socioeconomic justice as the type of remedy offered for violations of physical 
integrity and ethnic cleansing, and by the priorities of the post-socialist transition 
shaping its economic reform programme. The latter is in fact aimed at liberalising the 
Bosnian market and integrating it within the global economy, and does not reflect 
justice considerations. The case for taking socioeconomic justice more seriously, 
however, is strengthened by evidence that local Bosnian communities commonly 
experienced forms of injustice that are rooted in the political economy of the war and 
its aftermath. As they crossed the temporal boundary between the war and the 
transition, such experiences of socioeconomic injustice varied between Prijedor 
(where they often overlapped with interethnic violence) and Zenica (where the 
socioeconomic component remained strongest). Moreover, their perception was 
further intensified by the contrast with the socialist past and the dire conditions of 
post-socialism.  
These experiences, and the expectations formed through memories of the 
past, also affect the way in which local communities develop conceptions of justice 
and justice claims based on redistribution. These claims are, however, distorted by 
the international intervention, with ambiguous results. In Prijedor, where 
socioeconomic injustice overlapped with interethnic violence, justice claims can at 
least in part be related to the internationally-sponsored transitional justice discourse. 
This might offer some acknowledgment to local communities, but can only partly 
satisfy their feelings of injustice, because socioeconomic issues are left aside. On the 
other hand, transitional justice discourses do not capture socioeconomic claims 
emerging from Zenica. This limits the potential for redress and acknowledgment, but 
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can also leave citizens freer to develop alternative, and more transformative, 
conceptions of justice as redistribution. 
In this context, social mobilisation for redistribution can be interpreted as the 
expression of unsettled and persisting socioeconomic injustice, mostly felt in Bosnia’s 
post-industrial cities and towns. The 2014 protests, which drew on claims that are 
similar to the ones emerging in Prijedor and Zenica, further illustrate the limitations 
of the international intervention in not being able to understand the protesters’ claims 
as a way of seeking forward-looking redistributive justice. Despite their mixed 
results, the 2014 protests placed socioeconomic justice at the centre of political 
contention and democratic processes of deliberation, adopting civic and participatory 
forms of mobilisation.  
 
 
Bosnia and Herzegovina from a peacebuilding and transitional justice 
perspective 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is considered an important case to study for those interested 
in transitional justice efforts and peacebuilding interventions. This thesis briefly 
introduces the questions and research issues usually associated with the Bosnian case 
from these perspectives, but then approaches the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
from a different angle, as discussed in the following section. While dealing with 
violence in war had long been a preoccupation of states and international 
organisations, it was with the end of the Cold War that policy-makers were 
confronted with a new set of challenges and dramatic changes in the global political 
landscape. As the outbreak of regional conflicts led to the emergence of peacebuilding 
and the expansion of the remit of transitional justice, the fall of socialist regimes gave 
Western countries and international financial institutions the chance to promote 
radical transformations in the political, economic and welfare systems of newly 
democratised countries. The study of Bosnia and Herzegovina is usually set against 
this background.  
With the fall of the Soviet Union and the outbreak of several regional, 
unconventional conflicts, the international community led by the UN began 
developing new approaches to deal with wars and their consequences. In the 1992 
Agenda for Peace, UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali defined peacebuilding as the 
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‘action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify 
peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’ (Boutros-Ghali 1992: section II). 
Peacebuilding was meant to include diverse tasks, from ‘disarming former 
belligerents to providing financial and humanitarian assistance, monitoring and 
conducting elections, repatriating refugees, rebuilding physical infrastructure, 
advising and training security personnel and judicial officials, and even temporarily 
taking over the administration of an entire country’ (Paris 1997, 55). The practice of 
peacebuilding was also evolving over time, together with the conceptual 
underpinnings of the liberal peace to be promoted in post-conflict countries 
(Sabaratnam 2011), and one important development was the incorporation, within 
the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, of the ‘promotion of national reconciliation and 
the re-establishment of effective government’ (UN 1995) within the scope of 
international interventions.  
An international consensus started to emerge around the need to pursue 
justice and accountability following widespread violence against civilians in order to 
foster national reconciliation and promote sustainable peace. After the norm of 
individual accountability for human rights violations began spreading from the 
democratic transitions of South America (Sikkink 2011), transitional justice became a 
significant component of peacebuilding processes (Barnett et al 2007). On a 
conceptual level, some scholars have also argued that transitional justice and 
peacebuilding are also characterised by the same liberal thrust (Sriram 2007; Nagy 
2008). The 1990s were then characterised by a drive to institutionalise the pursuit of 
justice in transitional contexts (see Teitel’s 2000 definition), through the establishment 
of ad hoc tribunals for crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and 
the permanent, treaty-based, International Criminal Court (ICC). 
Peacebuilding and transitional justice arguably derived from progressive 
concerns. Early formulations of what peacebuilding meant referred to its purpose as 
addressing the ‘deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and 
political oppression’ (Boutros-Ghali 1992: I), while transitional justice aimed at 
revolutionising international accountability for human rights violations by 
undermining the immunity and impunity of heads of state and military leaders. The 
1990s thus represented the peak of liberal ambitions, but also revealed the limitations 
of the liberal internationalist paradigm, and especially of the way in which it had 
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been practically implemented in post-conflict countries throughout the decade. Both 
endeavours – transitional justice and peacebuilding – soon came under scrutiny. First, 
peacebuilding was singled out for giving primacy to the international community 
and its prerogatives in promoting liberal democracy and market economy in post-
conflict countries regardless of local conditions and preferences (Paris 1997). Such 
assumptions and the resulting subordination of local concerns and agency were 
heavily criticised (Autesserre 2010; Campbell et al. 2011; Pugh 2011; Richmond 2011) 
and plans to increase ‘local ownership’ of peacebuilding processes drawn up (Donais 
2009). Due to the way in which it was pursued through newly established tribunals 
and courts, transitional justice too came to be seen as a top-down effort that left little 
scope for local agency (Orentlicher 2007; Sriram 2007; Lundy and McGovern 2008). 
Transitional justice conducted in institutions located away from post-conflict areas 
was also at risk of developing problems related to outreach and social perceptions 
among local constituencies (Gready 2005; Shaw and Waldorf 2010). 
As peacebuilding and transitional justice developed and faced challenges, in 
parallel and jointly, socialist countries were undergoing a process of political 
transition that led to the establishment of democratic regimes in Eastern Europe and 
some former Soviet republics. Scholars began raising and answering interesting 
questions regarding the causes and dynamics of the transition (Linz and Stepan 1996; 
Stark and Bruszt 1998; Przeworski 1991), and economic reform was singled out as a 
particularly contentious matter. Driven by neoliberal ideas and implemented 
through ‘shock therapy’ (Sachs 1990; Lavigne 1995; Donais 2005), economic reforms 
produced effects still relevant for today’s analysis of the post-communist world, 
especially in light of the economic crisis (Dale 2011). In Eastern Europe the post-
socialist transition unfolded peacefully, but the wars that accompanied the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia posed a different challenge to the international community.  
What characterises Bosnia (and the former Yugoslavia more in general) 
compared to other regions affected by the processes mentioned above, is that the 
country was simultaneously subject to peacebuilding missions, transitional justice 
programmes, and post-socialist economic reforms. Despite the fact that Yugoslavia 
had already begun reforming its economic system in the 1980s, its road to market 
democracy was an uphill climb, featuring conflicts and the endurance of 
authoritarian regimes. Bosnia could be considered a prima facie intractable case, due 
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to the widespread violence of the war, the atypical post-war settlement featuring 
strong international authority, transitional justice ‘experiments’ (Dragović-Soso and 
Gordy 2011), and international pressures to liberalise the economy similar to Eastern 
Europe (Donais 2005, 26), whose effects were mediated by the dire economic, 
institutional and social state of the country at the end of the war (Pugh 2002). It is 
precisely the intersection of these phenomena, however, that makes Bosnia and 
Herzegovina an interesting case, and that is crucial for understanding the context 
within which the problem of socioeconomic injustice unfolded in the country.  
 
 
Case background: Bosnia and Herzegovina between socialism and war  
In this thesis, post-war justice processes are connected to changes in the political 
economy, and specifically to the post-socialist transition. Proving the importance of 
socioeconomic justice in a war that is usually considered a bitter conflict over 
ethnicity and national identity can give strength to the arguments for the 
incorporation of socioeconomic elements within processes of dealing with the past. 
The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina thus represents an important test case for the 
study of socioeconomic justice in war and transition. Looking at Bosnia from an 
alternative point of view also puts into question simplistic representations of the 
Bosnian case centred on the intractability of interethnic relations. This section thus 
provides a background on the country, focusing on its political-economic conditions 
towards the end of the Yugoslav period and leading up the war.  
After being part of the Ottoman Empire for centuries, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was occupied by the Habsburg Empire from 1878 until the end of World 
War I. Bosnia was lagging behind the other Yugoslav regions. The construction of 
railways and industrialisation only started after the arrival of the Austrians 
(Singleton and Carter 1982, 54 and 75), but much of the country was still in similar 
conditions as during Ottoman times when it was integrated in the new Kingdom of 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918, which later became Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 
1929 (Malcolm 2002). The establishment of the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia at the end of the Second World War brought significant political, social, 
and economic changes. Led by Josip Broz “Tito”, the partisan movement founded a 
socialist republic, and carved an independent space for the country between the 
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liberal democratic West and the communist countries of Eastern Europe under Soviet 
influence. Unlike Eastern European countries, Yugoslavia was not liberated by Soviet 
troops but by Tito’s forces, which also benefitted from the support of the Allies in 
their fight against the Nazi occupation (Malcolm 2002). This gave Tito, once he 
became President of the newly established Yugoslavia, a great degree of legitimacy 
and, to some extent, independence from external interference, or at least the 
possibility to use Yugoslavia’s position between the blocs to the country’s advantage.  
After post-war attempts at agricultural collectivisation and Soviet-style 
planning failed (Mercinger 1991, 72; Lampe 2000), and following the Tito-Stalin split, 
Yugoslavia pursued a different path to socialism, characterised by socially-owned 
(rather than state-owned) property, and by self-management (Uvalić 1992, 6). Self-
management was a key feature of Yugoslav socialism, supposedly giving the workers 
a prominent role in the management of firms, in social protection (Verlič-Dekleva 
1991), and in society as a whole, although its practical implementation was less 
radical than what the state ideology purported (Unkovski-Korica 2014; Woodward 
1995a). Yugoslav socialism was also characterised by a mix of socialist and market 
mechanisms in trade, investment and enterprise, as a result of reforms carried out 
throughout the 1960s. The SFRJ passed legislation allowing ‘foreign investment in the 
form of joint ventures’ already in 1967 (Getter 1990, 789), reformed the banking 
system and liberalised the movement of goods (Uvalić 1992, 7; Baker 2015, 21). Bosnia 
and Herzegovina benefitted from Yugoslav investment in the industrial sector, which 
brought employment opportunities outside of agriculture, urbanisation, and 
prompted the construction of modern infrastructure. At the same time, it was still 
one of the poorest regions of the Federation, and Yugoslav social plans from the 1970s 
and 1980s recognised that Bosnia was among the areas entitled to special assistance 
(Singleton and Carter 1982, 223). Internal migration to more developed republics was 
also common (Ibid., 228).  
Yugoslavia was thus socially and economically closer to the West compared 
to Eastern Europe, and thus more susceptible to the external shocks and attempts of 
reform that later played a role in the dissolution of the country. Economic and 
political problems hit Yugoslavia from the 1970s, and overlapped and interacted in 
the 1980s. The oil crisis of 1973 made industrialisation too costly, reduced exports, 
and slowed down remittances sent by Yugoslav workers temporarily in Western 
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European countries (Uvalić 1992, 10; Baker 2015, 26). Rising unemployment and 
inflation exposed citizens to a precarity that the socialist regime was supposed to 
have eliminated (Baker 2015, 26).5 The Federal government reacted to the crisis by 
resorting to borrowing on the international market, and increasing spending and 
consumption. Yugoslav foreign debt increased from $2 billion in 1970 to $14 billion 
by 1979 (Uvalić 1992, 10). The debt was refinanced through IMF loans, but in return 
the government had to commit to a programme of structural adjustment that would 
limit domestic spending and bring macroeconomic stability through restrictive 
monetary policies and devaluations of the Yugoslav dinar (Woodward 1995b; Donais 
2005, 6). The crisis brought a decline in personal income and living standards, 
increased unemployment, more frequent protests by workers (Lowinger 2009), and 
hyperinflation. Unemployment in a socialist economy was somewhat a paradox 
(Woodward 1995a), and the crisis of self-management put in crisis the very socialist 
character of the country, as it was hard to imagine Yugoslavia without it (Baker 2015, 
26). The structure of unemployment also changed, as the urban youth of industrial 
centres was particularly affected (Mercinger 1991, 82-83). At the same time as the 
internationally-mandated economic reforms required a strong federal authority, the 
new 1974 Yugoslav Constitution had decentralised power to the republic that 
constituted the SFRJ (Pugh and Cooper 2004, 152; Magaš 1993). As Baker (2015, 22) 
notes, historians discuss whether the new Constitution ‘made Yugoslavia so 
structurally weak that its disintegration became inevitable’, especially if one takes 
into account the situation of social discontent and instability provoked by the 
economic crisis. The causes of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and of the ensuing 
Bosnian war are complex and contested, and this section (and the thesis) does not 
intend to enter into these debates (for an excellent overview of debates on the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia see Dragović-Soso 2007). The background offered here 
is however useful to put the Bosnian case and the topic of socioeconomic (in)justice 
within its broader context.  
The economic crisis of the 1980s thus coincided with a struggle for power 
between ‘conservative’ and ‘reformist’ forces for political power after Tito’s death 
                                                          
5 See also Baker 2014 for a discussion of precarity in post-socialist Bosnia, specifically in 
relation to the workforce employed around the international intervention in the country. 
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(Gagnon 2004, 60-61). Conservatives opposed liberalising reforms in the political and 
economic field, and fuelled popular unrest on an ethnic basis rather than a 
socioeconomic one, thus precipitating social conditions and favouring the outbreak 
of conflict (Gagnon 2004, 62-77). As divisions within the Yugoslav elites, and 
especially between the Republics and the Federation, deepened, tensions in Bosnia 
were rising. The country was ethnically mixed: about 43.4% of the population was 
Muslim, 31.2% Serb, and 17.4% Croat, while 5.5% of Bosnians declared themselves 
‘Yugoslavs’ at the 1991 census.6 Citizens were losing faith in the political system after 
a scandal emerged in 1987, when the press published revelations that the largest food 
processing business in the country, Agrokomerc, which employed thousands of 
people in the area of Velika Kladuša (north western BiH), had been financing itself 
with false promissory notes (Pugh and Cooper 2004, 152). The Agrokomerc scandal 
symbolised the crisis of confidence between the public and political elites (Baker 2015, 
33). Political elites were able to use these tensions strategically and mobilise 
ethnically-based political support at the upcoming multi-party elections in 1990. 
Following months of covert preparation, especially on the part of Bosnian Serb VRS7 
forces receiving support from Federal Yugoslavia, the war in Bosnia started in 1992, 
following the referendum through which the Republic declared independence from 
the SFRJ.8 
As most international observers focused on the interethnic dimension of the 
conflict that saw Bosnian Muslim (or Bosniak) forces opposing Bosnian Serb and 
Serbian paramilitary units, and parallel conflicts between Bosnian Croat forces and 
both Serbs and Bosniaks, the story of the war as one of economic clashes, destruction, 
and exchange among opposing factions, ultimately at the expenses of the vast 
majority of Bosnian civilians, went more unnoticed. The political economy of the 
Bosnian war was mostly based on trafficking and on the seizure of social property. 
One of the first international reactions to the outbreak of war was the imposition of 
sanctions that hit all former Yugoslav republics, and contributed to fostering 
                                                          
6 Etnička Obilježja Stanovništva. Rezultati za Repuliku i po Opštinama, 1991. Available at 
http://fzs.ba/index.php/popis-stanovnistva/popis-stanovnistva-1991-i-stariji/>, accessed 
16 November 2016.  
7 VRS stands for Vojska Republike Sprske, the military forces of the Bosnian Serb self-
proclaimed entity during the Bosnian war. 
8 Slovenia and Croatia had already declared independence in 1991. 
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alternative sources of revenue such as trafficking and black markets (Pugh and 
Cooper 2004). Economic power mattered for the military effort, as the case of Velika 
Kladuša clearly illustrates. The former head of Agrokomerc, Fikret Abdić, used the 
economic and political power and resources accumulated over the years, and the 
strategic position of the town at the border between Bosnia and Croatia and at the 
junction of territories held by different warring factions, to establish his own 
Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia in 1993, breaking away from the Bosnian 
government in Sarajevo (Christia 2008, 468; see also Strazzari 2003, 143). Abdić traded 
with the ‘enemy’ Serb forces and enriched himself and his entourage through 
trafficking. Strazzari, who has extensively studied the link between the Balkan wars 
and the development of organised crime, notes that hostilities did not necessarily 
interrupt communication among different nationalist elites (Strazzari 2003, 142). 
Moreover, research shows that black markets often operated in symbiosis with 
international peace operations, for instance by complementing the role of 
international organisations in the distribution of essential humanitarian aid (Andreas 
2009). As the war went on, cities, industries, roads and bridges were shelled, up to 
two thirds of residential property was damaged or destroyed and the Bosnian 
industrial production shrank to 5% of its pre-war level (World Bank 2004, 1). At the 
same time, ethnic cleansing was often accompanied by economic incentives in the 
form of theft of private property, including for instance cars and valuables from 
abandoned homes (Griffiths 1999). Well-connected individuals could profit from the 
war by collaborating in the seizure of productive assets such as factories, which were 
often privatised on an ethnic basis once the conflict came to an end (Donais 2002; 
Pugh 2002).  
The Bosnian War ended in 1995 with the signing of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement,9 after the internationally community was compelled into action by events 
such as the fall of the Srebrenica enclave in 1995. NATO air strikes targeted Bosnian 
Serb troops and helped bring the siege of Sarajevo to an end. The Dayton Agreement 
gave extensive powers to the Office of the High Representative (OHR) of the 
                                                          
9 The official name of Dayton Agreement is General Framework Agreement for Peace in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was initiated in Dayton (Ohio) on 21 November 1995, and 
signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. See the full text here 
<https://www.osce.org/bih/126173?download=true>, last accessed 12 December 2016.  
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international community, including ‘ensuring the efficient implementation of the 
civilian aspects of the peace settlement’ (OHR 1995). A NATO mission, IFOR 
(Implementation Force), was deployed to monitor compliance with the military 
aspects of the Dayton Agreement, and later replaced by the Stabilisation Force 
(SFOR). Both IFOR and SFOR were peace enforcement missions approved under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Throughout the immediate post-war period, several 
UN agencies, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and 
the EU were heavily involved in supporting the state-building process in BiH.  
At the end of the war, Bosnia was politically and economically divided, and 
the political economy of the war affected the post-war transition as well. Broadly 
following the territorial gains made by the different factions during the war, the new 
Constitution (adopted as Annex IV of the Dayton Peace Agreement) recognised two 
entities constituting BiH: the Bosnian Serb Republika Srpska (RS) and the Bosniak-
Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH). A small central government and 
a tripartite presidency would guarantee the unity of the country and take on key 
functions in the military, monetary and foreign policy sector (OHR 1995). From an 
economic point of view, not only was Bosnia cut off from the Yugoslav market of 
which it had been part, but the territorial divisions fragmented domestic markets and 
deeply affected the country’s chances of recovery. The country’s population shrank10 
because of war casualties and refugee flows, and a large part of the population 
suffered from some form of material loss (Valiñas, Parmentier and Weitekamp 2009: 
19). The international community was not always able to devise appropriate 
responses to the situation on the ground. For instance, when a large market for 
trafficked goods (including human beings) sprung up in the outskirts of Brčko and 
boosted the economy of the region, international organisations supported it based on 
preconceived assumptions about the role of free market exchange in restoring good 
interethnic relations (Haynes 2010). While Fikret Abdić was eventually convicted (for 
war crimes), many other individuals who enriched themselves through the war were 
                                                          
10 Bosnia has today almost 500.000 inhabitants less than in 1991. See Cenzus of Population, 
Households and Dwellings in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2013, Final Results, Agencija Za Statistiku 
Bosne i Hercegovine, Sarajevo, June 2016, available at 
<http://www.popis2013.ba/popis2013/doc/Popis2013prvoIzdanje.pdf>, accessed 29 
November 2016.  
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able to continue with more or less legitimate businesses in its aftermath.11 Pugh and 
Cooper conclude that post-conflict intervention ‘failed to counter the economic 
interests of these entrepreneurs in maintaining a weak, fragmental state’, and 
neoliberal policies further contributed to this (Pugh and Cooper 2004, 145).  
The dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian War thus had important 
economic dimensions that are less often placed at the centre of peacebuilding and 
transitional justice studies. The economic dimension of war and its implications for 
the post-war transition clearly show that the Bosnian case is very relevant for the 
study of the socioeconomic dimension of transitional justice, which represents the 
focus of this thesis. While this section has only provided a background of the case, 
the political-economic aspects of the transition, in the form of socioeconomic 
transitional justice measures and post-socialist reforms, are also crucial for 
understanding the development of justice claims in Bosnia, and are therefore 
analysed more in depth in Chapter 3. This Introduction now turns to defining the 
scope of this thesis, its intended contributions and chapter layout. 
 
 
Scope and aims of the research 
The research design of the thesis will be presented in more detail in Chapter 1 and 2, 
which include the review of the literature, theoretical framework and methodology 
of the project. At this point, after presenting the research question and case 
background, it is however necessary to distinguish between what the thesis is trying 
to achieve and what it is not. First, the aim of the thesis is to challenge established 
assumptions on the meaning of justice in transitional societies. In particular, it points 
towards the importance of socioeconomic issues that have been marginalised but are 
potentially very relevant to the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This critical 
approach informs the investigation of experiences of socioeconomic injustice and 
justice claims conducted in the empirical chapters of the thesis. While engaging with 
themes and questions that belong in transitional justice field, the research also pushes 
its boundaries in new directions, by bringing to the surface the connections between 
                                                          
11 After being released, Abdić restarted his political career and was recently elected mayor of 
Velika Kladuša. 
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transitional justice and other concomitant processes that shape it, such as the 
transition from socialism to market economy. At the grassroots level, which is the 
vantage point of this thesis, such processes become inevitably entangled, and 
therefore the analytical separation between them remains useful insofar as it does not 
prevent us from investigating how they are actually interconnected in practice. What 
this thesis does not do, however, is questioning the importance of other transitional 
justice endeavours, such as establishing individual criminal accountability for 
violations of IHL (International Humanitarian Law), processes of truth-finding, and 
so on. The case made here for the relevance of socioeconomic justice is not meant to 
diminish the importance of dealing with war crimes, crimes against humanity, or 
genocide. In fact, the thesis shows that these matter also within the context of 
socioeconomic injustice in Prijedor and Zenica.  
The second clarification to be made here is that the political economy of the 
post-war and post-socialist transition is analysed from the perspective of justice 
processes, and thus according to the purpose of the thesis. In presenting the 
limitations of the liberal transitional project, and the ways in which they affect 
marginalised social groups (workers, civic protesters unaffiliated with the organised 
civil society sector) that are usually excluded from the formal processes of dealing 
with the past, the following chapters do not directly take issue with the effectiveness 
or appropriateness of specific economic reforms. What emerges clearly, though, and 
falls within the remit of this project, is that the international community’s approach 
to socioeconomic issues was – from a justice perspective – limited. While a discussion 
of the origins or specific features of the international community’s neoliberal 
approach is beyond the scope of this research, the thesis is still able to show the (often 
harmful) implications that post-socialist reforms had for the justice claims emerging 
from local communities in Prijedor and Zenica.  
Lastly, from a methodological point of view, the scope of the thesis is defined 
by the question of how we can study justice processes that occur at the margins of 
official ones, below the surface. As a result, the thesis moves away from studying 
how recognised and established actors deal with post-war justice issues, turning 
instead towards subordinated, marginalised groups. It is with this goal in mind that 
research locations and target groups were selected. The thesis’ central argument 
regarding the role of socioeconomic justice is thus illustrated with reference to the 
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cities of Prijedor and Zenica (rather than more thoroughly researched areas like 
Sarajevo). In order to research how war experience and post-war transition shape the 
development of justice claims, the thesis thus focuses on one location where 
interethnic violence was a prominent feature of the conflict (Prijedor) and one where 
it was not (Zenica). The choice of research participants in the two cities also follows 
similar criteria, privileging social groups who are not usually part of research projects 
on transitional justice, such as former workers, and people who are not affiliated with 
victims’ associations or civil society.12  
This research aspires to show that the study of post-war justice processes 
requires a more multi-faceted approach, and that the conception of justice promoted 
by international actors in post-conflict contexts cannot be taken as definitive. Through 
a critical theoretical framework that interrogates the boundaries of justice as a concept 
and as a practice, this study intends to demonstrate the relevance of socioeconomic 
justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina. An in-depth study was considered more suitable 
to an emerging field where empirical material is still scarce, and theories are still 
being built or refined. Lastly, the thesis extends an invitation to apply a similar 
approach to studying justice issues in other settings, to understand how different 
aspects of justice have been emphasised as a result of the political conditions of the 
transition, and it suggests where we should look in order to uncover the more hidden 
dimensions of justice processes in those contexts.  
 
  
Contributions of the thesis  
This work contributes to ongoing debates within the literature on the socioeconomic 
dimension of transitional justice processes. Socioeconomic justice within transitional 
justice has been understood, broadly speaking, in two ways. On the one hand, it has 
been defined as a type of remedy offered for violations or crimes that are not 
necessarily socioeconomic in nature. Reparation programmes are an example of this 
understanding (Posner and Vermeule 2003; de Greiff 2006). On the other hand, 
scholars have recently started questioning how transitional justice can address 
                                                          
12 Interviews were also conducted in the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo, with international 
officials and activists, and in other towns around Bosnia where the 2014 protest movement 
was active. See Chapter 2 for a more comprehensive explanation of the research design.  
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socioeconomic violence, or if it should at all (Arbour 2007; Waldorf 2012; Sharp 2014). 
I suggest that the current debate fails to adequately conceptualise the relationship 
between socioeconomic justice and transitional justice. First, my work reinterprets 
Nancy Fraser’s arguments about the nature of justice claims (1995, 2003, 2009) within 
the context of post-war, transitional societies. Justice claims emerging in these 
contexts are characterised by the peculiar role played by the war in producing 
injustice, as well as by the amplified international influence on the process of 
adjudicating justice claims. Second, it addresses the relationship between different 
dimensions of justice processes by redefining justice as a contested concept and 
practice. From the perspective of local communities experiencing injustice, cultural, 
socioeconomic and political dimensions intersect and overlap. Moreover, post-war 
justice processes involve struggles related to who is the bearer of justice claims, and 
how these claims are put forward in processes of public deliberation.  
One of the problematic aspects of the transitional justice literature on 
socioeconomic justice is that there is a lack of empirical studies on the role of 
socioeconomic violence in war, and how this affects the development of justice claims 
in the aftermath of the conflict. With the development of transitional justice into a 
successful field of practice, scholars have increasingly focused on the way in which 
transitional justice mechanisms reflect and put into play international norms of 
accountability and/or ideas of reconciliation. My study of the development of 
socioeconomic justice claims in Bosnia and Herzegovina shows that justice claims can 
develop outside of such a paradigm, coexist or contrast with it. The research shows 
that socioeconomic injustice occupied a central place in wartime experiences of local 
communities, and that it deeply influenced the type of justice claims emerging from 
the local level in the aftermath of the conflict. It also emphasises that groups putting 
forward justice claims can be defined on a socioeconomic basis in addition to the 
commonly used ethnic one. Their claims are also more comprehensive than what the 
transitional justice framework would expect. The research contributes to showing the 
ambivalent effects of internationally-sponsored justice discourses and various types 
of reforms have on local conceptions of justice. While based on wartime experiences 
and memories of the past, the development of socioeconomic justice claims is affected 
by the way in which the international intervention operates in a specific local context. 
Feeding into social mobilisation, these justice claims can represent a transformative 
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attempt at challenging the way in which the transition process was conducted.  The 
lens through which we view and analyse experiences of injustice and conceptions of 
justice matters. While my empirical findings are specific to Bosnia, the importance of 
adopting a socioeconomic justice perspective when studying justice processes can be 
extended to other post-war and post-authoritarian contexts. 
Thirdly, my thesis contributes to the analysis of the practice of international 
interventions in post-war societies. The critical peacebuilding and transitional justice 
literature has already identified a ‘nexus’ between these different but interrelated 
aspects of post-war intervention. My thesis takes a slightly different perspective, and 
shows that the analysis of transitional justice within the context of political and 
economic reforms aimed at completing Bosnia’s transition towards a market 
economy is also essential for understanding the importance of socioeconomic justice 
and injustice. While on the one hand transitional justice is thought to be supportive 
to the process of democratisation and liberalisation, the thesis shows that it also 
operates within the constraints imposed by such policies. Neoliberal economic 
reforms effectively aimed at tackling socioeconomic problems deriving from 
experiences of injustice, but do so by following market logics rather than justice 
principles. This reinforces a limited understanding of justice claims on the part of 
international actors, and marginalises or aggravates the concerns of affected local 
communities. One of the implications of my work is thus that the study of justice 
processes and transitional justice mechanisms, especially when in relation to 
socioeconomic issues, cannot be conducted in isolation from the political and 
economic reforms implemented in the country, often with the support of 
international organisations and financial institutions. 
 
 
Thesis outline  
The thesis begins with a review of the literature. Chapter 1 addresses the state of 
academic debates on the socioeconomic dimension of transitional justice, and points 
at two fundamental weaknesses: the underlying definitional confusion on the topic, 
and insufficient empirical studies on how socioeconomic violence manifests itself at 
times of conflict and on how post-war societies deal with it. While studies on the 
socioeconomic dimension of transitional justice are thus scarce, they have also not 
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engaged with post-war justice issues in the former Yugoslavia, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in particular. This chapter also looks into the contribution of scholarly 
studies of post-war Bosnia in the field of transitional justice, peacebuilding and post-
conflict reform and reconstruction, and their limitations. The study of socioeconomic 
justice calls for integrating research approaches and findings from the field 
transitional justice, peacebuilding and reconstruction, and post-socialist transitions 
to democracy and market economy. It is argued here that conducting research on 
socioeconomic justice requires establishing a common thread between these separate 
traditions and approaches, one that highlights the interconnections of the different 
facets of the international intervention in transitional countries. Chapter 1 thus sets 
the basis for both the theoretical contribution of the thesis, which will develop a more 
systematic approach for considering socioeconomic justice within transitional justice, 
and for the forthcoming empirical discussion that addresses the lack of studies on 
experiences of socioeconomic injustice and conceptions of justice developing from 
the bottom up. 
Building on this, Chapter 2 elaborates the theoretical framework of the thesis. 
Drawing on the contribution of critical scholars that have challenged the conventional 
aims of transitional justice (Lambourne 2009, 2014; Sharp 2014), and on Nancy 
Fraser’s work on the nature of justice claims (1995, 2003), I define socioeconomic 
justice as redistribution. This conceptual framework questions established 
understandings of transitional justice and encourages the analysis of justice processes 
from the perspective of the communities that take part in them. This 
conceptualisation of socieoconomic justice as redistribution also engages with the 
constraints or challenges posed by the ‘post-socialist’ and ‘post-war’ context of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and the tension between backward-looking politics of dealing with 
the past and the forward-looking dimension of redistributive justice. Chapter 2 also 
puts emphasis on the fact that justice is a contested concept, where different 
dimensions overlap, and a practice that involves struggles in democratic processes of 
deliberation. In the case of Bosnia, these are affected by the intervention of 
international actors that play an important role in the process of adjudicating justice 
claims and establishing the meaning of post-conflict justice. In sum, the first part of 
Chapter 2 develops the theoretical contribution of the thesis in full – which is then 
articulated through the empirical chapters – in rethinking the relationship between 
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socioeconomic justice and transitional justice and the emergence of socioeconomic 
justice claims within the context of transition and international intervention.  
The second part of this chapter outlines the research design, beginning with 
the methodological approach adopted in the study. The case analysed in this thesis 
contributes to our understanding of transitional justice processes by providing in-
depth insights into post-war societies deal with socioeconomic injustice, and linking 
these observations to the external forces shaping them. Chapter 2 defines the 
methodological approach of the thesis, the selection of research locations, 
interviewees, and methods of data collection and analysis. The study of 
socioeconomic injustice and development of justice claims is conducted in two 
Bosnian cities: Prijedor and Zenica. Despite having a common industrial background 
and history of development during socialist times, the two cities went through very 
different experiences during the war. Prijedor came under Bosnian Serb control in 
1992, and a campaign of ethnic cleansing followed which led most Muslims and 
Croats to flee the town. Zenica remained under Bosniak control, and did not 
experience systematic crimes against civilians to the same extent. Prijedor remained 
part of Republika Srpska, while Zenica is today part of the FBiH. Comparing these 
two cities provides a unique opportunity to understand how, in varying 
circumstances, Bosnian people experienced socioeconomic violence and injustice. 
The thesis relies on interviews conducted with people in Prijedor and Zenica, as well 
in other parts of Bosnia to study mobilisation around socioeconomic issues, and in 
Sarajevo to gather the views of international officials working in the country.  
The empirical chapters follow this introductory part of the dissertation. Before 
going into the detailed analysis of local experiences and conceptions of justice, 
Chapter 3 discusses how transitional justice and socioeconomic reform address (or 
fail to address) socioeconomic justice issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina. On the one 
hand, international officials understand justice issues as mostly linked to the 
prosecution of war crimes and establishment of the rule of law. When socioeconomic 
issues are addressed by transitional justice programmes, this is mostly in relation to 
providing economic remedies to victims, either in the form of restitution or 
reparation. In addition to having a narrow focus, Chapter 3 shows that these 
measures are applied in an inconsistent and incomplete manner that curbs their 
transformative potential. On the other hand, neoliberal economic reforms set out to 
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address some of the most serious socioeconomic problems that affected the Bosnian 
society after the war, but did so based on economic logics rather than justice 
considerations, thus contributing to marginalising socioeconomic justice concerns. 
This contributes to showing how the analysis of justice processes cannot overlook the 
role that international policies play in affecting social and economic conditions in 
post-war societies, and thus how transitional justice forms part and is shaped by other 
aspects of the international intervention that are not often put in relation with it by 
the literature, such as economic restructuring.  
Chapter 4 provides empirical evidence on how common experiences of 
socioeconomic injustice were in Prijedor and Zenica during the war, and how these 
spilled over into the transition period as well. Socioeconomic injustice varies from 
extreme material deprivation, to unjust dismissal from work, and social 
marginalization and exclusion. While sharing many features, experiences of 
socioeconomic injustice in the two cities differ to some extent, based on the different 
wartime experiences they went through. In Prijedor socioeconomic injustice 
overlapped with cultural injustice in the form of ethnically-based violence. 
Interethnic violence is much less central to the experiences of injustice narrated by 
citizens of Zenica, which revolve around the decline of the city as an industrial centre, 
and the great loss of identity and means of survival that came with it. Chapter 4 thus 
represents the first building block of the empirical contribution of this thesis to the 
literature on the socioeconomic dimension of transitional justice, by illustrating its 
relevance in the Bosnian case through an in-depth analysis of these two cities. The 
chapter not only shows the overlap between interethnic violence and socioeconomic 
injustice, but it also identifies instances in which second-order issues of political 
representation also become part of justice claims emerging from local communities.  
Chapter 5 proceeds by showing how justice claims are formulated based on 
the experiences of socioeconomic injustice discussed in Chapter 4, but also in relation 
to the context of the international intervention, especially in the field of transitional 
justice and socioeconomic reform. Conceptions of socioeconomic justice also draw on 
memories of the socialist past, which is often considered the standard for a just 
society, at least in economic terms. In both Prijedor and Zenica, this leads respondents 
to focus on issues such as employment and access to welfare, but also – and signaling 
again an overlap between recognition, redistribution and representation – the 
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position of non-Serbs citizens in Republika Srpska, and the accountability of 
ArcelorMittal for air pollution in Zenica. Differences between the two cities appear 
again as in the previous chapter, in relation to the justice claims put forward by 
interviewees. The transitional justice narrative focused on recognition offers partial 
acknowledgment of experiences of injustice suffered by non-Serbs in Prijedor, but not 
in Zenica. Interviewees in Zenica experience the international intervention more in 
terms of economic reform that has brought further damage to their city, and thus 
propose transformative and forward-looking remedies for injustice that challenge the 
way in which the transition process was conducted. In Prijedor, on the other hand, 
there is a stronger tendency towards present-oriented remedies that address the 
consequences of injustice without necessarily challenging the underlying system that 
produced the injustice in the first place. Through this analysis of the way in which 
socioeconomic justice claims, and remedies for injustice, are conceptualised at the 
local level, Chapter 5 further contributes to illustrating the central place that 
socioeconomic justice occupies in post-war societies, and to our conceptual 
understanding of the relationship between socioeconomic justice and transitional 
justice. 
The thesis concludes with an analysis of the role that socioeconomic justice 
claims can play in social mobilisation. Looking at the case of the 2014 protests, 
Chapter 6 traces the origins of the claims made by protesters back to the forms of 
socioeconomic injustice analysed in Chapter 4, and puts these in connection with the 
conceptions of justice expressed by interviewees in Chapter 5. Drawing from the 
work of activists from the progressive left, and from the civic mobilisations that 
occurred in different parts of Bosnia over the past years, the 2014 mobilisation grew 
out of workers’ frustration in Tuzla and quickly broadened in participation and 
scope. Socioeconomic issues were linked with broader political problems, once again 
showing the overlap between different types of justice claims. The protesters adopted 
a transformative approach to the justice claims raised, broadening citizens’ 
participation through the use of open assemblies (plenum), which contrasted with 
the perceived closure of formal avenues of political participation within the Dayton 
system. Even when faced with such a powerful articulation of socioeconomic 
grievances, the international community did not engage with these as justice claims. 
Rather, Chapter 6 shows how these were interpreted as problems to be tackled 
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through socioeconomic reforms that would complete Bosnia’s transition to a market 
economy. This chapter completes the empirical study carried out in this thesis, as well 
as providing further illustration of the multidimensional nature of justice claims in 
post-war and transitional societies. Ultimately, it shows that post-war justice 
processes develop through contestation and mobilization rather than simply as a 
result of the normative drive of transitional justice ideals. 
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CHAPTER 1 
A TALE OF TWO COUNTRIES? POST-WAR AND POST-




This chapter’s aim is to outline the role of existing literature and debates in advancing 
our understanding of socioeconomic justice, transitional justice, and of the case of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and identify the ways in which this thesis can originally 
contribute to these. Given the thesis’ focus on the role of socioeconomic justice and 
injustice in war and transition in the Bosnian case, Chapter 1 addresses the following 
questions: what is the state of academic debates on the socioeconomic dimension of 
transitional justice? What can scholarly studies of post-war Bosnia, in the field of 
transitional justice, peacebuilding and post-conflict reform and reconstruction 
contribute to this project, and what are their limitations? The overarching argument 
that is proposed is here is that recent debates on socioeconomic justice and 
transitional justice are in need of further theoretical and empirical development, and 
that they have not engaged with post-war justice issues in the former Yugoslavia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina in particular. 
Transitional justice debates on socioeconomic issues are not necessarily new. 
Reparations and restitution are commonly included within programmes that deal 
with the consequences of violence and in war or under authoritarian regimes (see for 
instance the definitions provided by Elster 2004, 1; ICTJ 2009; Hayner 2011, 8). More 
recently, however, and especially after the intervention of former ICTY and ICTR 
prosecutor Louise Arbour (2007), scholars have been discussing the importance of 
remedying to socioeconomic violence or injustice. Her remarks signalled a critical 
shift in the debate and gave prominence to the question of how social and economic 
justice for societies in transitions could be effectively conceptualised and achieved. 
The review of the literature presented over the coming pages shows that there is still 
little agreement on this matter, and that further conceptual work is needed to define 
what socioeconomic justice as part of the transitional justice paradigm might mean 
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or entail. Moreover, empirical studies on the relevance of socioeconomic violence in 
post-conflict and post-authoritarian contexts are still in short supply, and tend not to 
engage with the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina (or the former Yugoslav region, 
more broadly). This chapter also shows, however, that studies on transitional justice, 
peacebuilding and reconstruction processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina are not 
lacking, and their contribution to setting the basis for this project must be recognised.  
This literature review thus identifies two major trajectories in the scholarship 
focusing on Bosnia and Herzegovina which are relevant for this project. On one hand, 
the end of the war in 1995 raised pressing questions regarding justice and 
accountability. Bosnia was thus in transition from a period of war characterised by 
widespread violence to one of peace, which was enforced by the international 
community. On the other hand, with the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the following 
conflicts Bosnia ceased to be part of a socialist federation and was on its way to 
becoming a liberal democracy embracing market economy. Compared to Eastern 
European countries, however, it faced the additional challenge of peacebuilding and 
post-war reconstruction. Issues regarding economic and welfare reform came to the 
forefront, bearing important consequences for a population already badly affected by 
the war. This chapter argues that academic scholarship, with some exceptions, has 
mostly kept separated the analysis of post-war Bosnia from that of post-socialist 
Bosnia, with the former receiving more attention than the latter. In other words, the 
consequences of the war and post-war justice issues are analytically separated from 
the process of institutional and economic reform which normally characterises 
transitions from socialism to market democracy. This artificial separation conceals 
the connections between different forms of intervention that characterised the 
Bosnian scenario, ranging from transitional justice, to peacebuilding and 
reconstruction and post-socialist reforms. Connecting the study of post-war justice 
issues to other aspects of the transition, such as post-socialist reform, is crucial for the 
study of socioeconomic justice, as the following chapters will illustrate. 
Chapter 1 is structured as follows. After a short introduction to the concept of 
transitional justice and the way in which it has evolved over the past decades, Section 
1.1 addresses the debates on the socioeconomic dimension of transitional justice. It 
outlines the disagreements over its definition, and different positions over whether 
socioeconomic justice should be part of transitional justice at all. Scholars have also 
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put forward different proposals as to how socioeconomic justice could be included in 
transitional justice programmes, but this has rarely been done with reference to 
empirical studies on specific local conditions. Leaving open the question of how can 
we best conceptualise socioeconomic justice and its relationship to transitional 
justice, the chapter then moves on to discussing scholarly studies post-war Bosnia. 
Section 1.2 discusses the transitional justice literature, which offers important insights 
into the complexities of the relationship between an invasive international 
intervention and local actors. The review also shows that there is little overlap or 
interaction between this body of scholarship and the processes of social and economic 
transformation that are crucial for this project.1 Section 1.3 then opens with a brief 
note on the study of post-socialist transitions in Eastern Europe. In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, however, this transition started before the war, and occurred in 
conjunction with the conflict itself and the ensuing post-conflict reconstruction, often 
linked to peacebuilding projects. This section reviews the contributions of these 
studies to understanding the political economy of post-war Bosnia, while also 
highlighting its limitations in engaging with post-war justice issues. The chapter 
concludes by restating the need for a better conceptualisation of socioeconomic 
justice and its relationship to transitional justice, and calling for addressing the 
notable absence of studies on socioeconomic justice in post-war Bosnia.  
 
 
1.1 Transitional justice and its socioeconomic dimension  
The field of transitional justice is primarily concerned with the problem of justice in 
transitional contexts, and more specifically how societies deal with the consequences 
of mass violence in the aftermath of war or after the fall of authoritarian, repressive 
regimes. One of its most common definitions describes transitional justice as ‘the 
conception of justice associated with periods of political change, charachterized by 
legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes’ 
(Teitel 2003, 69). Here Teitel does not identify a specific meaning for the term ‘justice’, 
as she argues that its specific historical manifestations have been influenced by 
                                                          
1 Although some studies have begun taking post-socialism and its relation to the war and 
post-war transition more seriously, see for instance Horvat and Štiks (2015). 
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political circumstances and in turn have been constitutive of the political transition 
itself (Teitel 2000, 6). Her definition, however, does put emphasis on the judicial 
dimension of this process, reflecting the way in which transitional justice practice has 
developed over time. Other definitions have contributed to delimiting the boundaries 
of this practice. They generally emphasise that political transitions are characterised 
by various attempts to deal with crimes committed by previous regimes or during 
wars (Roht-Arriaza 2006, 2; Elster 2004, 1), not exclusively through legal means. 
Transitional justice can thus be seen as a ‘set of practices’ or as a process composed 
of different elements, where the work of judicial mechanisms needs to be 
complemented by lustration processes, commissions, transparency policies, 
reparations, memorials to the victims and different types of reform (Hayner 2011, 8). 
Transitional justice most often refers to state policies adopted to address past crimes, 
but non-official institutions and initiatives coming from the civil society sector have 
also been included within the remit of this concept (Barahona De Brito et al. 2006).  
It has been convincingly argued that the specific conditions of the political 
transitions can influence the choice of transitional justice mechanism, and these have 
evolved over time (Teitel 2003). While scholars have diverging opinions as to the 
origins of transitional justice efforts,2 the most contemporary cases often identified 
are the transitions in in Southern Europe in the 1970s-1980s (Greece, Portugal and 
Spain), Latin America in the 1980s-1990s (Argentina, Chile, Paraguay, Bolivia and 
Central American countries), Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War, and South 
Africa in the 1990s. Especially in earlier phases, transition was meant to characterise 
the process of evolving from a dictatorial/authoritarian to a democratic regime, in 
specific geographic settings such as South America (Kritz 1995; Teitel 2000; Barahona 
De Brito et al. 2006; Lessa 2013), and provide legitimacy to the new political systems 
(Teitel 2003, 89). With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of civil wars in the 
former Yugoslavia, as well as Central and West Africa, transitional justice has become 
increasingly associated with legalism, and linked to peacebuilding interventions 
informed by liberal assumptions. McEvoy (2009, 20-21) argues that legalism is often 
                                                          
2 Different attempts at tracing the origins of the practice of transitional justice have set the 
post-Second World War Tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo as the first expression of 
transitional justice (Orentlicher 1991; Teitel 2003). Elster (2004) traces its origins back to 
ancient Athens. 
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seen as an attractive option during transition because it represents objectivity and 
certainty in times of change, and because it anchors state practices to universal human 
rights norms.  
It is indeed through judicial institutions that transitional justice has extended 
its reach globally over the past few decades, and has become increasingly associated 
with post-conflict contexts and peacebuilding initiatives, compared to the earlier 
transitions from authoritarian rule in South America and South Africa.3 The mandate 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is perhaps the clearest example of 
institutionalisation of transitional justice, covering genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes (Schabas 2011; Bosco 2014).  While its existence makes 
potentially unnecessary any effort towards the creation of special international 
tribunals such as the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), the International Criminal Court still suffers from lack of legitimacy and 
resources, and by the threatened withdrawal of several of its members. Following 
repeated calls for the local ownership of transitional justice processes, domestic 
judiciaries have become more involved in trials for human rights violations. In the 
case of the Balkans, following an initial phase in which the ICTY was leading the 
process, the international community engaged in an effective capacity- and 
institution-building project aimed at localising a large part of war crimes 
prosecutions.4 National courts in Bosnia, as well Croatia and Serbia, are now engaged 
in a number of war crimes trials which are possibly more likely to convey a sense of 
justice to the population. Some national courts have become involuntarily involved 
in transitional justice cases. This is the case of the Dutch courts to which Srebrenica 
survivors have turned in order to get compensation for the mistakes of the 
international community, personified by the Dutch battalion based in Srebrenica in 
July 1995 (Nettelfield 2010), or the use of US Courts to file claims for reparations 
under the Alien Tort Claims Act against Radovan Karadžić (de Vlaming and Clark 
2014, 167), and cases in other European courts (Ibid. 170-173). In addition, after Bosnia 
tried – unsuccessfully – to sustain a case against Serbian authorities’ complicity in the 
                                                          
3 Indeed, McEvoy has characterised the development of transitional justice (as a field of 
study and as a practice) as occurring at the crossroads of ‘democratization, human rights 
protections, and state-reconstruction after conflict’ (McEvoy 2007, 412). 
4 This include the establishment of the hybrid (Bosnian and international) War Crimes 
Chamber in the newly created State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
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genocide committed in Srebrenica at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (SáCouto 
2007), Croatia and Serbia have made similar attempts, which were also rejected.5  
Many of the critiques of the liberal assumptions of transitional justice consider 
legalism to be part of the problem, as judicial mechanisms are most often imposed 
from the top-down, initiated by Western actors and populated by Western experts 
(Sriram 2007, 589). Andrieu (2010, 554) argues that legalistic approaches have 
detached transitional justice from local communities, creating a ‘deep disjunction’ 
between legal justice and ‘justice that is embedded in communities’. As Nagy (2008, 
277) points out with respect to Teitel’s arguments, transitional justice is explicitly 
concerned with ‘bringing “illiberal” regimes into the fold of liberal democracy’, and 
‘treats established democracies as benevolent models’. There is also a concern, among 
some critical scholars, that the implications of the inherently assumed desirability of 
the liberal model have not been sufficiently explored (see Franzki and Olarte 2014, 
203-204). Judicial mechanisms have indeed characterised the transitional justice 
approach taken by the international community in Bosnia. The way in which the 
choice of these mechanisms might reflect liberal priorities is important in order to 
understand the possible reasons behind the marginalisation of socioeconomic justice, 
whose scope could potentially go beyond establishing democratic regimes that are 
politically and economically liberal. Without intending to diminish the importance of 
establishing individual accountability for violations of IHL, the thesis focuses instead 
on some of the debates that developed precisely from the growing awareness of the 




1.1.1 The challenge of defining socioeconomic justice for societies in transition  
The debate on the socioeconomic dimension of transitional justice developed from 
the growing awareness that an approach too focused on criminal justice could not 
deal with the whole universe of consequences of mass crimes. Recent scholarly work 
has thus shifted the focus from an exclusive preoccupation with serious violations of 
                                                          
5 These attempts are illustrative of the increasing reach of transitional justice principles, but 
even more of their politicised use.  
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civil and political rights to directly addressing socioeconomic rights and violence. As 
noted by Hecht and Michalowski, work is still in progress, as ‘concepts that are 
relevant for this relatively new research area need to be explored and boundaries to 
be drawn’ (2012, 1). The debate is thus at an early stage, and scholars have mostly 
been answering questions concerning how to define socioeconomic justice, what is 
its place within the transitional justice paradigm and which mechanisms could best 
promote socioeconomic justice goals. This development is welcome, but – as the 
following review shows – much of this discussion is indeed taking place at the 
theoretical level, and empirical research is still under development. This section 
advances the debate on socioeconomic justice by attempting to provide an organising 
principle to the unstructured debate on socioeconomic justice, and clarify where more 
theoretical work is needed. This is followed by a review of some of the claims 
advanced by the literature which would benefit from further empirical investigation 
in different transitional contexts. 
A first group of authors defines socioeconomic justice in terms of the remedy 
proposed for the crime, that is, economic or material compensation for a certain crime 
or injustice that was not necessarily economic. This is the traditional understanding 
underpinning the practice of reparations, defined as ‘compensation, usually of a 
material kind and often specifically monetary, for some past wrong’ (Torpey 2003, 3), 
commonly with the aim of recognising the harm suffered, and promoting civic trust 
and solidarity (de Greiff 2006). According to this perspective, the remedy provided is 
economic, while the crime or violation committed not necessarily is. Reparations 
have been provided for crimes that were not primarily economic, such as the 
Holocaust or the internment of Japanese Americans during the Second World War, 
as well as for economic crimes including, for instance, the expropriation of private 
property by communist regimes in Eastern Europe. Pablo de Greiff analyses the 
conceptual relationship between justice and reparations in his contribution to the 
edited Handbook of Reparations, which also includes a number of case studies on 
reparation programmes (de Greiff 2006). According to de Greiff, reparations can be 
understood in two fundamentally different ways. In a legal sense, reparations are 
‘measures that may be employed to redress the various types of harms that victims 
may have suffered as a consequence of certain crimes’ (de Greiff 2006, 452). However, 
this type of approach to reparations is only possible when the deviation from legal 
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norms is exceptional. When violations of human rights occur on a large scale, 
reparations cannot be awarded to individuals through the judicial system. In those 
instances, reparations may refer to a ‘massive’ programme set to ‘provide benefits 
directly to the victims of certain crimes’ (Ibid., 453). 
Also writing about reparations, Posner and Vermeule (2003, 691) restrict their 
definition to programmes that ‘provide payment (in cash or in kind) to a large group 
of claimants’ when legal redress for the violations suffered is not available. Thus, their 
study mostly analyses reparations paid by governments (Ibid., 696-697). A further 
element characterising the authors’ definition of reparations is that these schemes are 
‘justified on the basis of backward-looking reasons’, thus providing compensation for 
past crimes rather than forward-looking, distributive justice aimed at the future 
welfare of the population (Posner and Vermeule 2003, 692). In this sense, reparations 
‘stand poised, uneasily, between ordinary remedies and large-scale transfer 
programs’ (Ibid., 693). This stance contrasts starkly with the view of authors like 
Torpey (2001, 2003), whose work analyses current trends in reparation politics. 
Noting their increasing relevance over the years, he identifies three types of sources 
for reparation claims: the Second World War, transitions from authoritarian rule, and 
anticolonial movements (Torpey 2001, 335-336). Demands for reparations are then 
classified in two types. The first type responds to past victimization for which the 
claimants are still suffering today, for instance on a psychological level. The second 
type of demands derives from the consequences of a past system of domination 
whose effects continue to disadvantage the groups that were suffering from it 
(Torpey 2001, 337). Contrary to Posner and Vermeule’s definition, Torpey sees this 
type of claims as fundamentally forward-looking, as reparations are ‘a means of 
transforming the current conditions of deprivation suffered by the groups in question 
and are more frequently connected to projects of social transformation than 
commemorative projects’ (Torpey 2001, 337). One aspect that, nonetheless, Torpey’s 
work shares with Posner and Vermeule is the definition of the socioeconomic aspect 
of transitional justice primarily in terms of the remedy proposed (reparations), while 
the crimes committed include different types of violations, including – but not limited 
to – economic crimes.  
Reparations are also considered a key part of peacebuilding processes 
(Firchow and Mac Ginty 2013), especially those including a transitional justice 
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component. The increased emphasis placed on their transformative or ‘emancipatory’ 
potential (Brett and Malagon 2013) should not, moreover, conceal their equally 
important symbolic meaning (Brown 2013). These recent studies are representative 
of a renewed concern for transformative approaches to justice, such as that advocated 
by Lambourne (2009, 2014). Her ‘transformative justice model’, situated within the 
peacebuilding paradigm, blends elements of retributive and restorative justice 
(Lambourne 2014, 21-22). In Lambourne’s definition, socioeconomic justice 
‘incorporates the various elements of justice that relate to financial or other material 
compensation, restitution or reparation for past violations or crimes (historical 
justice) and distributive or socioeconomic justice in the future (prospective justice)’ 
(Lambourne 2014, 28-29).  
At the other end of the spectrum, scholars have defined in greater detail the 
socioeconomic nature of violations and crimes committed, and discussed their 
potential inclusion within transitional justice processes.  This does not necessarily 
divert the focus away from discussing economic remedies, but identifies a different 
perspective from which the relationship between socioeconomic justice and 
transitional justice can be defined. The need to define the socioeconomic aspect of 
injustice originates from the relevance of the ‘still largely undefined economic and 
social dimensions of conflict and repression’ (Hecht and Michalowski 2012, 1). 
Authors in this tradition commonly complain that violations of socioeconomic rights 
have taken second place in post-conflict justice efforts, despite their relevance for the 
populations affected.  
Even within this group, views diverge substantially. Some authors argue for 
focusing on established socioeconomic rights (Arbour 2007, Szoke-Burke 2015) or on 
‘subsistence harms’ (Sankey 2014). Subsistence harms are defined as ‘deprivations of 
the physical, mental and social needs of human subsistence, perpetrated against 
individuals or populations in situations of armed conflict or as an act of political 
repression, where the perpetrator acts with intent or with knowledge of the inevitable 
consequences of such deprivations’ (Sankey 2014, 122). This legalistic focus and 
narrow definition would allow courts to adjudicate cases related to the most serious 
violations of socioeconomic rights, ‘since the cause effect relationship between the 
perpetration of the deprivation and the experience of the harm is much stronger’ 
(Sankey 2014, 129). Arbour, focusing on the relevance of socioeconomic rights 
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violations during conflict, argues that transitional justice’s neglect of socioeconomic 
rights is due to the widespread belief that civil and political rights are sufficient to 
provide the basis of an equitable society, and that socioeconomic rights will naturally 
develop through economic and social growth (Arbour 2007, 10).  
Other authors propose a more systemic approach to socioeconomic violence 
and injustice (Mullen 2015; Evans 2016). As Sharp (2014, 5) points out, economic 
violence includes, but goes beyond, violations of social and economic rights.  Still 
within this group, Laplante develops a continuum highlighting the different justice 
aims of reparations, ranging from the compensation for the violation of a right to the 
remedying of ‘historical social and economic inequalities’ (Laplante 2014, 66-70), 
which constitutes socioeconomic justice. Laplante is thus adopting a structural 
definition of socioeconomic justice which can clearly be distinguished from Sankey’s 
narrow understanding of subsistence harms, and from Arbour’s focus on identifiable 
socioeconomic rights. Miller (2008, 267-268) also suggests that economic issues are 
often downplayed as root causes of conflicts despite their relevance, and stresses how 
the transition process itself – often characterised by economic liberalisation - might 
exacerbate socioeconomic problems in post-conflict and post-authoritarian societies.  
Ultimately, this conceptual confusion over the nature of socioeconomic justice 
in transitions fuels resistance against the expansion of transitional justice for fear of 
overstretching it. As Sharp (2012) has noted, scholars express worry over the cost of 
socioeconomic justice programmes, as well as over the loss of significance potentially 
arising from trying to expand into the field of development and economic reform (see 
also Mani 2008 and Roht-Arriaza 2006). While concerns have been raised over 
whether transitional justice or peacebuilding efforts could (and should) address 
socioeconomic wrongs (Waldorf 2012; McAuliffe 2014), the expansion of our 
understanding of violence and – consequently – peace was already advocated by 
Galtung (1969). The work of Rama Mani (2002) also calls for a more holistic approach 
to dealing with the past, based on the concept of reparation. From such an inclusive 
perspective, justice should reach throughout society, including ‘neglected economic 
categories’ and ‘structural categories’, and attempt to re-establish the conditions 
previous to the conflict (Mani 2008, 522-523). Ultimately, it is only by embracing the 
challenge of formulating a theoretical approach that challenges dominant 
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conceptions of the meaning of justice for societies in transition that these concerns 
could be overcome. 
 
 
1.1.2 Advancing the debate: the need for empirical research   
Regardless of their position in this debate, authors share a concern for the limited 
space granted to economic violations and remedies in most transitional justice 
settings. Equally important to definitional issues are thus discussions regarding the 
consequences of marginalising socioeconomic violence, and how these can be 
addressed. However, the literature seems to be in need for more empirical research 
that could help answer these questions, and provide further support for the 
arguments proposed so far (and briefly reviewed in this section). With respect to the 
consequences of neglecting socioeconomic injustice, for instance, Chinkin (2009) has 
argued that this could impair post-conflict security and access to justice, while 
Waldorf (2012, 175) has warned that this could go against victims’ expectations and 
demands. Following the mixed results of mechanisms developed through a top-
down approach in the 1990s, such arguments show that transitional justice scholars 
have come to realise the importance of involving local communities in transitional 
justice processes in a more meaningful way. 
At the same time, there is still uncertainty as to what mechanisms would be 
more appropriate for dealing with it. Louise Arbour (2014, 14) proposes that ‘truth 
commissions lend themselves particularly well to the investigation and protection of 
economic, social, and cultural rights’. Although the article discusses some cases in 
which socioeconomic justice issues have been discussed by truth commissions, social 
opinions on the matter are still to be investigated. A similar argument is advanced by 
Sankey, who claims that  ‘[D]epending on their severity, deprivations of subsistence 
needs perpetrated recklessly or with negligence could, and should, be addressed by 
truth commissions as constituting negative violations of human rights’ (Sankey 2014, 
136). In contrast to Sankey and Arbour, García-Godos (2013) argues for giving victims 
the political agency necessary to achieve distributive justice. Similarly, Miller (2008) 
deems traditional transitional justice measures – such as reparations and truth 
commissions – insufficient for dealing with socioeconomic injustice. Distributive 
justice policies might therefore be needed in order to address it (Miller 2008, 286). 
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These works formulate viable suggestions, but are not designed to provide sufficient 
evidence as to why these approaches to socioeconomic justice might work, or in what 
circumstances. This thesis also takes into account the contentious nature of justice 
processes, and the following chapter is thus dedicated to exploring conceptual and 
political struggles involved in establishing the meaning of justice in transitional 
societies, as well as the limitations that external forces might pose to achieving 
socioeconomic justice specifically.  
 
 
1.2 Expectations not met? Transitional justice studies on Bosnia and Herzegovina 
As these debates on the socioeconomic dimension of transitional justice developed, 
the scholarship on Bosnia continued to be focused on studying the role of more 
traditional mechanisms, and especially the ICTY. Within a few years of the end of the 
war, scholars began analysing the political context within which the Tribunal was 
established. This occurred at the time of the ‘peace v. justice’ debate, which 
highlighted the supposed tension between the need to do justice for human rights 
violations and the threat that strict justice provisions might pose to peace. As 
Williams and Scharf underline (2002, 29-30), some believe that warring factions can 
be attracted to the peace table by the guarantee of some form of amnesty, while the 
prospect of international justice for their crimes might convince them that prolonged 
fighting gives better chances of success (and impunity). The tension between peace 
and justice is exemplified by the very nature of transitional justice mechanisms such 
as tribunals and truth commissions: while trials serve primarily the function of 
providing justice, truth-telling is more often associated with the aim of appeasing a 
turbulent society, even with the provision of amnesty (Bloomfield 2006, 17). It has 
also been argued that mass prosecutions that go on for a long period of time might 
reopen ‘too many old wounds’, whereas a certain degree of forgetting and forgiving 
might be required in order for the society to move on (Pankhurst 1999, 242). 
Nonetheless, most scholars nowadays recognise that sustainable peace can only be 
built on the recognition of justice claims. Justice might indeed remove the root causes 
of conflict and avoid spillover effects to neighbouring countries (Akhavan 1998), and 
form part of a peace process that includes retributive, restorative and social justice 
dimensions (see Lambourne 2004). Moreover, as Akhavan (2009) notes with reference 
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to the Yugoslav case, the main weakness of ‘political realist’ arguments against 
international criminal justice is their inability to prove adverse effects on peace-
making. 
The establishment of the ICTY, ultimately, reflected the balance between 
accountability principles and the peacebuilding approaches of several international 
actors involved in the creation of the Tribunal (Williams and Scharf 2002).6 This did 
not, as other authors point out, eliminate problems deriving from the lack of 
legitimacy and impartiality perceived by part of the population of the former 
Yugoslav states (Fatić 2000). These early works on the ICTY have highlighted the 
difficulties of its operations. As the work of Kerr shows, the workings of an 
international tribunal require a complex interaction of politics and law, which do not 
apply to national courts. For instance, despite formal obligations upon states coming 
from UN resolutions, the ICTY lacks enforcement powers to secure the arrest of 
indictees or access documents, and thus relies on states’ willingness to cooperate 
(Kerr 2004).  
The issue of cooperation with the ICTY, and the conditionality policy adopted 
by international actors to incentivise it, was thus another important subject of study. 
The first works on this issue were published by Peskin and Boduszyński on Croatia 
(2003) and Peskin (2008) on the ICTY and ICTR. Rajković’s book (2012) is helpful in 
tracing with great detail the events, international pressures and conditions of Serbia 
and Croatia’s compliance with ICTY orders. Formal obligations notwithstanding, a 
major role is played here by the EU, which added a specific clause to the Copenhagen 
Criteria for accession, requiring full cooperation with the Hague Tribunal. However, 
‘EU war crimes conditionality, by focusing exclusively on cooperation with the ICTY, 
has failed to facilitate the process of rebuilding the rule of law in the former 
Yugoslavia and to advance the goals of international justice’ (Rangelov 2006, 366). 
Two remarkable works on the issue of conditionality and cooperation have been 
published by Lamont (2010) and Subotić (2009). Lamont asks why, under constant 
                                                          
6 Transitional justice debates on the creation of international tribunals also reflect broader 
debates within the field of IR on international institutions. For instance, Bass (2000) contends 
that beliefs on the universality of certain rights explain liberal states’ willingness to create 
international tribunals, while Moghalu (2006) argues that the establishment international 
tribunals is favoured by the emergence of an international society with shared values 
facilitating cooperation among states. 
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international obligations, the level of cooperation with the ICTY of former Yugoslav 
countries has varied throughout the years. Entering IR debates between realism, neo-
institutionalism, liberalism and constructivism, he favours an explanation based on 
the combination of rational choice elements (such as the responsiveness to material 
incentives) and normative change. The Bosnian case is particularly challenging due 
to its institutional structure, and Lamont recognises that traditional theories are ill 
suited to the analysis of complex sovereignty configurations (Lamont 2010, 127-131). 
Subotić discusses the different types of pressure exerted by international actors to 
secure cooperation. She contests traditional constructivist explanations based on 
norm change and the role of norm believers, which are often weak and challenged by 
norm resisters. Thus, analysing the domestic use of norms by elites becomes 
necessary in order to understand the reasons for cooperation with the ICTY (Subotić 
2009, 30-31). The research conducted by these scholars is thus crucial in order to 
understand the political mechanisms at play in the functioning of international 
justice, and in transitional justice processes more in general. They showed that even 
when the ICTY succeeded in securing state cooperation, this was not necessarily the 
result of normative change, nor the sign of societal reconciliation.  
What effects, then, has the Tribunal’s work had on Bosnia? The literature has 
generally presented a gap between the expectations on the part of the Tribunal’s local 
constituencies, and the achievements of the ICTY. Lacking universally accepted 
criteria, some scholars have relied on the objectives stated in UNSC resolutions 
808/1993 and 827/1993 to assess the effectiveness of the ICTY. These include the 
restoration and maintenance of peace through deterring further war crimes and 
doing justice for the victims by putting on trial those most responsible for those 
crimes. Clark (2009, 124, 136) notes that these are not realistic goals to be achieved, 
and that the ICTY’s work should not be considered a failure solely on this basis. While 
there is indeed a gap between expectations and achievements, it can be argued that 
the ICTY provided ‘some measure of justice, often experienced as flawed, sometimes 
deeply so’ (Orentlicher 2010, 13). Some accomplishments of the ICTY are not 
necessarily related to the aims states in UN resolutions and to include capacity-
building towards the local judiciary (Orentlicher 2010) and the removal of war crimes 
suspects from the post-war political landscape (Kerr 2005, 326)  
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Social perceptions of the ICTY have been considered one of the criteria for 
assessing the ICTY effectiveness. Meernik (2005), for instance, finds little evidence 
that the level of societal peace in Bosnia has increased – or even significantly changed 
– as a result of the work of the ICTY. This type of analysis is however limited because 
it assumes that the effects of the ICTY’s work should be immediately visible, and 
because media outlets – upon which the study is based – do not necessarily represent 
diverse social views in an adequate manner. Ivkovic and Hagan (2011) 
comprehensively address the question of ICTY perceptions through surveys carried 
out in different locations of the former Yugoslavia, including Sarajevo. According to 
their findings, the effect of ethnicity in determining support for the ICTY is mediated 
by the environment or ‘cognitive landscape’. Their results appear similar to the study 
of Biro et al. (2004), which also underlines that the attitudes toward the ICTY of 
different groups vary according to both ethnicity and the status of the group in the 
location where the survey was conducted. Cibelli and Guberek’s 2000 study of the 
attitudes of Bosnian NGOs towards the ICTY found that local organisations had very 
little information on the Tribunal, and that many organisations in the Serb entity were 
wary of its work. When the study was replicated, after the establishment of the 
Outreach office and when more information was available, it showed an increased 
acceptance of the Tribunal (Nettelfield 2010). Delpla’s study on victim groups, relying 
on ethnography and interviews, provides more insight into the complex ways in 
which local actors perceive the ICTY. According to her, these groups are not fully 
satisfied with the work of the Tribunal because it does not address the internationals’ 
responsibility in war crimes and because the establishment of justice in the Hague 
does not always have positive repercussions at home (Delpla 2007).  
These studies are based on the assumption that, keeping in mind the goals of 
transitional justice initiatives such as the ICTY, it is possible to establish a clear 
relationship between the actions of the Tribunal and their effects on the ground, at a 
local level. However, this approach often lacks nuance in depicting local reactions 
and local agency in transitional justice processes. It is important to acknowledge that 
transitional justice goals are often themselves contested, and that a mix of reactions 
and feelings can coexist within the society at any given time. Moreover, 
acknowledging the limitations of trials in accounting for the extraordinary nature of 
mass crimes (Drumbl 2005, 540-543; Subotić 2011, 158), can pave the way for 
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considering the contribution of tribunals to expressivist goals (Drumbl 2007), such as 
favouring the democratic transition by promoting social mobilisation (Nettelfield 
2010). Adopting different methods ranging from surveys to participant observation, 
Nettelfield’s book recognises the agency of local actors, as it looks at the practice and 
meanings of transitional justice processes on the ground. The literature on Bosnia 
could thus benefit from an increased dialogue with ethnographic and 
interdisciplinary approaches that have been applied to the study of human rights and 
transitional justice practices in other regions of the world.  
Lastly, some scholars have further pushed the boundaries of transitional 
justice scholarship on the Balkans in order to highlight the alternative dimensions of 
this process. Non-legal institutions have received less attention and support at the 
international level, but are still very relevant in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A large 
number of local NGOs dealing with transitional justice were established after the war, 
and mostly funded through foreign donors. Many Bosnian NGOs have also worked 
with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on the project of ‘Access 
to Justice: Facing the Past and Building the Confidence for the Future’, and drafting 
a Transitional Justice Strategy for Bosnia that, however, has never been officially 
adopted.7 The prominent role of international organisations is indicative of the 
growing relevance of transitional justice for peacebuilding initiatives in different 
regional contexts.8 Another notable initiative of the civil society is the Coalition for 
REKOM (Regional Commission), an attempt to establish a regional truth commission 
that would discuss crimes committed during the wars in the former Yugoslavia, thus 
adopting a regional perspective (Bonora 2014; Kostovicova 2016). The group of NGOs 
involved in the Initiative, whose composition has varied widely over time, has 
struggled to get the support of governments of former Yugoslav states and thus to 
actually establish the Commission,9 but has provided important opportunities for 
regional dialogue and collaboration. O’Reilly (2016) has recently studied another 
grassroots justice initiative, the Women’s Court event that took place in Sarajevo in 
                                                          
7 The project ‘Access to Justice: Facing the Past and Building the Confidence for the Future’, 
began in 2009, was still allocated a budget of $814,201 in 2013 (UNDP 2013). 
8 The United Nations has developed a body of knowledge on transitional justice which 
includes a ‘United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice’ (UN 2010). 
9 See the website of the Initiative for RECOM, at 
<http://www.recom.link/category/institutionalization/>, last accessed 10 December 2016. 
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May 2015. In terms of institutional reforms, the education sector has been the object 
of some attention. Noting that reforms in the education system are thought to have a 
positive impact on reconciliation, Jones (2012) studied the case of the Brčko district. 
She encourages us to look beyond the ‘success’ of educational reform in Brčko, which 
was designed to promote multi-ethnic integration, in order to analyse the way this 
was experienced and the local practices associated with it. Despite the difficulty of 
defining reconciliation in socio-political terms, other authors have also asked 
questions regarding the role of other aspects of transitional justice – beyond trials – 
in ‘reconciliation’ processes. Among these, the work of Clark tries to establish a link 
between different components of the transitional justice paradigm in the case of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Starting from prosecutions (Clark 2009), she subsequently 
includes the issues of missing persons (2010a), religious actors (2010b) and truth 
telling (2012a), drawing them all together within a larger ‘reconciliation’ framework 
which is not based on teleological beliefs but on the analysis of separate, though 
interrelated, aspects of transitional justice. However, the reference to reconciliation 
remains problematic because it relies on the role of psychological phenomena that 
are difficult to analyse from the perspective of politics and IR studies.  
Throughout this section, there has been little mention of economic justice 
issues. On the one hand, this is due to the predominance of legalistic approaches to 
transitional justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina, exemplified by the international 
commitment to the ICTY as one of the catalysts of the democratic transition. On the 
other hand, scholars have rightfully dedicated time and resources to the study of war 
crimes trials and their social impact. The lesson to be drawn from these studies is that 
the role of the international intervention is crucial to understand transitional justice 
processes in the former Yugoslavia, and that its relationship to local actors is complex 
and multifaceted. Moreover, some of the studies on the ICTY and other transitional 
justice initiatives have adopted a bottom-up approach that reflects this thesis’ concern 
for the experiences and justice claims of local communities. Two further issues should 
be noted here with respect to the limitations of this body of scholarship that this thesis 
tries to address. First, the transitional justice literature has developed mostly in 
isolation from the study of the post-socialist transition, and especially the social and 
economic reforms that characterised it. Second, an original study of experiences of 
socioeconomic injustice during the Bosnian war, and how this led to the development 
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of justice claims and social mobilisation is still lacking, and this is what this thesis 
intends to address.  
 
 
1.3 Post-socialism and post-war reconstruction: building peace, democracy and a 
free market 
The last substantial section of this chapter addresses the question of what can the 
study of the Bosnian case from the point of view of the post-socialist transition and 
economic reconstruction contribute to this project. While the study of post-war justice 
has been kept substantially isolated from that of social and economic reforms, this 
section shows that bridging the gap between them is a necessary step for studying 
socioeconomic justice. Most studies of post-socialist transitions have addressed the 
cases of Eastern European countries rather than those of the former Yugoslav 
republics. Eastern Europe came to be considered a classic pool of cases for the 
literature on political transitions, which tried to assess ‘why, how and with what 
immediate consequences this wave of democratization occurred between 1974 and 
1990’ (Huntington 1991, xiii; see also Przeworski 1991; Linz and Stepan 1996; Stark 
and Bruszt 1998). Stark and Bruszt’s book (1998, 3) is the only one among these to 
focus exclusively on this region. It examines the ways in which East Central European 
countries transformed property rights and politics during the transition from 
socialism to capitalism. They focus on the cases of Hungary, the Czech Republic, East 
Germany and Poland, and explain the transition through the concepts of extrication, 
transformation and deliberative association. What this comparative works share, 
though, is that they do not address the post-socialist transition of Yugoslavia. Linz 
and Stepan explain that this was due to the fact that Yugoslavia was already 
considered a mid-way model between socialism and democracy (and was fairly 
independent from Soviet influence), where regional elites in the republics framed 
their opposition to socialism in nationalist terms rather than with reference to ‘liberal 
democratic values and democratization’ (Linz and Stepan 1996, 238-239).  
Most obviously, Yugoslavia’s transition was marked by violent conflicts. In 
the specific case of Bosnia, while elections had already been held before the war, its 
subsequent democratisation was directly led and monitored by the international 
community. The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFA), drawn up in 
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Dayton in November 1995 and signed in Paris the following month, includes the 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina as its Annex 4. The GFA specifically 
provides for the implementation of civilian aspects of the Agreement, including 
holding free elections, and establishes international oversight over Bosnia’s 
authorities through the High Representative of the International Community (OHR 
1995). The Bosnian case poses significant challenges to the democratic transition 
literature, violating some of tenets of Linz and Stepan’s definition of consolidated 
democratic transition (Linz and Stepan 1996, 3), and being characterised by an 
institutional framework that strengthens ethnic affiliation and stifles the democratic 
development of the country.10  
Despite these differences, there are similarities between Eastern Europe and 
the Bosnian case with respect to the economic dimension of the post-socialist 
transition. Indeed, political transitions do not simply aim at establishing liberal 
democratic systems, and the need for radical economic reform was a crucial part of 
the transition process. The proposed ‘shock therapy’ for post-communist countries 
envisaged simultaneous reforms in four major areas: liberalisation of prices and 
trade, liberalisation of the private sector regulations, privatisation of state firms, and 
monetary and fiscal policies aimed at macroeconomic stability. A downturn in the 
short-term was to be expected, but was considered to be momentary and necessary 
for future prosperity (Sachs 1990). Przeworski’s book Democracy and the Market clearly 
remarks the connection between political reforms leading to democracy and 
economic reforms installing a capitalist system. In his words, the origins of the 
transition lie in popular discontent about both repression and hunger (Przeworski 
1991, ix). While arguing that political and economic transformations are inevitably 
linked, Przeworski (1991, 138 and 161) acknowledges that the high short-term costs 
of structural reforms can actually jeopardise the stability of the new democratic 
system. Linz and Stepan (1996, 435-438) agree that the primacy given to economic 
considerations in Eastern Europe was problematic, and that market economy could 
not constitute a sufficient legitimacy basis for a new democratic country.  
                                                          
10 To give one example, it was ruled as discriminatory by the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) for not allowing candidates from minority groups (that is, not Bosnian 
Muslims, Serbs or Croats) to be elected at the Presidency or at the House of Peoples of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (ECHR 2009). 
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Some scholars have argued that the Bosnian transition was inspired by similar 
principles (Donais 2005, 88; Pugh 2006b). In fact, Jeffrey Sachs, in his famous 1990 
article that outlined the strategy for the economic transition in Eastern Europe, 
indicated Poland and Yugoslavia as the pioneers of these reforms. Yugoslavia’s 
economic system had already become increasingly open to international markets in 
the previous decades, and according to international observers simply needed a 
‘structural adjustment programme’ rather than a ‘proper transition’ (Lavigne 1995, 
107). The economic crisis of the late 1970s convinced policy makers to approach 
international financial institutions and Yugoslavia was granted access to IMF loans 
(Donais 2005, 6). Conditions of living consistently worsened throughout the 1980s 
and scholars have noted that the economic difficulties faced by Yugoslavia could 
have contributed to its violent dissolution (Woodward 1995a). The post-socialist 
transition in Bosnia thus effectively began before the war, and was then brought to 
completion during the conflict and through the reconstruction programmes in its 
aftermath.  
The study of post-socialist Bosnia thus inevitably intersects with that of 
peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction. Post-conflict countries need external 
support in order to recover from the destruction caused by the war. As Bojicic-
Dzelilovic stresses, post-war societies are characterised by ‘highly polarized 
economic and social relations, and decimated social cohesion’ (Bojicic-Dzelilovic 
2000, 101). Peacebuilding thus possesses an important economic dimension because 
it is concerned with physical rebuilding of infrastructure, provision of aid and 
economic reconstruction, and a wide array of organisations, including financial 
institutions, contributes to its realisation.11 Analyses of the political economy of post-
socialism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, however, are less common than studies dealing 
more specifically with the peacebuilding or reconstruction dimension.  
Despite the controversial results of shock therapy, which had led to decrease 
and unemployment increase exceeding expectations (Donais 2005, 19), scholars have 
noted how reforms in Bosnia were inspired by similar principles. International actors 
                                                          
11 Peacebuilding tasks may include ‘disarming former belligerents to providing financial and 
humanitarian assistance, monitoring and conducting elections, repatriating refugees, 
rebuilding physical infrastructure, advising and training security personnel and judicial 
officials, and even temporarily taking over the administration of an entire country’ (Paris 
1997, 55). 
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envisaged Bosnia’s reconstruction as based on private sector initiative: an 
‘internationally funded reconstruction phase, aimed at restoring basic infrastructure 
and services to pre-war levels’ was thus to be followed by a ‘policy-reform phase 
aimed at creating a permissible and favorable domestic environment for private 
enterprise’ (Donais 2005, 91). The ‘orthodox rationale of the political economic of 
peacebuilding’ was thus inspired by the principles of the Washington Consensus, and 
based on the assumption that post-war societies suffered from dysfunctions that 
neoliberal reforms would help to correct (Pugh 2005a, 24). The Washington 
Consensus as elaborated by John Williamson proposed macroeconomic stabilisation 
and trade liberalisation alongside a series of other measure aimed at countries in need 
for reform (Williamson 1990). Pugh (2005a, 25) also argues that peacebuilding in 
Bosnia ‘has promoted transformation through macro-economic stability, reduction of 
the role of the state, the squeezing of collective and public space, a quest for private 
affluence, and a reliance on privatisation and on exports and foreign investment to 
stimulate economic growth’. This model was hailed as a technical and necessary 
solution for economic recovery, but many scholars agree that post-war economic 
policy has wide-ranging political implications and ultimately depends on political 
choices (Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2000). Zaum’s (2006, 48-49) analysis of the reform of the 
Payment Bureaux highlights some of the domestic features characterising the 
economic reform process in post-war Bosnia: the need to limit the role of the state in 
the economy, the reluctance of local elites to embrace reforms for fear of losing 
personal gains, and the prominent role of the international community in driving this 
process.12 Despite their similarity to other Eastern European cases, domestic 
conditions thus also played an important role in how these reforms were 
implemented (Bartlett 2006, 215; Donais 2005: 112). 
In addition to being critical of the international community’s ‘off-the shelf 
policy prescriptions’ (Donais 2005, 45) in the field of peacebuilding and economic 
reconstruction, scholars have attributed them very similar problems to those that 
characterised post-socialist transitions, but also transitional justice. The same liberal 
assumptions informing transitional justice can be traced back to the ‘liberal 
                                                          
12 See also Pugh 2006a, arguing that, while in the first instance they often opposed reforms, 
elites often supported privatization plans at a later stage and tried to draw personal benefits 
from them (Pugh 2006a, 146). 
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internationalist’ paradigm from which peacebuilding originated (Paris 1997, 55), as 
the international community aimed at establishing liberal democracy and a market 
economy as the fundamental elements required for international peace (Paris 1997, 
56). Critical discussions of liberal peacebuilding have proliferated since the 1990s (see 
for instance Richmond 2006; Chandler 2010; Campbell et al. 2011; Sabaratnam 2011), 
but there has been little interaction with critiques of liberal approaches to transitional 
justice.13 Still, the two fields have struggled against similar problems (Sharp 2013), 
and discussions over the privileged role assigned to the international community 
(Paris 2002; Richmond and Franks 2007), and the need for ‘local ownership’ of peace 
processes (Donais 2009, 2012; Leonardsoon and Rudd 2015), bear striking similarities 
with more recent transitional justice debates (Orentlicher 2007; Nagy 2008), where 
scholars have also argued for the importance of local support for (and involvement 
in) justice efforts.  
The implications of these shared liberal assumptions emerge from some 
academic accounts of the limitations of post-conflict reconstruction and reform. Many 
complain that local needs were not assessed and targeted. A large part of the 
population, for instance, was displaced during the conflict, and confronted with the 
difficulties of return in its aftermath. Bosnians faced the prospect of returning to an 
area where their group had become a minority as a result of ethnic cleansing. The 
international community sought to ‘redress the wrong’ of ethnic cleansing partly 
through reconstruction, thus allowing for the return of refugees. Black analyses 
different types of return programmes in Bosnia, and criticise them on the basis that 
‘international policymakers have shared with nationalists the view that Bosnian 
should be encouraged to live in particular places’ (Black 2001, 196). In addition, 
international actors have sought to alleviate economic difficulties of returnees 
through other forms of economic support. For instance, unemployment is a 
widespread problem in Bosnia, but it affects minority returnees in a disproportionate 
way (Haider 2009, 97). Some international organisations and donors started offering 
economic means of support to returnees, including grants and microcredit loans, 
under the assumption that ‘economic opportunities and market activity’ have a 
                                                          
13 For some of these critiques see Sriram (2007) and Nagy (2008); see also Baker and 
Obradović (2016) and Miller and Lecy (2016) on the divide between the transitional justice 
and peacebuilding literatures. 
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positive impact on social reintegration (Haider 2009, 103-4). Belloni’s work (2007) 
highlights that, even when focused on the local level, international efforts tended to 
promote particular visions that were not based on local needs or culture. He analyses 
economic incentives to the development of the civil society, which is considered an 
integral part of the liberal peace project. The reliance on foreign funds made Bosnian 
NGOs dependent on the donors and their priorities. Funds were mainly channelled 
to bigger organisations in the cities and fundamentally ignored pre-existent forms of 
civil society (Belloni 2007, 113). Moreover, economic aid often empowered local 
nationalist leaders and fostered clientelistic networks (Ibid., 103).  
Studies focused on social reform have engaged with the questions posed by 
the legacies of socialism more directly. In his work, Bartlett analyses the varieties of 
capitalism which were established in Western Balkan countries during the 1990s. In 
his view, Bosnia’s economic transition was characterised by the use of voucher 
privatisation, the relevance of political parties in controlling the economy, labour 
market problems and increasing youth unemployment (Bartlett 2006, 203-209),14 
while other authors have expressed scepticism for development policies based on 
micro-credit rather than industry (Bateman et al. 2012). It is also worth mentioning 
the work of Paul Stubbs (and Bob Deacon; see Deacon and Stubbs 1997; Stubbs 1999; 
2002) on social policy as an example of how the social consequences of transitional 
reforms linked to the international intervention can be analysed without bracketing 
neither the war nor Bosnia’s post-socialist condition. This study takes into account 
this approach as well as the work of scholars who have studied the social impact of 
neoliberalism in Eastern Europe from the perspective of affected communities (see 
for instance Turbine 2007; Ishkanian 2008; Hemment 2009; Stenning et al. 2010).  In 
this body of literature, neoliberalism is seen as a transitional project that bears 
consequences not only for the economic sectors undergoing reforms, but for the 
whole society. While the former Yugoslavia is not at the centre of these studies, they 
raise questions on the social implications of post-socialist transition that are very 
relevant for analysing justice claims emerging among Bosnian communities. 
Two main points can be extrapolated from this overview of the literature 
covering the post-war and post-socialist transition in Bosnia, which respond to the 
                                                          
14 See also Bartlett 2007 and 2013 on welfare reforms in the Western Balkans.  
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aim of the section. Firstly, in the Bosnian case, post-socialism overlapped with the 
process of post-conflict reconstruction. According to many of the scholars cited here, 
this posed additional challenges to the implementation of an international blueprint 
for reforms that had already demonstrated its limits in the Eastern European context. 
Secondly, this section illustrates the existing separation between transitional justice 
studies and the study of post-socialism. In order to assess the threat that liberalisation 
policies might pose to the pursuit of economic justice (Miller 2008, 267), it is thus 
necessary to bridge the gap between these two fields of study, and take the 




As soon as they realised that transitional justice can be understood as a more complex 
process going beyond the ‘peace v. justice’ dichotomy, scholars have also recognised 
the need to engage with issues that had remained marginal in academic debates, such 
as gender issues (Franke 2006; Bell and O’Rourke 2007; Buckley-Zistel and Stanley 
2012), but also – most importantly for this project – socioeconomic justice. This 
chapter has argued that the study of socioeconomic justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
should take stock of the conceptual and empirical limitations of existing debates on 
the socioeconomic dimension of transitional justice, and of the contribution made by 
regional specialists writing about post-war justice, peacebuilding, and economic 
reform.  
While the definition of transitional justice left space for a variety of 
mechanisms, ranging from trials to reparations and truth commissions, legalistic 
approaches have been most common throughout the 1990s, and were international 
institutionalised through the establishment of the ICC. The former Yugoslavia was 
no exception. As scholars began to question the limitations of war crimes trials in 
helping processes of dealing with the past, they also began addressing the 
relationship between socioeconomic justice and transitional justice, which is the 
central concern of this thesis. It has been argued in Section 1.1 that these debates 
suffer from conceptual and empirical indeterminacies. The first issue thus has to do 
with the definition of socioeconomic justice itself. Even within the groups of scholars 
emphasising the importance of socioeconomic injustice, some (Arbour 2007; Sankey 
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2014) argue for the judiciability of socioeconomic wrongs or socioeconomic rights, 
while other scholars accept a wider definition of socioeconomic justice to include the 
redress of structural violence (Lambourne 2014; Laplante 2014). Others also question 
the feasibility of pursuing economic justice as an objective of transitional justice 
(Waldorf 2012). Empirical studies on this topic, moreover, are still scarce, leaving 
open the question of how socioeconomic justice can or should be addressed within 
transitional justice efforts. Lastly, these debates have not touched the former 
Yugoslav region, and thus this thesis aims to make a substantial contribution to this 
growing body of literature by investigating socioeconomic justice in Bosnia. 
While not contributing to debates on socioeconomic justice, scholarly studies 
of post-war Bosnia provide us with important findings on the role and effects of 
transitional justice institutions such as the ICTY, as well as the way in which 
socioeconomic reforms were carried out. In contrast to Eastern European countries, 
the post-socialist transition of Bosnia and Herzegovina started before the 1990s, and 
coincided with the war and the post-war reconstruction effort. Section 1.3 has thus 
illustrated the differentiation between Eastern European transitions and the case of 
Yugoslavia, but also identified the similar principles guiding the political-economic 
transformation from socialism to a market economy. Works on the economic 
dimension of peacebuilding and on social sector reform are the most informative 
sources on this topic. Nonetheless, it has developed independently of the transitional 
justice literature. This signals the need for a different approach that can join debates 
on the socioeconomic dimension of transitional justice while benefiting from 
studying not only post-war justice processes, but also changes in the political 
economy of the country.  
Rather than simply finding a ‘gap’, the purpose of this review was to lay the 
basis for a shift in approach, one that joins transitional justice debates with the 
challenges of the post-socialist transition. This chapter has shown how both processes 
are crucial for the analysis of socioeconomic justice in Bosnia, which is the aim of this 
thesis. Chapter 3 of the thesis will thus analyse how policies linked to justice 
processes and political-economic reforms, might have affected the development of 
socioeconomic justice claims. Before moving on to that, however, the thesis responds 
to the need, clearly emerging clearly from the literature review, that is, the need to 
adequately conceptualise socioeconomic justice and its relationship to other 
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dimensions of justice processes. Chapter 2 turns to this task and lays out the 









This chapter has the double aim of addressing the conceptual and methodological 
aspects of this thesis. Before outlining the research design of this project, Chapter 2 
responds to the challenges emerging from the debates on the socioeconomic 
dimension of transitional justice by defining socioeconomic justice as redistribution 
(drawing on Fraser 1995, 1997, 2003, 2005, 2009) and outlining the context within 
which justice processes unfold in post-war and post-socialist Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Overall, the chapter argues for the relevance of a critical approach to 
the study of socioeconomic justice, with the purpose of questioning established 
understandings of justice and highlighting the most marginalised aspects of 
processes of dealing with the past. This is then reflected in the methodological set-up 
of the thesis, aimed at exploring how the international intervention in the justice 
sphere interacts with varying local experiences of socioeconomic injustice during the 
war and the transition.  
Given the relevance of her work for understanding justice claims, it seems 
surprising that not many transitional justice scholars have referred to Fraser’ 
understanding of justice as recognition and redistribution (1995) when trying to make 
sense of claims emerging from post-war and post-authoritarian societies. This might 
have to do with the way in which the field of transitional justice evolved from an 
intellectual point of view (Arthur 2009), and with the development of transitional 
justice as a practice within international organisations and professionalised NGOs. 
More recently, however, critical authors have started recognising the potential of 
Fraser’s writings for the field. Notable among these is the work of Elizabeth Stanley 
(2005, 2009a), who applies Fraser’s (2003, 2005) understanding of justice as 
recognition, redistribution and representation in analysing the use of truth 
commissions, with reference to the specific case of East Timor. Woolford (2010) refers 
to the promotion of affirmative strategies to repair injustice against First Nations 




recognition and redistribution that do not threaten to radically transform society’ 
(Wooldford 2010, 144). Several authors have linked the concepts of cultural, 
socioeconomic and political justice to the issue of gender in peace and justice 
processes (Franke 2006; O’Rourke 2009; Ní Aoláin 2012). In a recent article, Maria 
O’Reilly (2016) has applied the tripartite understanding of justice to the case of gender 
justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina, analysing the claims put forward by the Women’s 
Court in Sarajevo in terms of recognition, redistribution and representation. This 
thesis takes these adaptations of Fraser’s work in the field of transitional justice 
forward, and does so by following Jansen’s (2013) suggestion that Fraser’s work 
could be fruitfully applied to the case of BiH, ‘in a context in which the preoccupation 
with ethnonational identity privileges questions of recognition and representation to 
a large extent’, and where the ‘insistence on the identitarian matrix renders invisible 
other inequalities’ (Jansen 2013, 237).  
After defining socioeconomic justice as redistribution, Chapter 2 
contextualises this definition for the post-war and post-socialist Bosnian scenario. 
Section 2.2 then defines the scope of our interest to the practice of transitional justice, 
and argues that from this point of view justice itself can be seen as a contested 
concept, as well as a contested practice. Section 2.3 concluded the theoretical 
framework by discussing how international forces operating in transitional contexts 
delimit the boundaries of post-war justice processes. The second part of the chapter 
outlines the methodology and methods. After breaking down the research question 
of the thesis into sub-questions, and showing how they are addressed in the following 
chapters, the methodological assumptions of the project are presented in Section 2.4. 
The criteria for selecting research locations and participants are then discussed in the 
following section. Lastly, the chapter gives an overview of the research methods for 
data collection and analysis, and discusses ethical issues related to doing fieldwork 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
 
2.1 Socioeconomic justice as redistribution  
Drawing on the contribution of scholars challenging established understandings of 
the functions of transitional justice, this thesis defines socioeconomic justice as 




that in privileging serious violations of basic civil and political rights over 
socioeconomic ones, transitional justice might be mirroring the biases and hierarchies 
of the broader field of human rights (Sharp 2012; see also Arbour 2007), and there 
might be good reason to challenge such hierarchies in instances where economic 
violence played an important role in the conflict. They have also noted that 
transitional justice might do better at addressing socioeconomic injustice if its link 
with the establishment of liberal democracy is rescinded, and its goal re-thought as 
the establishment of ‘positive peace’ (Sharp 2014; see also Galtung 1969). The 
dominant concern of these debates, however, is with the aims of transitional justice, 
as opposed to the meaning of justice for societies in transition. In proposing the shift 
from a ‘transitional’ to a transformative’ justice model that supports sustainable 
peace and reconciles retributive and restorative justice approaches, Lambourne (2009, 
2014) is indeed answering to the question of ‘What is the purpose of transitional 
justice?’ (Lambourne 2009, 28). She recognises that the justice aims of transitional 
justice can be multiple, and includes socioeconomic justice as one of its dimensions, 
indicating ‘the various elements of justice that relate to financial or other material 
compensation, restitution or reparation for past violations of crimes (historical 
justice) and distributive or socioeconomic justice in the future (prospective justice)’ 
(Lambourne 2009, 41). The question of what sort of injustices count as part of the 
transformative model, and how do they relate to local experiences and 
understandings, remains open.  
Socioeconomic justice is here defined as redistribution (drawing on Fraser 
1995, 2003). Its defining characteristic is that both the injustice suffered and the 
remedy proposed for such injustice are rooted in the political economy. Injustices of 
a socioeconomic nature can include ‘exploitation (having the fruits of one’s labour 
appropriated for the benefit of others); economic marginalization (being confined to 
undesirable or poorly paid work or being denied access to income-generating labour 
altogether), and deprivation (being denied an adequate material standard of living)’ 
(Fraser 2003, 13). Remedying such injustice entails ‘redistributing income, 
reorganising the division of labour, subjecting investment to democratic decision 
making, or transforming other basic economic structures’ (Fraser 1995, 73). Adapting 
this definition to the transitional justice field brings out the forward-looking potential 




reparations, the most established socioeconomic component of the transitional justice 
paradigm, have traditionally been considered a backward-looking tool to settle 
claims over past violations (Posner and Vermeule 2003), this conception can be 
challenged for being too narrow. Even some types of reparation claims, Torpey (2001, 
337) argues, can be forward-looking because they are ‘connected to broader projects 
of social transformation’. In the understanding proposed here, socioeconomic justice 
has a backward-looking component but also entails a concern with ‘justice in the 
future’ (Lambourne 2014, 29), and more specifically the need to repair past wrongs in 
such a way that contributes to establishing a fairer society. 
For Fraser, the definition of socioeconomic justice implies a specific 
understanding of the collectivities that put forward this type of claims. As an ideal-
type, they are defined by their economic relations to the rest of society, as social 
classes (Fraser 2003, 14). In countries undergoing complex processes of transition 
(Kostovicova and Bojicic-Dzelilovic 2013), however, groups that have suffered from 
socioeconomic injustice might struggle to establish themselves as the legitimate 
bearers of justice claims. Where national or ethnic identity comes to define the 
structure of society, the conditions of ‘parity of participation’ (Fraser 2003, 36), at least 
at the intersubjective level that requires equal respect and opportunities for everyone 
taking part in the process of democratic deliberation, might be lacking. The 
identification of those who suffered from socioeconomic injustice and who articulate 
socioeconomic justice claims can therefore be more complex, and involve belonging 
to multiple groups, defined on the basis of class and/or status.  
Socioeconomic justice is understood as one dimension of a broader 
conception of justice. The aim of the thesis is thus not to establish its primacy, nor is 
it to diminish the importance of serious violations of International Humanitarian Law 
and the need to address them, including through judicial mechanisms. Rather, it calls 
for rethinking post-war justice as a multidimensional concept. Socioeconomic justice 
and injustice, then, are also defined in relation to other justice dimensions, such as 
those related to ‘patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication’, that 
is, cultural injustice (Fraser 1995, 71), or to the process through which justice claims 
are debates and adjudicated (political representation; Fraser 2005, 2009). Overcoming 
injustice will most likely involve remedies that touch on all these dimensions (Fraser 




substantially different. Perspectival dualism is thus a critical tool adopted in this 
thesis to shift the focus from the common preoccupation with interethnic violence 
characterising transitional justice studies to a greater concern with socioeconomic 
issues, while at the same time overcoming the artificial separation between culture 
and political economy that could lead to obscuring important overlaps between 




2.1.1 Socioeconomic justice in the ‘post-socialist’ and ‘post-war’ condition  
The definition of socioeconomic justice adopted here takes into account the 
specificities, constraints or challenges set by the context under consideration. Bosnia’s 
experience as both a ‘post-war’ and ‘post-socialist’ country has important 
implications for the study of socioeconomic justice conducted in this thesis. First, 
Bosnia’s post-war condition points to the fact that socioeconomic injustice can be 
perpetrated as part of the military effort or conflict itself, or derive from it. The 
relationship between forms of socioeconomic injustice and the war, and the way in 
which different forms of violence overlap or interact, demand careful consideration 
when investigating the experiences of local Bosnian communities. Socioeconomic 
injustice can lead to justice claims that encompass redistribution, but also some form 
of recognition. As the following section shows, they can also contest the process of 
claim making itself, which might be characterised by the wrongful exclusion of 
specific groups and issues from transitional justice processes. Second, the post-war 
condition is characterised by a specific temporal problem. As a result of the war, 
victims may lack access to remedies or even the ability to articulate justice claims for 
years. The lack of remedies for injustice might be protracted into the post-war period, 
where structural reforms have already been singled out as one potential source of 
further social injustice (Laplante 2008). This has important implications for the 
process of formulation of justice claims, both in terms of timing (when are these 
claims put forward) and with reference to the subjects of such claims (who formulates 
them). As years go by, those who were directly affected by socioeconomic injustice 
during the war grow older, but socioeconomic injustice becomes entrenched in 




Transitional justice mechanisms can potentially contribute to socioeconomic 
justice intended as redistribution. In addition to sentencing war criminals, courts can 
sometimes provide economic reparation or compensation, in a way that contributes 
to future-oriented redistributive justice (with different arguments on the role of 
reparations and truth commissions, see Torpey 2001 and 2003; Lambourne 2014; 
Sankey 2014). As Stanley (2009a) noted with reference to East Timor, transitional 
justice institutions can also, however, limit opportunities to obtain justice and create 
further injustice, by withholding recognition, preventing participation and thus 
undermining their chances of fighting for social justice (Stanley 2009a, 18, 59-70). 
Some transitional justice literature has already suggested that doing justice after war 
might involve a ‘reparative’ goal, an attempt to restore, to the greatest extent possible, 
the conditions present before the violence took place, or if it had never happened 
(Mani 2002, 522). Therefore, we might expect people’s ideas of socioeconomic justice 
to be at least partly shaped by their memories of the previous system (or the memory 
that people have of it) (Jansen 2006).  
While Bosnia’s post-war condition does not necessarily preclude the 
possibility of socioeconomic justice, its post-socialist condition poses additional 
challenges. Fraser’s remarks on the post-socialist age – as an era marked by the 
absence of an alternative ‘emancipatory project’ in the wake of the fall of ‘actually 
existing’ socialism and the rise of neoliberalism (Fraser 1997, 3) – resonate with the 
Bosnian case. The Bosnian post-socialist condition, however, is more than that: it is 
also a way of characterising the role of the country’s past in shaping its contemporary 
transformation. According to Gilbert, the fact that state socialism was brought to an 
end by the war1 led to the ‘bracketing of the socialist era from public discussion in 
postwar Bosnia’ (Gilbert 2008, 168). The international intervention contributed to this 
mis-placement or dis-splacement of ‘socialist era values, narratives, and cultural 
perspectives’ (Gilbert 2008, 168).  
The international intervention in the field of peacebuilding and economic 
reform was inspired by a liberal paradigm that was not equipped to deal with the 
consequences of the fall of socialism through war. As a result, the reconstruction 
                                                          
1 Even though processes of democratisation or economic reform had started before the war, 
socialism ended through conflict rather than thanks to the pressure of democratising forces 




effort, both from a human and material point of view, was focused on addressing 
selected aspects of Bosnia’s post-war state of destruction. The paradox of Bosnia’s 
post socialist condition is thus not only what Torpey identifies as the crux of 
contemporary reparation politics, i.e. the fact that the politics of redressing past 
injustice has taken the place of progressive narratives focused on the future, such as 
socialism or the establishment of nation states (Torpey 2006). The Bosnian case is also 
paradoxical because, in the context of an international intervention with a short or 
selective historical memory, the (backward-looking) politics of the socialist past are 
often regarded as a form of progressive politics for the present. The definition of 
socioeconomic justice with reference to its context raises questions on local 
understandings of justice, and their relation to the international forces that shape this 
post-war and post-socialist background. The following section develops further the 
understanding of justice as a social practice, and a contested one, paving the way for 
the empirical analysis presented in Chapters 3-6.  
 
 
2.2 Transitional justice as a social practice   
Transitional justice is here primarily understood and researched as a social practice, 
concerned with the expectations, needs and – most importantly – claims of affected 
communities, as opposed to the emergence and establishment of international 
institutions. In particular, this thesis is concerned with how injustice was locally 
experienced during the war and transition, and how justice itself was conceptualised 
and acted upon at the social level. Rather than focusing on the impact and reach of 
transitional justice as a set of universal norms focused on accountability, this project 
adopts a more ‘inside out’ perspective, centred on the emergence of local justice 
claims and the processes of contestation and struggle that characterise their 
interaction with the international.  
 
 
2.2.1 Justice as a contested concept 
Compared to the top-down view of transitional justice as an intellectual project 




from a bottom-up perspective post war justice appears as an essentially contested 
concept. The substantial meaning of justice can be contested between those 
concerned, for instance, with the need to redress maldistribution and misrecognition. 
While the former requires downplaying differences and promoting equality, the 
latter calls for the recognition and celebration of such differences (Fraser 1995, 74). 
Theoretical debates on the redistribution-recognition ‘dilemma’ (see Young 1997; 
Butler 1998; Fraser 2000; Fraser and Honneth 2003) are outside of the scope of this 
thesis, but indicative of the difficulty in pinning down the meaning of justice, 
especially when taking into account the ways in which it is understood and enacted 
by social actors. The literature on the practice of human rights, from which the thesis 
draws inspiration, is precisely concerned with ‘all the many ways in which social 
actors across the range talk about, advocate for, criticize, study, legally enact, 
vernacularize, and so on, the idea of human rights in its different forms’ (Goodale 
2007, 24). The focus is on justice as an ‘interpretive process’ and on ‘how and why 
international justice is mobilised, understood and abandoned by concrete social 
actors and to what effect’ (Kelly and Dembour 2007, 7 and 2).2   
Instead of regarding a specific understanding of justice as fixed, the thesis 
adopts an approach that questions established understandings as definitive, and 
shifts the perspective towards marginalised dimensions of justice processes. From 
Fraser’s point of view, this would entail adopting an analytical (or perspectival) 
dualist approach, where redistribution and recognition are ‘co-fundamental and 
mutually irreducible dimensions of justice’ (Fraser 2003, 2). From the perspective of 
the scholarship on the practice of human rights, this entails understanding justice ‘as 
an essentially contested concept’, ‘always embedded within specific social 
relationships rather than being the produce of an abstract set of principles’ (Kelly and 
Dembour 2007, 17). The latter approach seems particularly apt to studying how social 
actors in specific circumstances, defined by the different configurations of the post-
war and post-socialist condition, make sense of socioeconomic justice. The 
conceptualisation of transitional justice and socioeconomic justice offered here is thus 
                                                          
2 Transitional justice scholars have followed similar approaches in studying the impact of 
transitional justice mechanisms beyond their stated objectives, in order to see how justice 
norms are adopted and modified by local groups for different purposes, and to what extent 




grounded in social practices rather than in international norms and institutions 
(Goodale 2009, 14), and should allow for sufficient flexibility to capture the nuances 
deriving from empirical observation.  
 
 
2.2.2 Justice as a contested practice  
The discussion above suggests that justice is not only a contested concept, but also a 
contested practice, and a practice of contestation. Leaving aside the philosophical 
background of the different justice dimensions, the thesis is concerned with justice in 
the political sense, as ‘families of claims raised by political actors and social 
movements in the public sphere’ (Fraser 2003, 9). A substantial part of the empirical 
chapters is dedicated to the analysis of what Fraser calls folk paradigms of justice (in 
order to distinguish them from the philosophical paradigm), that is ‘sets of linked 
assumptions about the causes of and remedies for injustice’ (Fraser 2003, 11). What 
are, then, the elements of contestation inherent to the process of formulating justice 
claims? First, justice claims emerge from groups that struggle to establish themselves 
as the bearers of such claims, to present themselves as entitled to put them forward 
in the public debate. This issue thus has to do with the problem of the ‘frame’, that is, 
how the boundaries of justice processes are set (Fraser 2009, 2) and to second-order, 
meta-level questions related to ‘not only who can make claims for redistribution and 
recognition, but also how such claims are to be mooted and adjudicated’ (Fraser 2005, 
75).  
Within a single ‘public sphere’ (Habermas [1962] 1992), relations of 
‘dominance and subordination’ among different groups in processes of public 
deliberation can deprive those in subordinate positions from the ability to articulate 
justice claims. (Fraser 1990, 66). In such circumstances, it is more helpful to allow for 
the existence of multiple public spheres, ‘subaltern counterpublics’ as ‘parallel 
discursive arenas where members of subordinated social groups invent and circulate 
counterdiscourses’ (Fraser 1990. 67). This might be particularly important in post-war 
contexts, where victims of war and violence have an intensified need to adjust their 
experiences to larger group narratives (Kolind 2008, 75).  Given the marginalisation 
of socioeconomic issues in transitional justice debates, and the organisation of 




‘counterpublics’ that we might have to look in order to understand the relevance of 
socioeconomic justice. Defining the ‘who’ of socioeconomic justice in these terms 
entails the possibility to challenge boundaries and to enlarge the scope of 
participation, while at the same time warning that alternative narratives of justice 
might remain hidden from the public space of civil society mobilisation through 
NGOs working in the peacebuilding and transitional justice sector.  
The practice of socioeconomic justice (and justice in general) also entails a 
tension between different strategies adopted to redress injustice. Fraser distinguishes 
between affirmative and transformative remedies, which have to do with the ‘level 
at which the injustice is addressed’ rather than with the substance of the injustice 
(Fraser 2003, 74). Affirmative strategies ‘aim to correct inequitable outcomes of social 
arrangements without disturbing the underlying social structures that generate them. 
Transformative strategies, in contrast, aim to correct unjust outcomes precisely by 
restructuring the underlying generative framework’ (Ibid.). In trying to correct 
outcomes, affirmative strategies can entail multiculturalist policies when addressing 
cultural injustice, or liberal, welfare state support when addressing socioeconomic 
justice (Fraser 1995, 82-84). These can have drawbacks, for instance promoting a kind 
of identify politics that reifies collective identities (Fraser 2003, 76), or a vision of the 
poor as ‘inherently deficient and insatiable, as always needing more and more’ 
(Fraser 2003, 77). Transformative strategies, such as deconstruction (to counter 
misrecognition) and socialism broadly conceived (to counter maldistribution) (Fraser 
1995, 84-86), do not suffer from these issues because they acknowledge cultural 
complexity and promote socioeconomic solidarity (Fraser 2003, 78). Even within the 
remit of political representation, affirmative remedies challenge injustice without 
questioning the process of frame-setting (Fraser 2005, 80), while transformative 
approaches ambitiously aim to ‘democratize the process by which the frameworks of 
justice are drawn and revised (Fraser 2005, 84). Once again, the context within which 
justice claims develop can affect local actors’ abilities to adopt different types of 
strategies. Wendy Brown (2000) notes that subordinated groups are often put in the 
paradoxical position of having to seek emancipation through means that partly 
reinforce or sustain their subordination. Moreover, Fraser (2003, 77) herself 
recognises that transformative remedies are limited by their difficult applicability. 




of power and alternative visions of what could be’ (Carrol and Ratner 1996, 602), and 
‘demanding the creation of new democratic arenas’ of justice deliberation and frame-
setting (Fraser 2005, 84), in other cases the bearers of justice claims will have to adapt 
to circumstances linked to their position within the post-war and post-socialist 
transition (and thus adapt to more pragmatic affirmative strategies, or more indirect 
or micro-level resistance).3  
The second element to be considered here is the way in which contestation is 
also part of the process through which justice claims are developed and expressed. 
According to Fraser (2005, 2009), problems related to democratic participation in 
justice processes are not simply procedural issues, but constitute a third justice 
dimension – political representation. In post-war justice processes, local communities 
might contest the possibility to participate as peers in public deliberation (ordinary-
political misrepresentation), or the drawing of the communities boundaries in such a 
way as to exclude some people from the chance to participate at all (misframing; Fraser 
2005, 76). Misframing leads to a sort of ‘political death’4 where those ‘who suffer it 
may become objects of charity or benevolence. But deprived of the possibility of 
authoring first-order claims, they become non-persons with respect to justice’ (Fraser 
2009, 20). Lastly, political injustice can become visible at a third level, as meta-political 
misrepresentation. This arises ‘when states and transnational elites monopolize the 
activity of frame-setting, denying voice to those who may be harmed in the process, 
and blocking creation of democratic arenas where the latter’s claims can be vetted 
and redressed’ (Fraser 2005, 85). This last point raises the question of how these 
processes of representation play out in the post-war and post-socialist context of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, where justice discourses were promoted by the 
international intervention in the country.  
 
 
2.3 International forces  
The international intervention, including transitional justice norms and programmes, 
and other types of post-war and post-socialist reforms, plays a role in defining what 
                                                          
3 See for instance Scott 1985, 1990. 




justice means in Bosnia, and delimiting the boundaries of justice processes. While 
past experiences are important in the development of conceptions of justice, it is also 
true that ‘this experience takes place inside structures which define people’s lives’ 
(Merry 1990, 5). In the context of post-war transitions, international intervention 
represents one important aspect of such structures. For the scope of this research, 
international intervention thus refers to an ensemble of practices, spanning a diverse 
range of fields. From a substantial point of view, intervention can include transitional 
justice, peacebuilding, but also political-economic restructuring, reflecting the 
multifaceted ways in which different types of post-war reform affect society. From 
the point of view of its modes of operation, intervention can thus entail institutional 
reform (as analysed by much of the literature on transitions (see Linz and Stepan 
1996; Stark and Bruszt 1998), ‘non-linear’ forms of intervention aimed at making 
institutional reform more viable in complex post-war settings (Chandler 2013), and 
in general attempts at producing transformations at the social level, from below 
(Gabay and Death 2012). Part of the process of intervention can be the establishment 
of authoritative transitional justice narratives through the establishment of specific 
mechanisms such as courts and commissions. These processes contribute to define 
justice meanings, and, to a certain extent, delimit the officially accepted boundaries 
of justice processes. 
The international intervention in the justice sphere thus can, on the one hand, 
have an important discursive impact, defining the meaning of justice in a specific 
way, and giving rise to established interpretations that inevitably push other 
conceptions to the side (Merry 1990). Like other human rights-related projects, 
transitional justice as a set of international norms embodied by transitional 
institutions is characterised by ‘universalism’, as such norms and claims are 
introduced into local settings and acted upon within existing social and political 
structures (Goodale 2009, 15). On the other hand, norms and institutions structure 
the process of adjudication of justice claims, and therefore they give voice to some 
groups, do justice in some ways, and in doing so they draw boundaries that delimit 
the community of people entitled to participate to such adjudication. Legal processes, 
for instance, have the double function of promoting stability and justice, and posing 
barriers against certain claims or even representing a space of contention (Gray 2012). 




traditional state-centric ‘Westphalian’ model (Fraser 2005, 69-70). Transitional justice, 
as developed during the 1990s, was an internationally-led endeavour that placed 
international organisations in a privileged position as initiators, guarantors and 
sponsors of post-war justice processes. In post-conflict settings, power relations are 
thus tilted in favour of international actors, called to engage with justice issues 
directly in framing justice problems and possible remedies. 
Studying the practice of transitional justice, however, requires not only taking 
into account the impact of transitional justice as an international programme, but also 
analysing the role of other aspects of the international intervention that might have 
affected the emergence of specific types of justice claims. Justice processes cannot, 
indeed, be isolated from the broader processes of post-war and post-socialist 
transition. The social relations and power structures within which justice processes 
are embedded are not only linked to dominant interpretations and practices of 
internationally-sanctioned transitional justice, but to the broader political economy 
of the transition as a whole. As forthcoming chapters will show, this entails putting 
in relation local experiences, conceptions, and forms of agency with policies and 
reforms that reflect international priorities for liberalisation, marketization and 
privatisation.  The thesis will thus adopt a relational approach, involving the joint 
analysis of these claims and of the ways in which the international intervention (in 
its different manifestations) affects their development and chances of success. 
 
 
2.4 Research design  
The overarching research question of the thesis, as outlined in the Introduction, is: 
what is the role of socioeconomic justice and injustice in war and transition, and how 
do post-war societies deal with socioeconomic injustice? More specifically, the thesis 
looks at the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina and tries to understand how the complex 
interaction between the war, socioeconomic violence, and the fall of the socialist 
system, has shaped local experiences of conflict and of the transition. As mentioned 
in Chapter 1, while the transitional justice literature debates the relationship between 
socioeconomic justice and mechanisms for dealing with the past, there is still little 
empirical research conducted on how socioeconomic violence actually manifests 




local communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina have experienced socioeconomic injustice, 
when this has happened, and how these experiences relate to other forms of injustice 
that are more commonly studied. This question will be answered in Chapter 4.  
A second, crucial aspect of the question relates to how local communities develop 
conceptions of justice as a result of specific experiences of socioeconomic justice. 
Chapter 5 thus discusses how Bosnians conceive of justice, what role do 
socioeconomic issues play in these conceptions and whether these ‘justice paradigms’ 
are characterised by an overlap of different justice claims, possibly including 
recognition and representation alongside redistribution. Developing specific 
conceptions of justice does not necessarily entail social mobilisation, but it can 
provide the basis for this. An important spin-off of this second question is thus 
whether socioeconomic justice claims have led to protests or other forms of action on the part 
of the affected communities. The final chapter of the thesis, Chapter 6, is thus dedicated 
to answering this question.  
While the thesis adopts a bottom-up perspective that is centred on the role of 
local communities, their experiences, voice, and agency, the theory section of this 
Chapter has emphasised the importance of taking into account the role of the 
international intervention in shaping post-war justice processes. It is thus necessary 
for this research project to identify the ways in which the international intervention affects 
socioeconomic justice issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Before moving on to the analysis 
of local experiences and justice paradigms, Chapter 3 will thus show that transitional 
justice policies on economic issues and political-economic reforms provide a 
necessary background against which we should evaluate the emergence of 




Methodology is the set of ‘assumptions about the ways in which knowledge is 
produced’, providing guidance on the question of ‘how can we go about acquiring 
[…] knowledge?’ (Grix 2002, 179-180), and consists of the ‘procedures and choices by 
which theory becomes analysis’ (Hansen 2006, 1), which is inevitably shaped by the 
researcher’s epistemological viewpoint. The thesis adopts a critical approach aimed 




developing a better understanding of the socioeconomic dimension of transitional 
justice processes. Theory is understood to have a guiding role in the research process, 
that ‘does not determine how we see the world but helps devise questions and 
strategies for exploring it’ (Kincheloe and McLaren 2005, 306). At the same time, 
researchers should approach the field while open to new findings and anomalies that 
do not necessarily conform to the theoretical framework, but contribute to reconstruct 
it (Burawoy 1998, 10 and 16-21).5 
 In answering the questions of what is the role of socioeconomic injustice in 
war and transition, and how post-war societies deal with it, the thesis focuses on the 
case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose background was presented in the 
Introduction. The case of Bosnia is critical case for the relevance of socioeconomic 
justice in post-war justice processes. In a setting where transitional justice 
programmes focused on redressing interethnic violence, and where competing 
narratives about the war centre around the importance of identity, showing that 
socioeconomic justice matters can provide a boost to arguments in favour of its 
inclusion – or at least consideration – in the transitional justice paradigm or post-war 
justice processes. A case study is usually understood as ‘the intensive study of a 
single case where the purpose of the study is – at least in part – to shed light on a 
larger set of cases’ (Gerring 2006, 20; see also George and Bennet 2005 for a similar 
definition). In this perspective, single case studies are nested within the comparative 
method: they can be used as deviant cases in order to modify theory (Lijphart 1962, 
692), they can serve the purpose of a plausibility probe or a building block for new 
theories and hypotheses (Halperin and Heath 2012). Rather than seeking to explicitly 
insert the Bosnian case within a comparative framework, the thesis is best served by 
a case study methodology because it allows for the in-depth and context-specific 
analysis of post-war justice processes at the local level. This methodological choice 
seems particularly important given that the aim of the thesis is to bring to light 
aspects of local experiences that are currently obscured by dominant approaches to 
                                                          
5 The researcher is thus never entirely separated from the object of its research. The case 
study itself can be understood as ‘theoretically constructed object’: it is the ‘theory we bring 
to the site that turns it into a case of something’ (Burawoy 2009b, 36). More specifically, the 
‘case’ is ‘doubly constituted: realistically by the social forces within which it is embedded 
and the social processes it expresses, and imaginatively by the position we hold in the field 




the study of transitional justice. The case study is also suited for enriching our 
theoretical understanding of the relationship between socioeconomic justice and 
transitional justice.  
The methodology of this project combines the use of a case study with a sub-
national comparison between the cities of Prijedor and Zenica. It has been argued that 
sub-national comparisons can help address some of the limitations of case study 
research, for instance remedying ‘invalid part-to-whole mappings’, where one 
thoroughly researched region is mistakenly taken as representative of the whole 
country, and by revealing spatial variations in processes of political and economic 
change (Snyder 2001, 99 and 100-103). The selection of these two cities contributes to 
addressing the problematic over-representation of Sarajevo and other more common 
research sites, whose views might indeed have become normalised as constituting 
the basis of our knowledge of justice processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, despite 
the specificity of the city’s experience of the war and post-war period.6  
 
Table 2.1 Fieldwork: summary of key information 
Total duration of fieldwork  9 months, between 2014 and 2016  
Main period of data collection  April – September 2015  
Cities targeted for the research  Prijedor (Republica Srpska)  
Sarajevo (Federation of BiH) 
Zenica (Federation of BiH)  
Other locations frequently visited  Banja Luka (Republica Srpska)  
Mostar (Federation of BiH)  
Tuzla (Federation of BiH) 
Main methods of data collection Semi-structured interviews  
Ethnographic observation and field notes  
 
In addition to their similar past as ‘typical socialist era working-class’ cities 
(Bose 2002, 15), Prijedor and Zenica also share the distance from the heavy presence 
of international actors that characterises Sarajevo. Prijedor and Zenica were known 
                                                          
6 It should be noted that Prijedor has been better represented in the transitional justice 
literature compared to Zenica, and thus we cannot assume the two cities are equally under-
researched. The research has however addressed different issues compared to other 
transitional justice studies, and targeted participants that were unlikely to have been 




for their mining and steel industry respectively, and it should also be noted that the 
iron ore extracted in Prijedor was transported to the steel mill in Zenica in order to 
be processed. After the war, during which industrial production almost came to a 
halt, one of Prijedor’s iron ore mines and the Zenica steel mill were acquired by the 
same multinational company, ArcelorMittal. Their post-war experience of the 
transition has been characterised by economic decline, and demographic and social 
changes. These two cases have been thus chosen because their in-depth analysis could 
potentially displace established interpretations of the war, of wartime injustices, and 
especially post-war justice processes. The selection of Prijedor and Zenica is also 
aimed at uncovering how experiences and conceptions of justice might differ based 
on different war events and conflict outcomes. Zenica remained under the control of 
Bosniak forces during the war, while Prijedor was taken over by the Bosnian Serb 
VRS and witnessed war crimes and crimes against humanity against the non-Serb 
population. Therefore, in order to show how past experiences and the interaction 
with the transitional justice framework can operate differently, the research looks at 
cities with different levels of interethnic violence and political economies of conflict.  
Against this methodological background, the development of the research 
design had to respond to the research question (and sub-questions). The following 
sections thus explain the methodological choices made in order to achieve the 
following aims: understand experiences of socioeconomic injustice and conceptions 
of justice, from the perspective of the local Bosnian communities; situating these 
experiences and justice claims within the context of the international intervention in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina; research the extent to which socioeconomic justice 
informed local agency and social mobilisation, by looking more in depth at the case 
of the 2014 protests. The following sections address these questions with reference to 
the methods of data collection and analysis.  
 
 
2.4.2 Research methods: data collection and analysis 
The overall aim of the research is of a qualitative nature – the deep understanding of 
local perspectives on the relevance of socioeconomic justice, and its connection to the 
transitional justice paradigm. The thesis thus approaches the international 




seemed particularly apt for this project, providing a guidance on the key themes and 
questions to be addressed, while leaving sufficient flexibility depending on the 
circumstances of the interview (Babbie 2010), and allowing for a certain degree of 
more spontaneous interaction between the researcher and the respondent. In order 
to uncover social perceptions of injustice and conceptions of justice, interviews with 
workers in Zenica and Prijedor have focused on their personal stories and 
experiences through the war and transition. Other researchers have also used focus 
groups to study similar contexts, as they offer advantages for researching the social 
construction of narratives through more spontaneous exchange (Sokolić 2016), 
among other things. In this case, interviews were preferred for several reasons. The 
socioeconomic dimension of wartime violence is still a little-explored issue, and in 
such context one-on-one interviews might allow participants to report their 
experiences in more depth (Josselson 2013, 5), and without frequent interruptions.  In 
addition to this, interviews better responded to the research aim of collecting stories 
that reflected the participants’ own experiences and perception of those experiences 
(Seidman 2006). In the few instances where I conducted interviews in small groups 
(at the participants’ request), the personal account of wartime socioeconomic injustice 
and its interpretation received less attention and time compared to the discussion of 
justice claims deriving from those experiences. Last but not least, problems related to 
access inevitably shaped the choice of research method. My position as a foreign 
young woman with a non-native knowledge of the local language inevitably affected 
some of my research choices. Within this context, adopting focus groups as the main 
research method might have made it more difficult to implement other important 
research choices, such as looking for participants outside of the formal civil society 
sector.  
The decision to research justice issues at the margins of conventional 
processes led me to target of specific groups for participation in the research. 
Participants were recruited through a strategy that combined snowball sampling and 
an approach aimed at ‘maximum variation’ (Tansey 2007; Ongwebuzie and Collins 
2007) on the basis of personal characteristics, such as gender, age, place of residence 
within the city, or status as a returnee/member of the Bosnian diaspora. Rather 
relying on established organisations, this thesis adopts an approach that is 




society’ (Kelly and Dembour 2007, 7). Therefore, I have specifically reached out to 
‘common citizens’ and in particular groups that are socially marginalised or 
subordinated (Lather 2004, 208). Given the thesis focus on socioeconomic justice, I 
interviewed workers or former workers, who suffered from losing the important 
place they occupied (or thought they occupied) in the Yugoslav society. As a social 
class, workers do not enjoy full participatory parity in a system that privileges 
ethnicity as a defining trait of one’s belonging to the society. In Zenica, most of the 
workers interviewed were employed in the steel plant, now owned by ArcelorMittal. 
In Prijedor, interviewees had been employed in many of the city’s businesses, 
including the mines, the ceramics sector, the paper mill, and so on. It should also be 
noted that while I tried not to use ethnicity as a criterion for recruiting participants 
for the study, this element inevitably affected my work in Prijedor, where the war 
was characterised by interethnic violence. Potential respondents of Serb ethnicity 
seemed more suspicious of me and were difficult to approach, and as a result many 
of the workers interviewed in Prijedor might be characterised as Bosniaks, Croats, or 
of mixed background. Respondents were not directly asked about their ethnicity 
during the interviews. I left them the choice of disclosing it or discussing it if they felt 
it was relevant to answer my questions. 
Interviews were conducted in Bosnian or English, in person (except for one 
email interview, and one conducted on Skype). Most of the interviews were audio 
recorded, always with the consent of research participants. I often explained that, as 
I was conducting interviews in a foreign language, recording would allow me to 
avoid missing important information, as I would have more time to listen and 
transcribe the material at home. In a few cases interviewees asked me not to record 
the interview, and I took notes manually during our conversations. In one 
circumstance, I conducted an interview with an activist (in English) while walking 
around the streets of Sarajevo and I could only write down notes after we separated. 
Luckily, however, in most cases I was able to have a record of the interview and 
analyse the authentic words of the interviewees. In addition to interviews, the thesis 
also draws on many informal conversations with people in Prijedor, Sarajevo, Zenica 





Table 2.2 Interviewees 
Banja Luka  1 
Mostar  1 
Prijedor  19 
Sarajevo  29 
Tuzla  4 
Zenica  22 
Other  1 (Vienna, via Skype)  
Total number of interview sessions  77 
Total number of interviewees  767 
 
The interviews done in Prijedor and Zenica, or with people from the area 
based in Sarajevo, constituted the bulk of the research. However, the thesis’ aim to 
research the involvement of the international intervention in post-war justice 
processes, with specific reference to socioeconomic issues, called for conducting 
interviews with international officials as well. Sarajevo hosts a number of 
international organisations, including several UN offices, the OSCE, the EU, the High 
Representative of the International Community, and others. Only few of these 
organisations have local offices in smaller towns. International organisations were 
contacted via email or phone, and through personal contacts in the Bosnian capital. 
This set of interviews was mostly used to gather the internationals’ views on justice 
issues in post-war Bosnia, including socioeconomic issues and international policies 
adopted to address these. While in Sarajevo, I have also interviewed Non-
Governmental Organisations, particularly on their views of socioeconomic justice 
and justice issues more in general, and their involvement with (or support of) the 
2014 protests.  
With respect to researching forms of social mobilisation, the focus of the 
research needed to be broadened beyond Prijedor and Zenica. In addition to studying 
mobilisation in these two cities, I targeted activists involved during the 2014 protests 
throughout the country. Started in the industrial town of Tuzla and sparked by 
                                                          
7 The two numbers differ because some informants were interviewed more than once, and 





socioeconomic problems left unaddressed in the post-war and post-socialist 
transition, the protests spread throughout the BiH, and led to the creation of a 
network of activists and groups whose agency with respect to socioeconomic justice 
issues can only be truly appreciated by adopting a country-wide outlook. Interviews 
have therefore been conducted with activists from Prijedor and Zenica, as well as 
other cities involved in the protest movement from 2014. This led me to travel to 
Mostar, Banja Luka, Tuzla, and to stay in touch with activists from other smaller 
towns and with the Austrian organisation that funded some of their activities in the 
aftermath of the protests. In-depth insights about how social mobilisation for 
socioeconomic justice developed also stem from the direct observation of the 
meetings of the Zenica ‘Plenum’ in the summer of 2015, from the material published 
by them as well as by other groups.8 Focusing on these grassroots groups, therefore, 
allows for the analysis of different patterns of agency compared to what emerges 
from engaging with NGOs and workers, and to show how these different local 
groups interacted in varied ways with the transition process and the international 
intervention as a whole. 
The thesis also relied on other primary material collected during the fieldwork 
and remotely, from online sources. This includes documents produced by 
international organisations such as the EU, UNDP, OHR, World Bank, IMF and 
EBRD, but also documents that were handed to me by some of the NGOs or activist 
groups I visited, and by the offices of the development agencies of Prijedor and 
Zenica. I gathered material from activists working in cities like Tuzla and Sarajevo 
after meeting them, and in Prijedor and Zenica where I lived for longer periods of 
time during my fieldwork. I have collected copies of the bulletin (“Bilten”) produced 
by the Plenum in Zenica since autumn 2015, and archived all relevant material from 
the protests available on the website Bosnia-Herzegovina Protest Files. Lastly, field 
notes were used to write up observations of protests, events organised by 
international organisations or local NGOs, and most importantly the meetings of the 
Plenum group of activists in Zenica in the summer of 2015. 
                                                          
8 A large portion of the material produced during the protests was gathered online at 




The interpretation and analysis of the material is sensitive to the researcher’s 
own positionality. The inclusion of research locations and target groups that have 
remained outside the beaten track of researchers in Bosnia and Herzegovina offered 
opportunities, but also posed challenges. Research is inevitably affected by the lack 
of an ‘Archimedean standpoint’ for the researcher in the field, as ‘we are always 
inserted somewhere in the site, which has grave consequences for what we see’ 
(Burawoy 2009, 37). Being a young Italian woman characterised me as an outsider to 
most participants in Bosnia. My background as a UK-educated researcher was very 
familiar to interviewees working for international organisations and NGOs in 
Sarajevo, but not to most people I talked to in Prijedor and Zenica. My working 
knowledge of Bosnian and my decision to move to these locations for some periods 
of time allowed me to access those sites and interact with people. Although my 
prolonged presence in the country and (far from perfect) language skills gained me 
the label of ‘bostranac’ according to one participant,9 I was still very much aware that 
my appearance, speech and gender made me stand out, and inevitably affected the 
way in which participants perceived me and answered my questions. As Gallagher 
(2015, 3) observes, though,  ‘the ‘catastrophic’ aspects of fieldwork can be the most 
illuminating as they force researchers into a re-evaluation not only of their 
conceptions of the ‘other’ but of themselves too’. 
Leaving aside some of the primary sources used as a background or to 
reconstruct relevant events, interview transcripts are analysed with the aim to reveal 
local interpretations of socioeconomic justice and its relation to post-war justice in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The analysis involves going ‘back and forth’ between the 
text and the interpretation, the words of the interviewees and the broader context, 
and connecting the meanings and interpretations emerging from the interviews to 
the broader social power structures, rather than just describing them (Lather 2004). 
Much of the interview material from Zenica and Prijedor is concerned with 
experiences and justice claims that derive from them. They also have to do with how 
people remember socialism and the way in which this affects their understanding of 
today’s world. These experiences, memories and narratives are thus not ‘uniquely 
                                                          
9 A mix of ‘bosanac’, meaning Bosnian, and ‘stranac’, foreigner. Interview SA/15/20, 




biographical or autobiographical materials, and they certainly do not convey 
unmediated private “experience”’, but they are constructed and enacted (Atkinson 
and Delamont 2005, 825). In sum, the interview material is not used to reconstruct an 
objective account of specific wartime violations (through they contribute to 
strengthening secondary sources in some cases), but mostly to analyse the way in 
which people make sense of these experiences and memories, and how they inform 
local conceptions of justice and justice claims.  
Part of the interview analysis thus consisted in reconstructing local 
interpretations of socioeconomic injustice in war and during the transition process, 
but also in identifying common understandings of socioeconomic justice and justice 
claims. Rather than developing specific codes for analysis, the interviews were 
scrutinised for common themes or broader categories that emerged from the accounts 
given by research participants. The theory guided the analysis towards experiences 
of injustice and justice claims that were grounded in the political economy of conflict 
and had to do with redistribution. Within this general field, the interview material 
revealed a variety of ways in which local communities experienced socioeconomic 
injustice, or various ways in which they developed justice claims. At the same time, 
the analysis was sufficiently open-ended as to allow the emergence of patterns or 
issues that were not necessarily anticipated. For instance, interviews about 
experiences of injustice not only revealed that socioeconomic justice was felt during 
the war and continued in the transition process, but that the meaning of transition 
itself and its temporal boundaries were much more contested than expected, and 
definitely went beyond academic definitions focused on the establishment of the rule 
of law and liberal democratic institutions. 
The question of how people in Prijedor and Zenica make sense of 
socioeconomic justice was particularly challenging, especially in light of the difficulty 
of expressing one’s own thinking in response to specific prompts, and in a context 
that is abstracted from the experience of the phenomenon under scrutiny (Autesserre 
2014, 275). Thus, in order to meaningfully present conceptions of justice emerging 
from local communities, the analysis relies on answers to direct questions (for 
instance, what does justice mean for you?), but complements it with references made, 
throughout the interview, to ‘egocentric’ (related to one’s own situation) or 




Mondak 1997; Kleugel and Mason 2004). Kluegel and Mason (2004) find that 
sociotropic evaluations of fairness are particularly important in explaining people’s 
attitudes towards the perceived legitimacy of the new economic and political order 
in Eastern Europe. Looking at statements that refer to justice in relation to personal 
circumstances or to how social groups are fair allows us to corroborate findings 
deriving from answers to direct questions.  
 
Table 2.3 Analysis of interviews with workers and activists 
Socioeconomic injustice  
 Experiences of war  
 Experiences of transition  
 Possible overlap/intersection of different forms of injustice  
 Emerging category: meaning of transition  
 
Conceptions of justice and justice claims  
 Conceptions of justice: socioeconomic justice as redistribution  
 Perception of one’s situation and justice claims (egocentric and sociotropic evaluations) 
 Justice claims: affirmative/transformative; backward-looking/forward-looking  
 
Social mobilisation  
 Origins of the protests  
 Links between wartime socioeconomic injustice, transition, and protest claims  
 Socioeconomic justice claims and forms of mobilisation  
 
2.5 Ethical issues  
This sections considers research ethics from the point of view of formal procedures 
and more substantial ethical dilemmas involved in conducting research in post-
conflict settings such as Bosnia and Herzegovina. Concerning the first aspect, the 
research project has taken into account the College Research Ethics Guidelines,10 and 
                                                          
10 Royal Holloway, University of London, Research Ethics Guidelines, updated August 2010, 
available at 
<https://www.royalholloway.ac.uk/iquad/collegepolicies/documents/pdf/research/rese




sought ethical approval at the Departmental level as appropriate. Participants were 
informed of the scope of the research. To this end, an information sheet and consent 
form was redacted in English and Bosnian. Participants were offered the opportunity 
to remain anonymous in the research. Particular care has been taken in keeping the 
identity of the citizens from Prijedor and Zenica concealed, and they are referred to 
in the thesis through pseudonyms (using Bosnian names that reflect their gender). 
Where information was obtained during conversations or interviews with 
international officials, this is reported in the text without indicating their specific 
role.11 Interview files and transcripts were password protected to minimise the risk 
of strangers gaining access to them. The content of the interviews is generally not of 
a sensitive nature but, given the occurrence of incidents involving activists in parts 
of Bosnia, caution is advisable.  
Beyond such measures aimed at respecting basic principles of ethical 
research, doing fieldwork in a post-conflict setting requires a deeper engagement 
with some questions related to the research site, Bosnia, and the relationship between 
researcher and participants. The difficulties of conducting research post-war 
countries have often been discussed by researchers working on Bosnia. Clark (2012b, 
825), for example, argues for an approach where ‘ethical issues are addressed, 
discussed, and negotiated in a co-learning environment as the research progresses’ 
and with the involvement of interviewees. Doing research in these contexts raises 
questions on the legitimacy that non-local researchers have in speaking for local 
communities (Robben and Nordstrom 1995, 10-11), especially if we consider their 
presence as a form of Western intervention onto non-Western places (Spivak 1988). 
Conducting research on the implications of international intervention in Bosnia 
effectively reproduces some of the problems of the international intervention itself, 
as researchers work, just like international officials, ‘as if they are “the experts” in the 
field while locals are reduced to being mere observers’, leading to an ‘over-
participation’ of internationals’ (Stanley 2009b, 278). In the case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and Sarajevo in particular, I have experienced frustration on the part of 
                                                          
11 Supervisors and examiners are provided with a list of interviewees that includes the 
names of international officials who participated in the study, which should remain 
confidential. Direct quotes from them could only be used after seeking permission from 




the locals for the prominent role played by internationals in researching the country’s 
process of dealing with the past. In many cases, what was noted by interviewees 
working in the NGO sector in Sarajevo was that foreign researchers were too present. 
The field of research was somehow ‘exhausted’, having accommodated many 
undergraduate students, postgraduate students and more experienced researchers 
over the years. Worryingly, in many cases NGOs had not seen research results, 
despite the fact that they might have been potentially useful for their work. Some 
organisations have admitted refusing interview requests during busy periods, and 
have established more stringent rules for accessing the organisation.12 While a large 
part of my fieldwork was conducted in other cities where this problem was not 
present, I do think that it is important that researchers make an effort to make 
participants aware of findings to which they have contributed.  
With respect to the relationship between researcher and participants, smaller 
cities presented more challenges compared to Sarajevo, where international officials, 
NGO workers and activists are used to the presence of foreign researchers. Power 
relations are always at play in interview research. It is thus important to take into 
account how they ‘might affect the generation of evidence’ and consider ‘whether 
research relationships are likely to be neutral, friendly, professional, or possibly even 
hostile’ (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 62). Such relations can be affected by many 
factors. On the one hand, the presentation of one’s self, including gender, age, 
physical appearance and attire plays a role (Ibid.). On the other hand, the researcher’s 
attitude and personal disposition towards participants, such as feelings of empathy, 
also plays a role in these relationships. According to Clark, in some difficult research 
contexts, such as Bosnia, empathy can be a more ethical choice than remaining 
objective (Clark 2012b, 883-834). My gender and strangeness to the local context in 
some ways facilitated the access to interviewees,13 although they also placed me in a 
                                                          
12 One interviewee said ‘we cannot employ one person just to respond to requests and do 
interviews’ (Interview SA/15/27, Fondacija Lokalne Demokratije, Sarajevo 5 November 
2015).  
13 Although not always: in Prijedor I struggled getting in touch with members of the Serb 
community. This might be due to the fact that most foreign researchers studying the city 
have done so from the perspective of interethnic violence perpetrated by the Bosnian Serb 
police and armed forces, and perhaps assumed this was also the topic of my research. This 
could have entailed, in their view, a more hostile attitude on my part compared to what 




subordinated social positions in contexts where I could be perceived as a young 
woman interacting with older Bosnian men, especially when in a group. At the same 
time, and especially after leaving the field, the researcher has the power of 
representing and naming people in specific ways, ‘the power to designate people, 
places, and events as mattering, or as mattering in a certain way or, by omission, as 
not mattering at all’ (Daupinhée 2007, 64). This matters for how knowledge of a 
specific place in constructed in the academic world, where foreign experts on a 
specific region act as epistemic gatekeepers. It is thus up to researchers to take steps 
in order to make their research accessible to participants and local communities more 
in general. This can be done by sending copies of the dissertation, shorter summaries 
written for practitioners that could be circulated among those who have taken part in 




This chapter concludes the first part of the thesis, which has laid out the groundwork 
for the study conducted in the following chapters. It has answered the conceptual 
and methodological questions raised by the literature review, paying particular 
attention to the ways in which debates on the role of socioeconomic justice within 
transitional justice can shape and guide future research.  Drawing on the contribution 
of scholars that have challenged the conventional functions of transitional justice 
(Lambourne 2009, 2014; Sharp 2012, 2014), and on Fraser’s work on the nature of 
justice claims (1995, 2003, 2005), I have defined socioeconomic justice as 
redistribution. Justice is thus understood as a multi-faceted concept, and claims 
emerging from injustices rooted in the political economy of war form part of it. This 
                                                          
14 Interviewees who dedicate much time to talking with researchers have indeed started 
asking something back. In most cases, they have requested that I send them copies of my 
work once this is completed. While they might be put off from reading a whole doctoral 
dissertation, shorter summaries written for practitioners could be circulated among those 
who have taken part in the study. In one case, a participant agreed to be interviewed in 
exchange for either promoting the web page of the organisation he works for, or writing a 
short article for their website. I agreed and chose the latter option, and decided to write 
exactly about the ethical issues involved in doing research in Bosnia and Herzegovina. See 
the Mreža Mira website, ‘Some reflections on doing research in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 13 
April 2016, <https://www.mreza-mira.net/vijesti/clanci/reflections-research-bosnia-




conceptualisation of socioeconomic justice engages with the constraints and 
problems posed by the peculiar condition of Bosnia as a ‘post-war’ and ‘post-socialist’ 
country, which has significant implications for the development of socioeconomic 
justice claims from the bottom-up. This underscores the importance of looking at the 
role of the international intervention in Bosnia, and the different ways in which it has 
shaped the boundaries of post-war justice processes. The first part of the thesis has 
also noted how justice can be understood as a contested practice, embedded in 
processes of public deliberation and struggle for the expression of claims originating 
from marginalised social groups.  
The second part of Chapter 2 engages with methodological questions. Starting 
from a critical approach, the thesis aims at challenging established conceptions of 
post-war justice, and analysing marginalised aspects of the process of dealing with 
the past. A case study methodology is particularly useful for providing a rich 
contextual answer to the research question, as well as furthering our theoretical 
understanding of the relationship between socioeconomic justice and transitional 
justice. In order to support this endeavour, the thesis also relies on a sub-national 
comparison between the cities of Prijedor and Zenica, which represent two different 
instances of wartime violence, and as a result – as Chapter 4 and 5 will show – interact 
with the international intervention in the justice field in different ways. The following 
chapters will also provide an illustration of how the methods of data collection and 
analysis discussed in this chapter have been used in practice. The methodological 






SOCIOECONOMIC JUSTICE ISSUES BETWEEN TRANSITIONAL 




The thesis is concerned with understanding how post-war societies deal with 
socioeconomic injustice. As international actors are heavily involved in justice 
processes in these contexts, Chapter 3 raises the question of how we can make sense 
of such involvement: what was the role of the international intervention in post-war 
Bosnia with respect to socioeconomic justice? What place does socioeconomic justice 
occupy within the transitional justice effort in BiH, and within the intervention in the 
post-socialist economic reform process? Setting the ground for the following chapter, 
which will investigate experiences of socioeconomic injustice lived by local 
communities in Zenica and Prijedor, here we analyse the different ways in which 
international discourses, transitional justice efforts, and socioeconomic reforms dealt 
with socioeconomic problems in post-war Bosnia. Discursive limitations in defining, 
studying and applying justice played a role in the marginalisation of socioeconomic 
justice, as does the limited approach to the socioeconomic dimension of transitional 
justice as incorporated in return programmes, reparations, and other aspects of 
reparative justice. Most importantly, however, economic and social reforms 
promoted by the international institutions at the end of the conflict were carried out 
without taking into account justice considerations and thus posed significant 
obstacles to achieving socioeconomic justice as redistribution. The argument 
advanced here is that the international intervention was limited in a twofold manner: 
first, by its narrow understanding of socioeconomic justice; second, by the priorities 
embedded in post-socialist economic reforms, which left no space for justice 
considerations.  
Chapter 3 addresses some of the concerns raised in Chapter 1 on the 
insufficient attention paid to the relationship between dealing with past crimes, 




between the transitional justice literature and the study of post-socialist reform by 
analysing the socioeconomic aspect of transitional justice measures, and by 
discussing the justice implications of socioeconomic reforms. Second, it draws on the 
debate on the socioeconomic dimension of transitional justice presented in the 
literature review to show how transitional justice programmes in Bosnia relied on a 
more traditional understanding of the socioeconomic dimension of transitional 
justice as a form of material compensation.  
As energies were directed towards retributive transitional justice 
programmes, international actors gave limited space to socioeconomic remedies for 
wartime violence. Socioeconomic justice within the international intervention, and 
transitional justice specifically, focused on addressing consequences of violations 
against personal integrity, or of forcible displacement. The socioeconomic 
consequences of the war were instead targeted by internationally-sponsored 
economic reforms. Far from being understood as justice issues, however, they were 
seen as problems to be tackled through market liberalisation. In some cases, they 
might have exacerbated – perhaps unintendedly – some of the socioeconomic justice 
issues to be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, or pose problems of meta-political 
misrepresentation where reforms are conducted with little local input or in such a way 
that limits the potential for organised opposition to the will of international 
institutions.  Overall, the chapter thus gives an indication of how limited the space 
for the emergence of socioeconomic claims was in post-war Bosnia, given transitional 
justice’s limited reach in the socioeconomic sphere, and the lack of integration 
between justice considerations and other spheres of the international intervention 
that were subordinated to economic priorities.  
Following a brief discussion of the limited ways in which international 
organisations working in Bosnia understand the concept of justice, the second section 
addresses the more specific issue of socioeconomic justice within transitional justice 
efforts. It reviews programmes related to return, reparations, and missing people, to 
show how they tapped on the first conceptualisation of the socioeconomic dimension 
of transitional justice, rather than on the second. It also shows how the 
implementation of socioeconomic provisions has been haphazard and inconsistent. 
The third and last substantive section of the chapter moves on to discussing neoliberal 




problems. In analysing this issue, this section focuses on macroeconomic policy, 
privatisations and industrial policy, and labour law and social policy. The conclusion 
summarises the contribution of this chapter as laying the basis for the following three 
longer empirical chapters. While this part of the thesis considers where the top-down 
element of international intervention more carefully and systematically, the 
remaining empirical chapters (4-6) adopt a grassroots perspective and go to the heart 




3.1 Setting discursive boundaries: international perspectives on justice in BiH   
The background of transitional justice efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina is well 
known and has been thoroughly researched by scholars over the past two decades. 
The establishment of the ICTY during the Bosnian war can be interpreted as both an 
attempt to give the impression that the international community was taking a more 
active approach towards the conflict, short of military intervention (Gow 1997; 
Williams and Scharf 2002), as well as the sign that the new paradigm of liberal 
peacebuilding would include a dimension of accountability for violations of 
International Humanitarian Law, reflecting a growing international consensus that 
doing justice would foster peace and reconciliation. The decision to focus transitional 
justice efforts on individual accountability for war crimes was a product of its time, 
and part of a broader tendency within transitional justice practices to prefer legalistic 
solutions (Teitel 2003; McEvoy 2008). Prosecutions at the ICTY and in local tribunals 
were accompanied by less developed and less funded mechanisms for compensation 
and restitution, discussed in the following section. In practice, international 
organizations working in Bosnia and Herzegovina became soon aware of the 
limitations of an approach focused on retributive justice, and tried to support local 
authorities in developing a more comprehensive transitional justice strategy. While 
this attempt ultimately failed, the space occupied by war crimes prosecutions within 
the transitional justice discourse also led to an increasing specialization of 
international officials dealing with these issues in BiH, and contributed to creating a 
compartmentalized view of justice that kept separate transitional justice, the rule of 




With respect to the transitional justice strategy, the UNDP coordinated 
consultations with international stakeholders and a wide range of local actors, 
including government representatives and civil society actors.  The strategy was 
drafted, but never adopted by the Bosnian government. The document is however 
useful for understanding the international community’s approach to socioeconomic 
issues within the scope of transitional justice. Most notably, socioeconomic issues 
within the document are discussed in relation to reparation, which is understood to 
include compensation, restitution, rehabilitation, different forms of satisfaction and 
guarantees of non repetition.1 The working group on reparations and memorials was 
composed of representatives coming from associations of missing people, veterans, 
women, former camp detainees, and civilian victims.2 While compensation in the 
form of social transfers are the most common form of reparation for Bosnian victims, 
and restitution of properties forcibly abandoned during the war was envisaged by 
the Dayton Peace Agreement, the document calls for an expansion in the scope of 
action of reparations programmes, for instance by incorporating gender 
considerations.3 This concern for socioeconomic remedies emerges also from 
interviews conducted with NGOs working in the field of transitional justice in 
Sarajevo.4 It also identifies problems with legal proceedings on compensation, and 
with respect to the different treatment of civilian and military victims.5 Interestingly, 
the document also mentions that social expenditures are constrained by international 
pressures for budget stabilisation, which is linked to international loans granted to 
Bosnia.6 This marginal reference to the context of socioeconomic reforms within 
which transitional justice mechanisms have to operate seems to weight justice 
                                                          
1 Strategija Tranzicijske Pravde u Bosni i Hercegovini. 2012-2016. Ministarstvo za ljudska 
prava i izbjeglice, Ministarstvo pravde, Radni tekst, p. 16.  
2 Ibid. 117. 
3 Ibid. 46. 
4 NGOs seem to share the internationals’ understanding of socioeconomic justice as the 
remedy provided for crimes that are not necessarily socioeconomic, rather than the view of 
interviewees from Prijedor and Zenica. When asked more directly about socioeconomic 
justice issues understood in the sense of this thesis, some NGO activists explicitly gave their 
own personal opinion rather than the organisation’s. See Interviews SA/15/11, SA/15/26, 
SA/15/27.  
5 Strategija Tranzicijske Pravde u Bosni i Hercegovini, p. 47. 




considerations and economic imperatives, but does not go into further detail in 
considering the social implications of this.  
The limited treatment of socioeconomic issues within the transitional justice 
strategy is indicative of a broader issue, related to how officials working for 
international organisations in BiH tend to understand the concept of justice. In most 
cases, justice is understood as connected to either transitional justice or the rule of 
law (or both). International organisations operating in Bosnia have long been 
invested in transitional justice processes, as these were also embedded in the EU 
conditionality (Rangelov 2006; Batt and Obradović-Wochnik 2009). Supporting the 
rule of law has increasingly become part of peacebuilding processes, in Bosnia and 
other post-conflict countries, partly because of its appealing promise of 
reconstructing the political landscape through seemingly ‘technical’ reforms (Donais 
2013).  Within the field of the rule of law, international organisations have assisted in 
the reform of the police sector (Collantes-Celador 2005; Juncos 2011), as well as 
judiciary. More recently, anti-corruption has also become a central interest of the EU 
Mission in BiH and part of the Reform Agenda.7 When asked about what are the most 
important issues related to the concept of justice in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
most international officials interviewed for this study mention war crimes 
prosecutions, both at the ICTY and within the country, as well as transparent and fair 
judicial proceedings.8 Drawing from these understandings of justice makes it more 
difficult, for many of them, to see the connection between socioeconomic problems 
and justice issues that becomes evident when talking to those who have a direct 
experience of wartime violence.9 Moreover, there is often a separation of competences 
between international officials working on the economic reform process and those 
engaged in the field of transitional justice.10 The reliance on transitional justice experts 
                                                          
7 BiH Anticorruption Strategy 2015-2019. Agencija za prevenciju korupcije i koordinaciju 
borbe protiv korupcije, Sarajevo, December 2014, available at <http://rai-see.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/Final-ACS-sent-to-the-CoM.pdf>, accessed 30 Setpember 2016.  
8 Interview SA/15/1, International official, 30 April 2015, Sarajevo; Interview SA/15/9, 
International official, 27 May 2015, Sarajevo; Interview SA/15/11, International NGO 
official,  4 June 2015, Sarajevo; Interview SA/15/14, International official, 5 August 2015, 
Sarajevo; Interview SA/15/15, International official, 13 August 2015, Sarajevo.  
9 See for instance Interview SA/15/9. 
10 Interview SA/15/1, interview SA/15/4, International official, 6 May 2015, Sarajevo. See 
for instance the separation between the sectors of Justice, Home Affairs and Public 




trained in the field of IHL and war crimes prosecutions inevitably affects what 
becomes known and understandable to policy-makers (Autesserre 2014), thus 
contributing to isolating socioeconomic problems from the concept of justice. This 
issue becomes particularly evident when analysing cases such as the 2014 protests, 
during which socioeconomic justice came to the forefront of public debate, but was 
interpreted by international organisations in terms of economic reforms needed to 
complete Bosnia’s transition to a market economy (see Chapter 6). With respect to the 
present chapter, this compartmentalised view of justice issues that characterises the 
operation of international organisations in Bosnia might contribute to reinforcing the 
problems presented in the following two sections that discuss, in turn, the 
socioeconomic dimension of transitional justice processes, and socioeconomic 
reforms carried out in the post-war period. 
 
 
3.2 The socioeconomic dimension of transitional justice efforts in BiH 
This section looks at where and how socioeconomic issues have been incorporated 
within the transitional justice framework in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
international intervention supported the inclusion of some socioeconomic elements 
in its programmes, but this was too limited and narrowly focused to contribute to 
socioeconomic justice as redistribution. Most importantly, these policies reflect a 
concern with the socioeconomic dimension of transitional justice as the type of 
remedy required to address crimes and violence that were not necessarily 
socioeconomic in nature. These remedies were also implemented in a limited way, 
having only a palliative effect in alleviating socioeconomic injustice. This section 
illustrates this with reference to the socioeconomic components of reparations, return 
processes and the search for missing persons.  
 
 
                                                          
Infrastructures (Section II) and Social Development, Civil Society and Cross-Border 
Operations (Section III) in the EU Mission to BiH, at <http://europa.ba/?page_id=468>, 
accessed 30 September 2016; see the UNDP separation between Justice and Security sector 
and Social Inclusion and Democratic Governance sector, 
<http://www.ba.undp.org/content/bosnia_and_herzegovina/en/home/operations/about




3.2.1 Reparations as war-related payments  
Reparations, defined as ‘compensation, usually of a material kind and often 
specifically monetary, for some past wrong’ (Torpey 2003, 3), are frequently part of 
transitional justice efforts in post-conflict and post-authoritarian contexts, and the 
most explicitly socioeconomic aspect of transitional justice. While reparations can 
often be awarded through state-run, administrative programmes (de Greiff 2006), this 
did not happen in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Already during the war, however, 
victims had tried to get compensation through civil litigation, first outside Bosnia, 
then inside the country (de Vleming and Clark 2014). These efforts were especially 
significant for victims because they contributed to establishing accountability for the 
crimes they suffered and provided acknowledgment, even though the amounts 
awarded in compensation by the courts were rarely if ever paid to them (de Vleming 
and Clark 2014). Ad hoc mechanisms also existed in BiH, such as the Commission for 
Real Property Claims of Displaced Persons and Refugees (CPRC), established by 
Annex 7 of the Dayton Peace Agreement, whose tasks potentially included the 
provision of compensation for property that Bosnians had to abandon during the 
war. The Commission, however, dealt mostly with the restitution of property.11 The 
Human Rights Chamber, on the other hand, was tasked with guaranteeing the 
respect of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in BiH, but its 
jurisdiction only covered the post-1995 period. The Chamber’s mandate, established 
at Dayton, ended in 2003, and cases now fall under the competence of Bosnia’s 
Constitutional Court.12 
Reparations to civilian victims and veterans of war in BiH are mostly paid out 
by the two entities and the Brčko district. While the definition of ‘victim’ provided in 
international documents such as the UN General Assembly’s Declaration of Basic 
Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (UNGA 1985) is wide-
ranging and encompasses those who have ‘suffered harm, including physical or 
mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their 
fundamental rights’, Bosnian laws set stringent criteria to be eligible for war-related 
                                                          
11 See the following sub-section on this. 
12 See the web page of the Human Rights Chamber and its successor Human Rights 





payments. Civilian victims must have at least 60% physical disability in order to get 
access to payments, while veterans need to prove at least 20% (Hronešová 2016, 346; 
Popić and Panjeta 2010, 7). The amounts payable to veterans are also higher than 
those granted to civilian victims, thus further showing the discriminatory nature of 
the system in favour of military personnel at the expense of civilian victims of war.13 
These payments are disbursed monthly and indexed to the average salary of the 
entity in the previous year. Given the way in which it works, the scheme has been 
described as ‘a hybrid of social welfare and reparation’ (Hronešová 2016, 340). 
International actors have also understood this programme in different ways. Popić 
and Panjeta (2010, 16) point out that while the IMF and the World Bank label these 
payments as social transfers or rights-based transfers, the UNDP Transitional Justice 
Guidebook of 2009 refers to them as compensation, and as a form of reparation.  
This discrepancy contributes to highlighting two elements that characterise 
the practice of reparations as socioeconomic justice in BiH. First, the review of the 
literature already made a case that the aims of reparations can be multiple (Laplante 
2014), and encompass backward-looking and forward-looking elements that can 
contribute to the reconstruction of society. In the work of some transitional justice 
scholars, the concept of reparation constitutes the founding element of a different 
paradigm of post-war justice, one that challenges the dominance of justice as 
retribution (Mani 2002), favours an inclusive and survivor-centred approach (Mani 
2005), and values distributive justice as an essential part of the peacebuilding process 
(Lambourne 2009). In the case of Bosnia, money is related to justice in multiple ways: 
it can be understood as a redistribution measure for disadvantaged groups, but also 
a restorative and corrective measure providing a sense of fairness (Begicevic 2016, 
400). Studies such as the one by Hronešová (2016) show that benefits often do not 
target the poorer strata of the population, and their allocation mostly reflect the post-
war transition settlement rather than justice principles.  
Second, the way in which the reparation system was set up as a welfare 
mechanism opens up tensions between the justice aims of these payments and the 
budget constraints imposed by international financial institutions (IFIs). As Popić and 
                                                          
13 Moreover, victims of torture are not entitled to payments unless they can prove they are 
60% disabled. Victims of sexual violence are considered civilian victims and do not have to 




Panjeta (2010, 19-20) already noted in 2010, the IMF and the World Bank asked for 
revisions to the payments systems in order to make it economically more sustainable 
as early as 2002. As Section 3.3 of this chapter shows, these conditions have featured 
in subsequent loan arrangements and continue to be issues of contention today. 
Ultimately, the limitations of the reparations scheme as a form of socioeconomic 
justice are twofold. On the one hand, a collective scheme for reparations that could 
have settled claims against the state and its entities is lacking, and the current system 
of war-related payments has been implemented in a way that systematically 
disempowers civilian victims, thus having a limited redistributive function. On the 
other hand, reparations in BiH are envisaged as a means of redressing serious 
physical harm inflicted by the war, and thus fail to encompass the socioeconomic 
dimension of crimes and violence that characterised the conflict.  
 
 
3.2.2 Return, reconstruction and the search for missing people 
Another important aspect of socioeconomic transitional justice in BiH is what 
Nettelfield and Wagner (2014, 73) call ‘the politics and practice of homecoming’, that 
is, refugee return. This expression suggests that return is a complex process, and 
clearly one that encompasses an important socioeconomic dimension, going well 
beyond the right to return to the country of origin at the end of the war. First, return 
implied the possibility of repossessing one’s home. As Bosnians became refugees or 
internally displaced persons during the conflict, abandoned houses in one entity were 
often occupied by civilians displaced from other areas of the country. The right to 
return was enshrined in the Dayton Peace Agreement, Annex VII (Agreement on 
Refugees and Displaced Persons). Article I of the Agreement stipulated that refugees 
and displaced persons not only had the right to return to Bosnia, but specifically to 
‘their homes of origin’. Under the Agreement, refugees had the right to reclaim 
possession of their property or receive compensation for it. Article VII of Annex VII 
provided for the establishment of a Commission tasked with adjudicating property 
claims. The Commission on Real Property Claims of Refugees and Displaced Persons 
worked from 1996 and 2003, and ‘adopted 311 757 final and binding decisions 




Second, as Jansen (2006) points out, the very concept of ‘return’, for most 
Bosnian refugees, entailed hopes of returning to other aspects of pre-war 
socioeconomic life, including employment. This commonly held hope clashed against 
the practice of return programmes that prioritised ‘small home’ politics (such as 
property restitution) over ‘big home’ politics, defined as ‘efforts to normalize the 
political and socioeconomic structures beyond the confines of private homes’ 
(Stefansson 2006, 116). It also clashed against local authorities’ reluctance to accelerate 
minority returns, that is, the return of people belonging to an ethnicity that was not 
the largest one in that entity or municipality (for instance, Muslims in Republika 
Srpska or Serbs in the Federation). Third, return is rarely a straightforward process, 
fixed in time, and more often a ‘dynamic and open-ended’ one, which can involve 
moving between places over extended periods of time (Eastmond 2006), with all that 
implies for the social and economic situation of refugees and returnees. In many 
cases, return also involved intermediate steps: after the termination of their asylum 
in Western Europe, refugees returning to Bosnia could spend several years in another 
town or entity before they could repossess their homes and thus complete the process 
of return.14 
If analysed from the theoretical vantage point of this thesis, the return process 
can be understood as symbolically – and potentially - encompassing elements of 
justice as recognition, redistribution and political participation. On the one hand, 
return was meant to redress the legacy of ethnic cleansing (Dahlman and Ó Tuathail 
2005), contributing to justice as recognition (drawing on Fraser 1995).15 On the other 
hand, return processes could offer a chance of pursuing transformative policies that 
could challenge the rigid ethnic divisions envisaged by Dayton, by reconstituting a 
multi-ethnic polity and reintegrating refugees in the socioeconomic environment. 
The way in which they were implemented, however, limited the potential of return 
in contributing to these multiple justice goals. International efforts in supporting 
sustainable employment and access to basic infrastructure and services were, 
especially in the first post-war years, insufficient. Nettelfield and Wagner’s analysis 
of return in post-war Srebrenica clearly demonstrates the crucial importance of 
                                                          
14 This is the case for many interviewees: see Interview ZE/15/8, PR/15/4, PR/15/7, 
PR/15/8, PR/15/15.  




supporting return with appropriate and well-targeted reconstruction aid (Nettelfield 
and Wagner 2014, see especially 88-96). In cases like Prijedor, where ethnic cleansing 
was preceded by mass dismissals of non-Serb employees, few efforts were made to 
reintegrate them in the local socioeconomic environment. 
Besides return programmes, the search for missing persons also bears 
relevance for the socioeconomic dimension of transitional justice in BiH. According 
to the International Commission for Missing Persons (ICMP), established in 1996, 
about 31,500 of the 100,000 victims of the Bosnian war were missing persons.16 The 
ICMP and local authorities thus faced the enormously challenging task of locating 
and identifying these victims. This process has several socioeconomic implications. 
Firstly and most simply, missing people were often male victims, and their 
disappearance posed important economic difficulties to their families. From the point 
of view of accessing compensations, families were originally asked to declare their 
missing dead in order to receive pensions and inheritance benefits they were entitled 
to (until the Law on Missing Persons changed this), and struggled to get access to 
compensation from the authorities compared to other categories of civilian victims 
(Hronešová 2016, 348). Lastly, this is also important within the broader context of 
socioeconomic elements envisaged by transitional justice efforts and in particular the 
2004 Law on Missing Persons. The Law was ‘the first such piece of legislation in a 
post-war country dedicated to missing persons’,17 and mandated the creation of a 
Central Record on Missing Persons (CEN) that would centralise and verify existing 
information databases on missing persons. Articles 11 to 17 of the Law covered the 
right to financial support for the families of missing persons, and article 15 requires 
the establishment of a ‘Fund for Support to the Families of Missing Persons of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina’, ‘with the purpose of providing funds and realizing the rights of 
family members of the missing’.18 Nevertheless, the Fund has never been established 
due to disagreements over its location, governance, and sources of funding. Even 
when the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees proposed to amend the law so 
that the Fund could draw from the state budget, the necessary changes were not 
                                                          
16 See the website of the ICMP, at <http://www.icmp.int/where-we-
work/europe/western-balkans/bosnia-and-herzegovina/>, accessed 19 September 2016.  
17 Ibid.  
18 Law on Missing Persons, available at <http://www.icmp.int/wp-




approved and the Fund failed to materialise (Sarkin et al. 2014, 37). While the search 
for missing persons can be important for grassroots processes of reconciliation (Clark 
2010), and for local processes of redress and social reconstruction (Wagner 2010), it is 
also a transitional justice process with important socioeconomic implications. As in 
the case of reparations and returns, the redistributive potential of this process was 
curbed by its selective implementation.  
Overall, this section shows that socioeconomic transitional justice efforts in 
Bosnia were not entirely absent, but limited in both their conceptualisation and use. 
They have been narrowed to a particular understanding of what socioeconomic 
transitional justice might signify: economic redress for having suffered crimes that 
are not socioeconomic in nature. Part of the argument advanced in this thesis, and 
illustrated in the next chapter, is that experiences of socioeconomic violence and 
injustice shape people’s understanding of the war and the transition, as well as their 
conceptions of justice.  
 
 
3.3 Neoliberalism and the political economy of socioeconomic injustice  
After the previous sections showed how the conceptualisation and implementation 
of transitional justice efforts ended up limiting their socioeconomic potential, here we 
turn to the role of the international intervention in the sphere of socioeconomic 
reforms, and how these affected socioeconomic justice as redistribution, a little 
researched perspective. Neoliberal economic reforms tried to respond to 
socioeconomic problems, including the outcomes of the war and the post-socialist 
transition. However, it is argued here that these reforms subordinated justice 
considerations to economic priorities.  
While it is generally accepted that the Dayton Peace Agreement itself was 
silent on economic issues compared to political and military ones, the preamble of 
the Constitution (Annex 4 of the Agreement) does express a desire ‘to promote the 
general welfare and economic growth through the protection of private property and 
the promotion of a market economy’. The Agreement also includes dispositions 
regarding the establishment of the Central Bank and Bosnia’s monetary policy, and 
provides for the role of international actors in the reconstruction of the country. The 




IMF, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), US Agency for 
International Development (USAID), UN Development Programme (UNDP), OHR 
and Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – were heavily 
involved in shaping Bosnia’s new economic system. This section analyses their 
intervention in some key sectors, such as privatisation and industrial policy, labour 
laws, and the general conditions placed for supporting Bosnia’s macroeconomic 
stability. In doing so, it shows that the way in which reforms were implemented, with 
significant international input, and often contributed to creating the conditions for 
the continuation of socioeconomic injustice in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
 
 
3.3.1 Labour laws and social policy 
The international community played an important role in the process of drafting new 
Labour Laws, which in Bosnia and Herzegovina fall under the competencies of the 
entities rather than the central state. During socialist times, economic and political 
arrangements were devised in order to increase employment or allow workers to 
travel abroad, thus containing social pressures and discontent. The transition of 
Bosnia from socialism towards market economy required the introduction of a 
different approach to work and to the relationship between workers and their 
employers, many of which would now be private rather than public. Reforming 
labour regulations was also necessary in light of the uncertain status of many workers 
at the end of the war. Factories had often been destroyed or had ceased production 
during the conflict, but had not dismissed their personnel. Employees who were not 
working were usually placed on ‘waiting lists’, while employers were supposed to 
continue paying their healthcare and pension contributions, but not salaries 
(European Training Foundation 2006, 38). Very often, such payments were delayed 
or suspended due to lack of financial resources, leaving the workers deprived from 
their right to a pension at the end of their working life (Maglajilić and Rašidagić 2011, 
22) Overall, reforms in the labour sectors ‘reflect an uneasy compromise between 
narrow economic rationality and social justice’ (Donais 2005, 123), mostly at the 
expense of social justice. 
The principles inspiring the new labour legislation reflected the international 




abandonment of an active approach to employment, whose level would have to be 
determined by market forces instead. Reform agendas in the early transition years, 
such as the OHR-sponsored ‘Jobs and Justice’ programme (Pugh 2006b) clearly stated 
that ‘governments cannot create jobs’ (OHR 2004, 6), and that it would be necessary 
to transform the economy so it becomes capable of creating jobs: ‘this does not mean 
endless government intervention, but instead, allowing the free market to flourish’ 
(Ibid. 5). Supporting the privatisation process and the role of new private actors in 
the market was thus crucial to increase employment. While this document was signed 
by the OHR, the PIC19 and BiH governments at different levels, scholars have 
doubted the presence of local input in drafting it (Merdzanović 2015, 303). 
International actors also intended to foster employment growth through microcredit 
schemes, although institutions such as the EBRD have recently recognised that they 
are not very effective in this respect (EBRD 2015-16, 42-43; see also Banjeree et al 2015).  
In practice, employment levels are still very low, and the first employer in the country 
is still the state – a fact much criticised by the international community. Public sector 
employees are often referred to, by international officials and policy documents, as a 
group of ‘insiders’ to the labour market who, having access to the privilege of 
permanent contracts, guarantees and union protection, do not want to allow 
change.20 Such change, coming in the form of a flexibilisation of the labour market 
and reduction of workers’ rights, would increase employment and thus help 
‘outsiders’ to the system, according to international views. However, changes to 
public sector employment are difficult to achieve without changing the cumbersome 
administrative structure of Dayton, and because political elites have established and 
maintain electoral support through public sector hiring.  
Second, labour-related reforms tried to resolve the status of workers left 
hanging in the transition from socialism to capitalism through war. When the new 
FBiH and RS Labour Laws were approved in 1999 and 2000 respectively, they 
featured similar provisions that required employers to resolve workers’ status within 
six (in the FBiH) and three (in RS) months of their entry into force. If employees could 
                                                          
19 Peace Implementation Council. This is the international body tasked with the 
implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement.  
20 Interview SA/15/2, International official, 5 May 2015, Sarajevo; Interview SA/15/5, 




not be reinstated, they were entitled to severance pay, in addition to the already due 
health and pension contributions.21 In practice, surviving companies, many of which 
had not been privatised yet by the time of these reforms, could not afford such 
payments, and waiting lists were carried on long after their formal expiration date 
set by the Laws. According to the European Training Foundation (2006, 37) the cost 
of severance compensation for all waiting lists employees was estimated at KM 100 
million22 by the World Bank. Importantly, the laws did not envisage the possibility of 
reinstatement or alternative employment for workers who had been fired unjustly 
during the war, for instance as a result of ethnically-based discrimination. Article 152 
of the RS Labour Law stated their right to request severance pay within three months 
after the law’s approval, a right which very few could exercise while still being 
displaced or in the face of local authorities’ hostility.23 The survival of a category of 
workers who had legitimate claims to their right to work came to be seen, by the 
international community, as a legacy of socialism in need of permanent dismantling 
and reform.  
Thirdly, reforms aimed at liberalising the labour market. The first attempts at 
introducing different forms of employment were already made in the Labour Laws 
of 1999 and 2000. These envisaged the possibility of having part-time or temporary 
employment, but limited it temporally, and still granted high maternity benefits and 
severance compensation based on the length of service and average pay (European 
Training Foundation 2006).24 A more decisive push towards the liberalisation of the 
labour market came with the approval of new legislation linked to the Compact for 
Growth and Jobs and the Reform Agenda, required by international actors for the 
negotiation of new loans such as the new IMF stand-by arrangement. Trade unions 
have criticised (and protested against) the new laws, passed in the Federation and RS 
                                                          
21 Labour Law of the Federation of BiH, Official Gazette of the Federation of BiH 43/99, Art. 
143; Labour Law of Republika Srpska, Official Gazette of Republika Srpska 38/00, Art. 151. 
22 Konvertibilna Marka or Convertible Mark (KM) is the currency of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 1 KM = 0.51 EUR.  
23 According to Vaša Prava Prijedor, many of of these claims are still pending (Interview 
PR/15/2). 
24 See Art. 136 of the FBiH Law and Art. 34 of the RS Law on temporary contracts, Art. 51-63 
(FBiH Law) and Art. 70-79 (RS Law) on maternity, Art. 100 (FBiH Law) and Art. 127 (RS 




in 2015, arguing that they reduce workers’ rights.25 Much of their criticism focused 
on changes related to the dismissal of employees, which was one of the key points 
argued for by the EU and IFIs in the Compact for Growth and Jobs. In the Federation, 
the limits of time within which an employer can dismiss an employee after a breach 
of contract is revealed have been extended from fifteen days to up to one year, thus 
leaving the employee vulnerable to pressures and manipulation on the part of the 
employer (Art. 100 of the FBiH law; Vaša Prava 2016, 25). Firms with more than 30 
employees (as opposed to 15 in the previous law) are not obliged to consult the firms’ 
employees council or the union when intending to dismiss workers for economic, 
technical and organisational reasons.26 According to Vaša Prava (2016, 27), this leaves 
a large number of workers deprived of protection against redundancies, given that 
the economy in BiH is increasingly characterised by the presence of small and 
medium enterprises. Article 179 of the new RS law, on the other hand, stipulates that 
an employer can dismiss an employee who breaches his contract by engaging in 
criminal activities, even when the fact is not investigated by the competent 
authorities. This leaves the employer in charge of establishing whether a criminal act 
was committed, not granting the employee the benefit of the doubt (Vaša Prava 2016, 
29). More generally, it is likely that the new legislation ‘will not improve the material 
and social status of employees until it is harmonized with all other provisions 
regulating all of the accompanying rights (provisions on the bankruptcy and 
liquidation of companies, pension insurance, employment mediation, social 
protection regulations regarding rights arising from motherhood, other social 
benefits, etc.)’ (Vaša Prava 2016, 40). 
                                                          
25 Labour Law of the Federation of BiH, Official Gazette of the Federation of BiH 26/16; 
Labour Law of Republika Srpska, Official Gazette of Republika Srpska 1/16. On the protests 
see: Katarina Panic, Bosnian Serbs Protest against Labour Reform, Balkan Insight, 4 May 
2015, at <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/thousands-bosnian-serbs-protest-
against-labor-reform>;  Danijel Kovacevic, Bosnian Serbs Adopt Labour Reform Amid 
Protests, Balkan Insight, 29 December 2015, at 
<http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/tbc-bosnian-serbs-assembly-adopts-key-
reform-law-amidst-protests-12-29-2015>; Elvira M. Jukic, Thousands Protest Against New 
Bosnian Labour Law, Balkan Insight, 30 July 2015, 
<http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/thousands-bosnia-workers-protests-against-
labor-law-reforms>; all accessed 30 September 2016. 




These social rights, which should constitute a social security cushion for 
unemployed people and those unable to work, have also undergone wide ranging, 
internationally-sponsored reforms in the post-war period.27 Social assistance that was 
previously administered by the Centres for Social Work became increasingly 
privatised and decentralised. Bosnia’s system became characterised by ‘feudalist’ 
trends with competing, ethnically-based claims to authority, and by the presence of 
non-governmental actors receiving funds to provide social services ‘at the expense of 
promoting good social welfare practice’ (Deacon and Stubbs 1998, 110). A large part 
of the budget for social spending is taken up by war-related payments, which are 
disbursed on the basis of status rather than being means tested. Partly as a result of 
this, only 17% of social transfers goes to the 20% poorest part of the population (OSCE 
2012). For what concerns employment and pension issues, as noted above, workers 
on waiting lists were still entitled to pension contributions, but these were often 
delayed or not paid at all. This situation, coupled with the reduction in the number 
of contributing workers as a result of the dramatic decrease of employment levels, 
brought pension funds under great strain in both the FBiH and the RS (Maglajilić and 
Rašidagić 2011, 20-22). While in the past early retirement and printing money for 
social spending were used as a tool for limiting these pressures, both options soon 
became unavailable due to, respectively, OHR decisions modifying pension laws and 
Bosnia’s new currency board arrangement. 28 The health system, characterised by 
universal public coverage during socialist times, was also badly affected by the war, 
during which 30% of facilities were destroyed, and casualties and migration resulted 
in the loss of 30% of health staff (Cain 2002, 17). In the aftermath of the war, the 
healthcare system was decentralised, with the entities (and Brčko District), as well as 
the cantons in the FBiH, responsible for setting up and managing health funds.29 
These are funded through insurance funds and mandatory contributions paid by 
                                                          
27 According to Keil’s (2011, 48-49) review, the OSCE was mostly in charge of education 
reforms and local government, UNDP dealt with infrastructure and housing reconstruction, 
UNHCR with refugee return and reintegration, while the IMF and World Bank provide 
financial assistance and the OHR should have a coordination role. 
28 See OHR, Decision amending the RS Law on Pension and Disability Insurance, providing 
for financial feasibility and independence, 11 December 2000, 
<http://www.ohr.int/?p=68025>, accessed 30 September 2016; see Section 3.2 on the 
currency board.  
29 See Cain 2002, 19-23 for an organizational diagram of the health care system in BiH. See 




employers and employees. The decentralisation of the system, however, resulted in 
great inequality of access to good-level health care within the country (Maglajilić and 
Rašidagić 2011, 24-25), and to high costs due to the funds’ weakness in negotiating 
pharmaceutical provisions.30 Social policy in BiH, to sum up, was constrained by the 
limitations placed by the post-socialist transition, as well as by inefficient and 
unequal implementation.  
 
 
3.3.2 Privatisations and industrial policy  
In 1990, nearly 40% of the Bosnian GDP and 55% of the economic sector was in the 
industry and mining sectors (Tesche 2000, 315). About 35% of the GDP was produced 
by 12 large conglomerates alone. The conflict destroyed a large part of the country’s 
industrial facilities, with industry producing at only 5 or 6% of its capacity during the 
war (Bojicic and Kaldor 1999, 94). It also fragmented the Yugoslav market of which 
Bosnia had been the ‘industrial core’ (Hamilton 1964), and created new internal 
borders that separated different parts of the extractive and energy production sites 
that would otherwise be connected (Steblez 1998). This is precisely the case of the two 
cities whose situation is analysed more in detail by this thesis, Prijedor and Zenica, 
as Prijedor was the main extractive site for the iron ore that was transported to the 
Zenica steel mill via rail. The international community’s approach to privatisation 
would have determined living conditions for Bosnia’s many industrial towns and is 
one of the most contested elements of the transition process.  
 The privatisation process in Bosnia and Herzegovina was set up by 
international organisations, which adopted a model of voucher privatisation that had 
already been used in Eastern Europe. Vouchers were handed out to citizens on the 
basis of claims they could bring against the state. Foreign currency savings, for 
instance, were held at the central bank in Belgrade during Yugoslav times, and were 
frozen at the beginning of the war (Tesche 2000, 316). Vouchers could also be assigned 
as compensation for nationalised property,31 unpaid salaries for soldiers, and other 
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31 Property in Yugoslavia was socially owned, and thus had to be nationalised before the 
state could privatise it. Vouchers were given as compensation for property that would no 




general claims (Jahovic 1999, 91). Vouchers could be used either to buy socially-
owned flats in which families used to live before the war, or to acquire shares of 
privatised companies, often operating through Privatization Investment Funds 
(PIFs). The use of vouchers also had the goal of creating a group of potential buyers 
within a socialist society that did not have a class of private entrepreneurs (Donais 
2005, 106). The international community was determined to leave market forces in 
charge of establishing whether large Yugoslav enterprises would restart production 
or simply close down (Donais 2005, 94), and required these firms be sold before being 
internally restructured (Stojanov 2001). Privatisation before restructuring and 
voucher privatisation, in practice, resulted more often in asset stripping than in 
successful privatisation. The OHR itself admitted in 2004 that in cases where 
privatisation was mostly done through vouchers and the associated PIFs, such as in 
Tuzla, the process resulted in widespread failures and closure of facilities (OHR 
2004).  
Partly as a result of this, and after a series of privatisation scandals that 
showed how politically well-connected individuals were gaining control of public 
assets, the international community decided to set aside about 140 strategic 
enterprises that would not be privatised through the use of vouchers, but through 
foreign direct investment (Donais 2005, 123). The reliance on FDI meant that, just like 
employment policy, industrial policy was neglected in the transitional plan for 
reforming Bosnia. International actors refrained from giving direct financial support 
to industries, but at the same time the FDI necessary to restart the economic sector 
was not materialising as quickly as expected. Even when FDI arrived, almost half of 
these investments went into the services sector rather than production, and about 
16% of this in the banking sector alone (Stojanov 2009, 19). Of the EBRD current 
portfolio in Bosnia, only 4% is in industry, commerce and agribusiness, and out of 
the 133 projects in which the EBRD has been involved in BiH, only four specifically 
dealt with manufacturing.32 One of these projects related to ArcelorMittal’s purchase 
of the Zenica Steelworks, which was Bosnia’s largest foreign investment since the end 
of the war, and is often cited as a successful case of privatisation. The EBRD financed, 
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with €25 million, energy efficiency investments and working capital of ArcelorMittal 
Zenica in 2005. The impact of the project was identified by the Bank as the promotion 
of industrial restructuring, market expansion (as Mittal was already planning on 
acquiring the iron ore mines in the Prijedor area), and the promotion of private 
property ownership.33 Importantly, the ArcelorMittal investment could show that 
Bosnia was a good business destination, and thus promote further investment in the 
country. The case of EBRD support for ArcelorMittal’s deal, however, also 
demonstrates a contradiction in the international approach to industrial policies and 
privatisation, as the most successful case of FDI, set as example for others to follow, 
was partly made possible through international help that was generally refused to 
the industrial sector.  
International organisations (including the EBRD, but also USAID and other) 
were much more active in promoting microcredit schemes for the creation of small 
private enterprises,34 with the goal of promoting entrepreneurship at the local level 
and reducing unemployment. The record of microcredit schemes is mixed: some have 
argued that microcredit loans were often used for consumption and that they were 
not bringing sustainable business, nor increasing job prospects in deprived parts of 
Bosnia (Pupavac 2006; Bateman et al. 2012). The international community found it 
more convenient to shift its approach towards the support of small and medium 
enterprises, rather than redirecting resources towards the heavy industry sector that 
required substantial restructuring and investments for the modernisation of facilities 
and equipment. As Donais (2005, 104) notes, however, the international focus on 
SMEs is not necessarily ‘compatible with the goal of export promotion’, as larger 
firms are better suited to compete on international markets. A number of large public 
enterprises are still in public hands, and international actors have been disappointed 
by the slow pace of the process even in the aftermath of the 2015 commitment to the 
                                                          
33 See the EBRD website at <http://www.ebrd.com/work-with-
us/projects/psd/arcelormittal-zenica-.html>, accessed 22 September 2016.  
34 See the EBRD website at 
<http://www.ebrd.com/cs/Satellite?c=Content&cid=1395245312978&pagename=EBRD%2
FContent%2FContentLayout> and <http://www.ebrd.com/work-with-
us/projects/psd/usebrd-sme-procredit-bank-bosnia.html>, on loans to the Micro Enterprise 





Reform Agenda, although the need for additional revenue has pushed Bosnian 
authorities to accelerate the process lately. 
 
 
3.3.3 Macroeconomic policy 
Macroeconomic policy can also have an impact on the condition of Bosnian citizens 
at the end of the war. International intervention in the aftermath of the war aimed at 
normalising the situation by providing macroeconomic stability for Bosnia, but this 
intervention also failed to adequately consider socioeconomic justice issues. 
International influence over general economic policy in Bosnia is discussed here in 
relation to international organisations’ role in supporting recovery and budgetary 
stability, and to the Central Bank and currency board arrangement.  
Economic growth in the aftermath of the war was impressive, but mostly aid-
driven, and did not contribute substantially to reduce unemployment in the country 
or promote sustainable employment beyond the reconstructive effort. In October 
1998, the productive sector employed only 53% of the number of people it did in 1991 
(Jahović 1999, 94). During the late Yugoslav period the Republic of BiH ran current 
account surpluses, but exports dramatically declined in the post-war period (Tesche 
2000), due to the dramatic fall in industrial production. The reconstruction-driven 
recovery lasted well into the new decade, and up until 2007, while BiH had high 
growth rates, poverty fell thanks to higher levels of consumption and public 
spending (World Bank 2015). Higher consumption, however, was partly the result of 
using credit obtained through microcredit schemes or banks for consumption 
purposes, which improved living standards, rather than for investments that could 
help sustain future growth and generate employment.35 Public finances had also 
benefitted from an inflow of tax revenues in the previous years, especially thanks to 
the introduction of value added tax in 2006 (World Bank 2015, 3), that were partly 
diverted to excessively expand the public sector.36 
As growth rates decreased with the end of reconstruction and the financial 
crisis, the economic situation started worsening (OHR 2004). With the crisis and the 
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slowing down of fiscal revenues, Bosnian authorities became increasingly reliant on 
IFI support. Bosnia had already established stand-by arrangements with the IMF in 
2002, which were then renegotiated in 2009, 2012 and 2016.37 IMF tranches are paid 
directly into the country’s budgets, and contribute to paying for public services, 
pensions and salaries. The World Bank and IMF also intervened in the aftermath of 
the 2014 floods, by providing aid in the form of loans to be used for reconstruction 
and for improving the country’s resilience to meteorological events.38 The conditions 
attached to the loans commonly include streamlining bureaucratic procedures that 
discourage business investment,39 privatisations, and a reduction of public 
expenditure. International organisations have consistently asked Bosnia to reduce the 
size of its public sector, whose expenditure in 2014 amounted to 41.5% of the GDP 
(IMF 2015). The bulk of this sum is spent on salaries, with the rest mostly consisting 
of social transfers (including war-related payments discussed in Section 2; World 
Bank 2014). As mentioned above, IFIs demand the reduction of these payments that 
are considered ‘subsidies that simply perpetuate the current situation without doing 
anything to encourage social and economic development’ (World Bank 2014, 125), 
and propose switching from status-based payments to needs-based assessments. It is 
however legitimate to wonder what impact can further budget cuts have on the most 
vulnerable categories, at a time when growth and employment levels are still very 
low. 
This brief discussion of Bosnia’s reliance on international financial support 
also highlights the double-edged character of conditionality. On the one hand, 
international pressures for socioeconomic reform are becoming increasingly 
coordinated and thus stronger. The current Reform Agenda, for instance, originated 
as part of the international community’s response to the 2014 protests and floods, and 
involved several international institutions led by the EU in the proposal of a Compact 
for Growth and Jobs. International financial institutions, such as the IMF and World 
                                                          
37 See the IMF website at 
<https://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/tad/exfin2.aspx?memberKey1=75&date1key=201
6-09-20>, accessed 22 September 2016.  
38 Interview SA/15/2. The World Bank gave 100 million dollars in loan to BiH from the 
remaining IDA funds that the country could access after graduating from the programme. 
39 Bosnia occupies the 79th place in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business rankings, see 




Bank, saw a convergence of interests with the European Union, now more concerned 
with progress in economic and social reform rather than political and institutional 
matters.  For the EU, it was convenient to rely on the IFIs’ ability to put pressure on 
Bosnian institutions as a result of loan conditionality.40 The Reform Agenda resulting 
from the consultations with Bosnian authorities, and which is being used as a 
benchmark to measure progress towards Bosnia’s integration in the EU, is supported 
by a host of international partners, each leading in a specific sector but with collegial 
support.41 On the other hand, IFIs and the EU have an interest in guaranteeing 
Bosnia’s stability, also due to their exposure in the country. Withdrawing support for 
lack of compliance is thus risky, and local authorities (especially at the entity level, 
which is mostly responsible for implementing reforms due to the constitutional 
division of competencies) test the patience of international organisations by dragging 
their feet and attempting to renegotiate conditions as much as they can. Bosnia thus 
continues to be increasingly dependent from external financial support, while 
implementing reforms slowly or incompletely.  
Since the Dayton Peace Agreement, the international community has also had 
a significant influence over financial and monetary matters. Article III of the 
Constitution assigns responsibility for monetary policy and finances of the 
institutions to the central BiH government, while Article VII specifies rules regarding 
the establishment of a Central Bank. During the war, Bosnia had operated with three 
separate institutions acting as central banks for the territories controlled by different 
ethnic groups, and with three different currencies (Coats 2003). German Marks were 
in use in the Bosniak-controlled area of the country. The Dayton agreement provided 
for unifying the banking system through the creation of a Central Bank, and required 
that the first Governor of the institutions was appointed by the IMF, and that he could 
not be a citizen of BiH or of any neighbouring country (Art. VII.2).42 Most 
                                                          
40 Interviews SA/15/2, SA/15/5 and SA/15/8, International official, 21 May 2015.  
41 See Table 4 in World Bank 2015, 34. For instance, the IMF is the lead partner in the field of 
‘public finance, taxation, and fiscal sustainability’, while the EU leads ‘public administration 
reform’, and the World Bank Group tackles reforms in the labour market and welfare 
system.  
42 The first two directors of the Central Bank of BiH were Serge Robert and Peter Nicholl. See 
IMF News Brief: IMF Management Announces the Appointment of Serge Robert as 
Governor of the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 29 October 1996, 
<https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/nb/1996/nb9611.htm>; and IMF News Brief: IMF 




importantly, the DPA mandated that the Central Bank could not ‘extend credit by 
creating money, operating in this respect as a currency board’. Currency board 
agreements had been implemented in other transitional countries in Eastern Europe, 
and IMF officials report that there was no controversy over this disposition with local 
officials (Coats 2003, 2). Other details of the draft Law on the Central Bank, such as 
the location and powers of the entity branches, the name of the new currency and the 
aspect of bank notes were much more controversial (Ibid., 5-6).43 After the approval 
of the Law, the Central Bank of BiH (CBBH) began operations on 11 August 1997, 
while the Convertible Mark (KM) started circulating in the following year. The 
operation of the CBBH as a currency board, with the KM anchored to the German 
Mark,44 meant that the Bank had to keep, according to the Law, full exchange backing 
for all its KM liabilities, and thus could not print money in order to lend in the 
domestic market. This measure was adopted in order to provide stability and low 
inflation at a time when there was ‘considerable difficulty in establishing institutions 
and making political decisions’ (OHR 2004). The CBBH thus has virtually no means 
to conduct monetary policy, for instance in order to reduce unemployment. 
This decision also contributed to placing private commercial banks in a 
crucially important position for promoting investment and economic recovery 
through lending. The liberalisation of the banking sector was also strongly sponsored 
and financed by international actors in the aftermath of the war and began with the 
reform of the payments bureaux that during socialist times was responsible for 
payments, tax collection, and accounting services, among other things, and whose 
existence was politically problematic, and prevented the liberalisation of the market 
(Zaum 2005). International institutions invested heavily to support the private 
banking sector, especially if compared to the resources assigned to industry and 
manufacturing. For instance, engagements with financial institutions make up 13% 
of the EBRD current portfolio in BiH.45 Since the immediate post-war period, the 
                                                          
Herzegovina, 31 October 1997, 
<https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/29/18/03/nb9721>; both accessed 22 
September 2016.  
43 The currency name ‘Convertible Mark’ (Konvertibilna Marka, KM) was eventually 
proposed by a US Treasury official (Coats 2003, 6).  
44 The KM is now pegged to the Euro.  
45 See the EBRD website, at <http://www.ebrd.com/bosnia-and-herzegovina-data.html>, 




EBRD has been involved in financing micro- and small- enterprise financial 
institutions, as well as microcredit programmes hosted by commercial banks. It has 
also financed the consolidation of young private banks, such as Market Banka, 
through equity investment in its share capital.46 Market Banka was subsequently 
acquired by the Austrian Raiffeisen Bank in 2000, and became Raiffeisen BANK dd 
Bosna i Hercegovina in 2003.47 The EBRD granted it support through different types 
of loans in 2003 and 2006, while in 2002 it also financed UPI Banka’s (of the Intesa San 
Paolo group) capital increase.48 Commonly, these loans aimed at supporting the 
liberalisation and strengthening of the banking sector, and to increasing banks’ 
abilities to lend, thus facilitating the development of the SME sector.  
The close relationship between IFIs and private banks in supporting Bosnia’s 
stability became evident, lastly, during the financial crisis of 2008-2009. With the 
losses linked to the crisis, parent banks in Western Europe started withdrawing 
liquidity from Bosnian branches in 2008. The currency board lost 16% of its reserves 
between October 2008 and May 2009 (Gedeon 2010, 14). Worried that foreign banks 
would leave Bosnia to avoid further losses, the Central Bank – supported by IFIs – 
initially used ‘moral suasion’ to convince local branches ‘to petition the parent for 
emergency lines of credit’ (Ibid., 15). The CBBH also implemented measures to reduce 
the costs for banks to maintain deposits in the country and to facilitate loans. Given 
that the Central Bank, under the currency board arrangement, is incapable of 
becoming a ‘lender of last resort’, private banks were convinced to assume this role: 
in February 2009, the IFIs agreed to support the banks with €24.5 billion over two 
years (in total, for several Eastern European countries) in exchange for the banks’ 
commitment to remain in the region.49 Five banks in Bosnia received support through 
this programme, called the Vienna Initiative (De Haas et al. 2012, 32). The banks also 
                                                          
46 See the EBRD website at <http://www.ebrd.com/work-with-us/projects/psd/raiffeisen-
bank-bosnia-f-market-portage-equity.html>, accessed 22 September 2016. 
47 See the Raifeeisen Bank website at <https://raiffeisenbank.ba/eng/menu/view/6>, 
accessed 22 September 2016.  
48 See the EBRD website at <http://www.ebrd.com/work-with-us/projects/psd/raiffeisen-
bank-bhsenior-sme-retail-loan.html>  and <http://www.ebrd.com/work-with-
us/projects/psd/intesa-sanpaolo-banka-bih-f-upi.html>, accessed 22 September 2016. By 
2003, according to the OHR, 92% of banking capital was private, and 72% of this foreign.  
49 Vienna Initiative, At €33 billion, EBRD, EIB Group, World Bank Group crisis response for 
banks tops target, <http://vienna-initiative.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Joint-IFI-




‘won agreements from fiscal authorities to wage controls and other austerity 
measures to trim domestic fiscal budgets’ (Gedeon 2010, 15). The currency board and 
the relevance awarded to private banks in safeguarding monetary stability, further 
underscore the international influence and the constraints under which economic 
policies are conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
 
3.4 Conclusion  
The war put a great strain on the economy of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on its 
citizens as a result. While the narrative of the war has usually centred on ethnic 
cleansing and genocide, the fall of Yugoslavia and the conflict itself shaped far-
reaching socioeconomic transformations in the country (Pugh and Cooper 2004). 
Responding to the need of analysing transitional justice processes in conjunction with 
socioeconomic reforms that characterised Bosnia’s transition, this chapter has 
provided the general context within which experiences of socioeconomic injustice are 
developed and interpreted by local communities.  
As transitional justice efforts were conceptualised in a way that privileged the 
point of view of cultural recognition, socioeconomic justice as redistribution was 
given second place in the consideration of international organisations. Section 3.2 
showed that even when transitional justice programmes were devised with economic 
goals in mind, their flawed implementation did not result in socioeconomic justice. 
For instance, compensation for civilian victims was organised in the form of social 
transfers, which are lower and more difficult to obtain than benefits for veterans of 
the war. The fact that these funds are considered part of social spending rather than 
a proper reparation mechanism also leaves them vulnerable to the budget cuts 
requested by international financial institutions. Far from being subject to 
socioeconomic justice considerations, social policy is increasingly being conducted by 
Ministries of Finance under IFIs conditions (Deacon, Lendvai and Stubbs 2007).   
The influence of IFIs and other international organisations over 
socioeconomic justice issues becomes even more visible when we consider 
socioeconomic reforms such as labour laws and privatisations. The impact of these 
policies is particularly visible when we consider the experiences of individuals and 




Chapter 4 will show, workers who had been displaced during the war could have 
been put on a waiting list, while their factory’s assets were stripped by an ineffective 
voucher privatisation. Lacking healthcare and pension contributions, the living 
conditions of these workers’ communities had deteriorated, and effectively 
crystallised the situation of impoverishment and marginalisation they had endured 
during the conflict itself. Considering the role of such reforms is thus crucial in order 
to understand how citizens in Prijedor and Zenica suffered injustice, and how they 
reinterpret the concept of justice in light of their experiences. Chapter 4 turns to this 
specific context of socioeconomic injustice, during the war and the transition, to show 
what sort of injustices emerge from the interviewees’ accounts that are commonly left 




CHAPTER 4  
SOCIOECONOMIC INJUSTICE IN WAR AND TRANSITION: 




The overall aim of this chapter is to present the experiences of socioeconomic injustice 
that constitute the basis for developing justice claims. Here we take a step back from 
questions of how (and to what extent) socioeconomic concerns should be part of the 
transitional justice framework, to investigate why they should, or why the need arises 
for such a debate to be held in the first place. In order words, the question guiding 
the chapter is: what experiences of injustice felt on the ground might require the 
incorporation of socioeconomic grievances in transitional justice approaches? 
Referring back to the theoretical framework of the thesis, the chapter argues that the 
analysis of socioeconomic injustice and violence does not actually require an 
expansion of transitional justice, rather an analytical shift from questions related to 
recognition to questions of redistribution (Fraser 1995, 2003). While different types of 
injustice inevitably overlap in lived experiences, the chapter attempts to disentangle 
these two dimensions and show the extent to which socioeconomic violence matters 
in war (and post-war) scenarios. Compared to other situations of economic distress 
and hardship, socioeconomic injustice in post-conflict societies is particularly 
problematic. Victims do not have immediate access to remedies or alternative ways 
of ameliorating their condition, thus leading this situation of injustice to continue well 
into the transition period.  The case of Bosnia is also indicative of how the distress 
caused by the war might be aggravated by the effects of neoliberal economic 
restructuring.1 
Chapter 4 argues that experiences of socioeconomic injustice were rooted in 
the political economy of the war, but that they were also further aggravated, in the 
perception of the interviewees, by the stark contrast with the socialist past and by the 
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dire conditions of the post-socialist transition. This chapter looks at the cases of two 
medium-sized Bosnian cities, Prijedor and Zenica, and shows that socioeconomic 
injustice was present during the war and constituted an important part of the war 
experience in both cities. It also notes one crucial difference between the two: while 
socioeconomic injustice in Zenica can be primarily interpreted in this lens, the case of 
Prijedor is more complex. There, interethnic violence intersected and overlapped 
with socioeconomic injustice. In Prijedor, socioeconomic violence was an essential 
part of the war strategy of Bosnian Serb elites, which was aimed at the removal of 
non-Serb population from the region. Identity-based injustice thus overlapped with 
socioeconomic injustice. The case of Zenica, on the other hand, illustrates how 
socioeconomic deprivation can take place in ways that are unrelated to interethnic 
violence, but that also touch on its identity as a workers’ city. The cities of Prijedor 
and Zenica also show how socioeconomic injustice can manifest itself and develop in 
different temporal phases. While in Prijedor the war represented the dramatic peak 
of injustice for the non-Serb population, which then suffered from its consequences 
and lack of redress in the post-war period, in Zenica the injustice begun with the war 
fully developed through the transition process that led to economic and social 
marginalisation, and worsening environmental conditions for the city’s population. 
In the latter case, the war represented the prelude to the dismantling of the economic 
capacity of the town, and to the decline of its industrial identity.  
The first section of the chapter analyses the similarities between Prijedor and 
Zenica, based on data related to their economic and demographic development 
during socialism, as well as their current, peripheral position in post-war BiH. This 
section also shows that, from the perspective of interviewees, life in Prijedor and 
Zenica exhibited similar features during socialism. The second and third section 
delve right into the key question of this chapter, and illustrate the experiences of 
socioeconomic injustice of interviewees in the two cities against the background of 
the war, which affected them differenty, and the transition. The Bosnian Serb elites 
engaged in the ethnic cleansing of the non-Serb population of the Prijedor area, 
resulting in a mass exodus of refugees and killing of civilians.2 Zenica remained 
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under the control of the Armija BiH for the whole duration of the war, and the most 
pressing problems were the lack of food and basic necessities. Interviews show that 
socioeconomic violence featured prominently in the personal experience of local 
communities in the two cities. The conclusion presents some reflections on the 
relevance of socioeconomic injustice, and raises questions on conceptions of justice 
emerging from these contexts, which will be addressed in the following chapter.  
The chapter is based on two different sets of sources. Secondary literature, 
reports from international organisations, international and local NGOs, as well as 
material produced by development agencies (both local and international) are used 
to provide a background of the war and the transition in Prijedor and Zenica, with a 
focus on its socioeconomic dimension. The main argument of the chapter, related to 
the relevance of socioeconomic injustice in both cities during the war and the 
transition from a local perspective, is based on the analysis of interviews conducted 
with citizens of Prijedor and Zenica. In the case of Prijedor, most interviewees belong 
to the Muslim or Croat community that was marginalised and persecuted during the 
war. Most of those interviewed in Zenica are former workers of the steel mill, activists 
in grassroots groups or environmental organisations.  
 
 
4.1 Commonalities between Prijedor and Zenica  
Prijedor and Zenica are similarly sized urban centres that followed a common path 
to development through heavy industrialisation during the socialist period. Despite 
being located in different entities, Prijedor (Republika Srpska, RS) and Zenica 
(Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, FBiH) share geographical and demographic 
characteristics. They both grew from being small countryside towns to typical 
Yugoslav industrial cities. In the aftermath of the war, they reverted to occupy a 
similar, marginal position, relatively isolated from the direct influence of the 
international intervention in BiH and the priorities and interests of international 
actors.  
The interviews show that the two communities have a common outlook 
towards their life before the war. Stable socioeconomic conditions were a valued 
feature of life during socialist times, and one that shaped people’s perception of what 




the background against which the different experiences of socioeconomic injustice 
during the war and the transition process are interpreted by research participants.  
 
 
4.1.1 Two cities, one path to development 
Prijedor and Zenica share demographic and geographical characteristics, as well as a 
specific path to economic development, based on substantial public investment in the 
local industrial sector during the socialist period. Located in the northwest of Bosnia, 
not far from the border with Croatia, Prijedor currently counts 97,588 inhabitants 
(Institute for Statistics of Republika Srpska 2013). Zenica, on the other hand, lies 
among the hills and mountains of central Bosnia, and is currently inhabited by 
115,134 people (Institute for Statistics of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
2013). Both cities are crossed by rivers (Sana and Bosna, respectively) and are 
approximately one hour away from the main city of their entity, Banja Luka and 
Sarajevo. Zenica has a majority Muslim (or Bosniak) population, but it used to be a 
mixed urban centre. According to the 1991 Yugoslav census, 15.5% of the population 
was Croat and 15.4% Serb. Prijedor currently has a majority Serb population, but 
before the war 43.9% of its citizens were Muslim, 42.3% Serb and 5.6% Croat (Institute 
for statistics of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 1993).   
Both Prijedor and Zenica developed as industrial centres, with mines and 
plants opening as early as the end of the XIX century, thanks to Austrian investment 
at a time when BiH was under the control of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In 
Prijedor, the Austrians were responsible for the opening of the iron ore mine. 
According to a 1994 UN report on Prijedor, 3 million tons a year of iron ore were 
produced in the mine in the late 1980s. The mine was not only the largest in 
Yugoslavia, but one of the largest in Europe, and renown for the quality of its 
products (Greve 1994, Part two, paragraph II, D). The Prijedor Development Agency 
(PREDA) confirms that the mining and industrial sector in general was the major 
component of Prijedor’s economy. In addition to iron ore, the city was known for the 
production of paper, textiles, wood and metal.3 Such economic development 
                                                          





effectively turned Prijedor into a ‘typical socialist-era industrial working class town’ 
(Bose 2007, 15). Compared to Zenica, where the steel mill is located at the edge of the 
city centre, Prijedor drew on its surroundings in the process of economic 
development. The most important iron ore mines were located in towns like Ljubija 
(around 13km from Prijedor) and Omarska (20km). Ljubija, in particular, also hosted 
the administration of the mining complex before it was moved to Prijedor, in the 
building that today belongs to ArcelorMittal, near the city hall and police 
headquarters. At that time Ljubija had its own town hall, a theatre, library, and other 
amenities. Compared to the mines and industries (such as the ceramics industry) 
located in its surroundings, the paper mill – which was the second largest employer 
during socialist times – could be reached with a twenty minutes’ walk from the city 
centre. 
 
Table 4.1. Basic social and economic data, Prijedor and Zenica 
 Prijedor Zenica 
Population (as of 2013) 97,588 115,134 
Location North-Western Bosnia Central Bosnia 
Entity Republika Srpska Federation of BiH 
Distance from entity 
capital 
55.3 km 69.5 km 
Ethnic composition in 1991 
43.9% Muslims; 42.3% 
Serbs; 5.7% Yugoslavs; 5.6% 
Croats; 2.5% Others 
55.2% Muslims; 15.4% 
Croats; 15.4% Serbs; 10.8% 
Yugoslavs; 3.1% Others 
Ethnic composition in 20134 
62.5 Serbs; 32.5% Bosniaks; 
1.9% Croats; 1.8% Others; 
0.8% not declared; 0.5% no 
answer. 
84% Bosniaks; 7.5%Croats; 
5% Others; 2.2% Serbs; 1.2% 
not declared; 0.1% no 
answer.  
Main industry during 
socialism 
Mining of iron ore Steel production 
 
                                                          
4 Data from the 2013 Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Final Results (Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, June 2016). 
The categories given here correspond to the ones used in the census (the category ‘Yugoslav’ 
is not in use anymore; ‘Bosniak’ broadly corresponds to ‘Muslim’). The census results were 
published in 2016 after long delays and political disputes over the methods used to count 




Zenica followed a similar path. Steel production had been initiated in 1892, 
when the town only counted about 2,000 inhabitants. Following Austrian investment 
in the construction of the steel plant and the development of railways from the 
Croatian border to Zenica (Malcolm 2002, 141), the city started to grow. In 1941, its 
population had risen to 12,500 citizens. The real boom, however, only occurred in the 
aftermath of the Second World War when the new socialist government approved 
the reconstruction and modernisation of the steel plant (Željezara) as part of its first 
five-year industrialisation plan (Avdić 2013, 72-73). People moved from all over 
Yugoslavia to work in the steel plant in Zenica. The city grew exponentially in size 
and population into a ‘boom town’, as portrayed in the 1961 Yugoslav film bearing 
that name (Bulajić 1961). Previously a small agrarian village, the population of Zenica 
reached 33.240 in 1953, and about 60.000 in 1964 (Avdić 2013, 57 and 78).  
The influx of workers had to be met by a significant infrastructural 
investment. Workers who had been hosted in temporary accommodation were 
moved to newly built apartment blocks that still characterise the city’s landscape 
today. These buildings were often built very close to the steel mill, and many of the 
entrances of the industrial complex are within a short walking distance from the city 
centre. In order to maximise the number of people that could be hosted in the city, 
entire families were often assigned to live in very small studio flats. In addition to 
residential housing, roads, bridges, schools, libraries, a new theatre, a cinema, hotel, 
swimming pool and new canalisation system were built (Avdić 2013, 73).5 A branch 
of the University of Sarajevo, offering studies in metallurgy, was established in 
Zenica in 1961 in order to provide skilled workers and engineers to the factory. It was 
therefore thanks to the steel plant that Zenica became a proper city, by size and any 
other social standard. As discussed in the following sections, this created a special 
economic and emotional connection between the Željezara and Zenica’s citizens, one 
that is crucial in order to understand feelings of injustice among the local population.  
As a result of their development, people in Prijedor and Zenica were mostly 
employed in the industrial sector. In Zenica, the Željezara was an ‘industrial giant 
with over 20,000 employees’ (Slavnić et al. 2013, 41). Overall, 22,370 people were 
                                                          
5 According to several interviewees, it was at this time that the oldest Ottoman houses of the 
city centre were destroyed to make space for high-rise complexes. There is only one well-




employed in the industry and mining sector in the Zenica municipality in 1990 (UK 
DfID 2002b, 51). According to different estimates, including ones from the Prijedor 
Development Agency PREDA, the mining company RŽR (Rudnik i Željezne Rude, 
mining and iron ore) Lijubija was the biggest employer in the Prijedor area 
(approximately 5,000 people), followed by the paper mill company CELPAK that had 
about 3,000 workers.6 It is worth noting, moreover, that a close connection existed 
between the Prijedor mine and the Željezara in Zenica. Iron ore extracted in Prijedor 
was transported to Zenica to be processed and turned into steel. During socialism, 
RŽR Ljubija and the steel plant were also formally linked through RMK Zenica 
(Rudarski-Metalurški Kombinat, mining and metallurgic industrial complex) 
(Krčkovski, nd). Workers from both Prijedor and Zenica could also spend their 




4.1.2 Prijedor and Zenica in transition 
Similar by size and type of development, Zenica and Prijedor experienced the war in 
very different ways. Local perceptions of the war from the perspective of the 
socioeconomic injustice and violence will be discussed in depth in section 4.2. While 
socioeconomic injustices related to the transition process also differ (see the 
forthcoming section 4.3), Zenica and Prijedor have also been sharing some problems 
or concerns during the post-war period. After having enjoyed similar privileges in 
the socialist period, the two cities reverted to occupy similar positions in the post-war 
system, especially if we take into account their relationship to the international 
intervention and – once again – economic development.  
As argued in previous chapters, the international intervention in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has been far-reaching and comprehensive, going from peace- and state-
building to processes of transitional justice and economic reform. The effects of such 
intervention are clearly visible everywhere in BiH, and engrained in its institutional 
and political setup. However, Bosnian cities other than Sarajevo have remained quite 
peripheral to the international intervention in some respects. First, international 
                                                          




organisations are based in Sarajevo. While some do have small field offices in other 
cities, Prijedor and Zenica are not their chosen locations. Zenica is not far from 
Sarajevo, and therefore not out of reach for officials based in the capital. Similarly, the 
EU Delegation, UNDP, and OSCE have regional offices in Banja Luka, which is one 
hour away from Prijedor. Some international organisations have also been scaling 
down their presence in BiH. The OSCE, for instance, used to have up to fifteen field 
offices, which are now reduced to eight. Only in 2014, following the floods, the 
Organisation decided to open up temporary branches in other locations, including 
Prijedor (OSCE 2014).7 Prijedor and Zenica are mostly left out of the social and 
economic benefits brought by the presence of international organisations and large 
well-funded NGOs. There is a visible economic disparity between Sarajevo and 
smaller Bosnian cities like the ones here considered.  
Second, in addition to such peripheral position in the post-war international 
intervention, Prijedor and Zenica share similar socioeconomic transformations. 
While many of those who left during the war came back, especially towards the end 
of the 1990s, others did not. At the same time, people arrived from other towns and 
parts of Bosnia, changing the social fabric of the cities.8 The fall of the industries that 
had enriched Zenica and Prijedor during the socialist period also hit both cities hard. 
During the war and in its immediate aftermath, many companies had stopped 
working and were waiting to be privatised.  The intervention of international 
institutions and the interests of local elites left Bosnia and Herzegovina unable to 
formulate a proper macroeconomic and industrial policy, partly as a result of the 
conditions applied by the World Bank and IMF, and the industrial and production 
sector was described to be in a ‘state of deconstruction’ (Stojanov 2001, 45). With 
regard to steel industry in particular, it has been argued that the lack of financial 
means and the privatisation process ‘implied the absence of a strategic state capacity 
to restructure the steel industry in Bosnia and Herzegovina in general, and the Zenica 
steel works in particular’ (Slavnić et al. 2013, 42). It was believed that companies 
should be sold first, and then restructured (Čausević 2001, 73), but this often led to 
                                                          
7 According to an OSCE official, the office was still open at the time of the fieldwork in 
summer 2015, but it was not possible to verify this.  




companies being sold for less than their value, and to asset-stripping (UK DfID 2002a, 
17). 
The privatisation of the cities’ main industries, the iron ore mine in Prijedor 
and the steel plant in Zenica, also led to similar outcomes. The same multinational 
corporation, Mittal Steel, bought part of RŽR Ljubija and restarted the production at 
the Omarska mine in 2004, and also acquired the Željezara in Zenica, where the 
privatisation agreement was signed in 2004. The company, which became 
ArcelorMittal after its merger with Arcelor in 2006, grew by acquiring for low prices 
companies that were ‘state-owned, badly managed and in acute need for 
restructuring’ (Slavnić et al. 2013, 37), and is now the first producer of steel in the 
world. In both towns, the privatisation led to a significant reduction in the workforce. 
ArcelorMittal currently employs 733 workers in Prijedor (ArcelorMittal nd), down 
from 5.000 before the war. Mittal did not buy the Ljubija mine, which has not been 
operating since the war. This accelerated dramatically the decline of the town, which 
had already started after the RŽR headquarters transferred from Ljubija to Prijedor. 
Ljubija is now a crumbling small village, part of Prijedor’s municipality, and hosting 
only very basic services: a post office, pharmacy and the bus station. Most residents 
do not work, and local organisations from Prijedor and Ljubija operate a soup kitchen 
for the most indigent citizens.9 In Zenica, according to data from the environmental 
NGO Eko forum, ArcelorMittal had 2.950 employees as of 2011, compared to the 
20.000 who used to work for RMK in the 1980s.10 The restarting of industrial 
production in Zenica, albeit with a reduced workforce, has also brought back high 
levels of air pollution in the city.11 
 
 
                                                          
9 Interview PR/15/1 and PR/15/9, Sladjana Milijević, Associazione Progetto Prijedor. 
10 The number of workers employed today is said to be lower by a few hundred units 
compared to the 2011 figure.  
11 A problem that does not affect Prijedor, due to the less polluting nature of mining 
compared to steel production. See the recent investigation by Peter Geoghegan and Nidžara 
Ahmetašević, “Zenica, Bosnia: Where Even Taking a Breath Can Be a Struggle”, The 
Guardian, 14 February 2017, available at: 
<https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2017/feb/14/arcelor-mittal-failing-emissions-air-




4.1.3 ‘We had our Germany right here’: life during socialism  
As the previous paragraphs show, Zenica and Prijedor were representative of 
medium-sized, industrial Bosnian cities, which developed thanks to investments 
made in their industries by the socialist government. Their urban setting can be 
compared to that of other cities across BiH, such as Tuzla or Mostar. Living in a city 
gave people the possibility to enjoy services and standards of living significantly 
different from those of the countryside, and to avoid unemployment and poverty. 
Interviews with research participants in both Prijedor and Zenica show a similar 
outlook on life conditions during the socialist period. In addition to providing a 
further point of contact between the two cases, people’s perception of their life during 
socialism is important in order to understand their experience of injustice during the 
war, and expectations for the post war period (Jansen 2006). The fact that such 
memories of the past do not necessarily correspond to the reality of social conditions 
during socialism (see Archer 2014 on social inequality in Yugoslavia) does not 
necessarily affect people’s perception of what elements of the ‘old’ system they 
valued most and would have liked to see reproduced in the current system. The two 
most prominent features emerging from the interviews are related to interethnic 
relations and social security and stability.  
Interviews with research participants from both cities highlight that life 
during socialism was considered peaceful and relatively prosperous. Social peace 
was often understood in terms of harmonious coexistence between different ethnic 
groups or nationalities (and thus as a form of justice as recognition in Fraser’s terms). 
A 57 year-old woman from Prijedor, Suada, stated that during socialism they were 
‘taught how to be all equal’.12 Nefisa concurred: ‘there was no problem among Serbs, 
Croats and Muslim. There was no conflict, we socialised, without regard for religion. 
(…) We were all like one, during socialism.’13 Not only were religious differences not 
the source of animosity, but they were often overcome in socialising with neighbours. 
Mediha, from Zenica, says: ‘I was always a Muslim. I went to the mosque, my 
neighbour went to church, we always drank coffee together.’14 Other interviewees, 
such as Sanja from Prijedor, speak of interethnic marriages: ‘I am catholic, my 
                                                          
12 Interview PR/15/4, worker for Prijedor (Suada), 12 July 2015. 
13 Interview PR/15/13, worker from Prijedor (Nefisa), July 19th 2015. 




husband is orthodox, but we respect each other’.15 According to Ines, such differences 
were played down by the socialist system: ‘I can freely say that that system was 
human, organised and better. Why? Because I had friends for which I could not even 
say what nation they belonged to, because that did not matter’.16 People, it is often 
said during interviews, lived ‘normally’, and did not expect the war to break out. 
Jasna felt that in her family there was no hatred against anyone until the war began: 
‘we did not believe that the war would never happen. You know when you live 
normally with your neighbours…’17. Maja also stressed how the war really came as a 
surprise: ‘We really were all like brothers18 and we thought that no one could change 
that’.19 A UN report on Prijedor from 1994 provides further evidence of this: ‘many 
people have stated that it never occurred to them that serious difficulties between 
ethnic groups – not to say war – ever could happen in the area. None have said the 
opposite’ (Greve, 1994, part two, paragraph II, B). While such feelings might be 
common among the population of industrial cities such as Zenica and Prijedor, 
scholars have noted that the situation in rural areas with respect to interethnic 
relations might have differed significantly, even during socialist times (Bose 2007, 14).  
Sharing a workplace was an important part of a peaceful interethnic 
coexistence. Work had traditionally occupied a special place in Yugoslav official 
rhetoric, and workers had represented the backbone of society. A second element 
conducive to understanding people’s satisfaction with life in Zenica and Prijedor 
before the war was thus the good standard of living enjoyed by workers. Two issues 
should specifically be highlighted here: job security, and social assistance in a range 
of issues, not least in recreational activities. First, interviewees report, from their 
personal experiences, how they moved swiftly from education to employment. This 
held true both for those who completed specialised high schools and those 
graduating from universities. Belma, for instance, explains how she completed the 
Ekonomska Škola (Economics high school) and, shortly thereafter, found a job at the 
                                                          
15 Interview PR/15/11, worker from Prijedor (Sanja), 16 July 2015. 
16 Interview ZE/15/7, worker from Zenica (Ines), 29 June 2015. 
17 Interview PR/15/12, worker from Prijdor (Jasna), 16 July 2015. 
18 This is a specific reference to the Yugoslav motto ‘Bratstvo i jedinstvo’ (Brotherhood and 
unity), which was meant to unite all Yugoslav citizens regardless of national affiliation. 




Prijedor branch of the bank Privredna Banka Sarajevo.20 Jasna and Suada also 
graduated in the economics school and were employed in the administration of RŽR, 
in their central offices in Prijedor.21 Sakib, also from Prijedor, studied metallurgy in 
Zenica, and was immediately employed by RŽR upon graduating. Most importantly, 
as mentioned by many interviewees, these were considered ‘secure’ jobs. This 
element of security is mentioned specifically when interviewees attempt to qualify 
their statements of satisfaction with their pre-war conditions, often explicitly using 
the terms ‘secure’ and ‘security’. Maja, from Prijedor, says that ‘salaries were not high, 
but you had security, that you will get the salaries, that you will be able to go to the 
seaside on holiday…’.22 The same opinion was expressed by Velid and Nihada in 
Zenica: ‘we had security, it was a safe employment to be working at the steel plant. 
We had a good salary, it was not that high, it was not a luxury, but it allowed you to 
live well and have everything you needed’; ‘the steel plant was the most secure 
company, the biggest company you could work for’23. While workers admit that 
salaries were not high in absolute terms, social equality, guaranteed rights, and the 
absence of extreme poverty compensated for that. Within this context, it was not just 
the war, but also the post-socialist economic transformation brought about a form of 
precarity that people never experienced before (Baker 2012).  
With respect to social assistance, interviewees emphasise the good standard 
of other social services. Interviewees felt that this was an important aspect of their 
quality of life. According to Jakub, ‘we [citizens of Zenica] were privileged and 
recognised as workers and as citizens. For instance, when I got surgery in 1983, they 
told me I was entitled to leave and thermal treatment paid by the company’.24 People 
in both cities also mention free and equitable access to education, also thanks to 
bursaries that were often sponsored by those companies interested in hiring young 
and qualified workers. Suada, for instance praises the system for granting her and 
her brothers scholarships to study, despite her family’s good economic status as small 
                                                          
20 Interview PR/15/15, worker from Prijedor (Belma), 19 July 2015. 
21 Interview PR/15/4; Interview PR/15/12. 
22 Interview PR/15/8, worker from Prijedor (Sakib), 14 July 2015; Interview PR/15/7. 
23 Interview ZE/15/17, worker from Zenica (Nihada), 11 August 2015; Interview ZE/15/18, 
worker from Zenica (Velid), 11 August 2015.  




private entrepreneurs (her father owned a car repair shop).25 The interviews also 
show that recreation and holidays were also part of people’s definition of a good 
quality of life. Without differences between the two cities, interviewees mention the 
possibility to travel and go on vacation at subsidised hotels and resorts on the 
Adriatic coast (or the mountains) as one of the greatest privileges enjoyed by workers 
and their families. Yugoslav authorities thought that holidays were beneficial for the 
physical and mental wellbeing of workers, and therefore, helped enhance 
productivity (Duda 2010). Suada sums up this feeling of satisfaction with life: ‘We 
had our jobs, our salaries, we had our peace, and a beautiful, beautiful life. And we… 
my generation (from 1954), we mourn those times (…) I did not need Germany, we 
had our Germany right here’.26  
This section has shown that Zenica and Prijedor can be compared by social 
and economic characteristics, economic development and their marginalisation in the 
post-war system. However, it is also important to emphasise that the perceptions and 
accounts of life during socialism expressed by the interviewees in the two cities also 
share important elements. First, interviewees did not experience problems in relation 
to interethnic coexistence, and report having good relations with friends and 
neighbours of different backgrounds. Second, local communities in Prijedor and 
Zenica were said to enjoy social security and stability, guaranteed by good 
employment opportunities offered by the industry sector and its satellite activities. 
Such social elements, analysed from the perspective of the interviewees, are 
important in order to understand how they experienced and perceived 
socioeconomic injustice during the war and the transition. While studies have shown 
that the 1980s were characterised by increasing social mobilisation throughout 
Yugoslavia as a result of economic decline (Lowinger 2009), in the eyes of the 
interviewees serious difficulties and injustice only arose with the war and the ensuing 
transition. Most importantly, their expectations for the post-war period involved the 
stability and security they had appreciated during socialism.  
 
 
                                                          
25 Interview PR/15/4.  




4.2 Socioeconomic injustice and violence during the war  
Experiences of socioeconomic injustice and violence were common during the war in 
BiH. Important differences in how the conflict unfolded in Prijedor and Zenica, 
however, transpire from the interviewee accounts. Crucially for this project, 
socioeconomic injustice characterised both, but occurred in conjunction with 
interethnic violence in Prijedor, where socioeconomic discrimination was pursued on 
the basis of ethnicity against Bosnian Muslisms and Croats. This was part of a broader 
strategy conducive, together with persecution and killing, to the ethnic cleansing of 
the area from non-Serbs. Experiences of socioeconomic injustice recounted by 
interviewees from Prijedor’s Muslim and Croat (or, more generally, mixed) 
community are directly linked to this. Workers interviewed in Zenica do not recount 
experiences of injustice or nonrecognition on the basis of ethnicity, and focus on 
economic violence in the form of deprivation and marginalisation. In these accounts 
it becomes apparent how economic violence, referring to ‘violations of economic and 
social rights, corruption, and plunder of natural resources’, is ‘typically more indirect’ 
compared to physical violence (Sharp 2014, 5). While making experiences of 
socioeconomic injustice in both cities finally ‘visible’ (Miller 2008), this section 
emphasises their differences, and most importantly the overlap between 
socioeconomic and cultural injustice in Prijedor that Zenica lacks. This will prove 
especially important when examining the emergence of justice claims in Chapter 5.  
 
 
4.2.1 The socioeconomic consequences of the war  
The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina brought destruction and death all over the 
country. In addition to the tragic death toll and the direct impact on civilian victims, 
the socioeconomic consequences of the war also led to dramatic transformations. 
Physical damages were accompanied by the definitive end of a system and the 
emergence of a new one, led by a new elite that gained economic and political 
influence through the conflict itself. Externally, such dramatic change in Bosnia’s 
conditions was visible in the destruction of infrastructures, civilian dwellings and 
industries. According to a 2004 World Bank report, the war damaged about two 




hospitals and about 45% of industrial facilities; and caused industrial production to 
fall to 5% of the pre-war levels (World Bank 2004, 1). 
Secondly, and importantly for this research, the war marked the end of a 
system that would not exist anymore, a complete overhaul of the social and economic 
aspects of life for everyone in the country. Yugoslavia had already started a process 
of socioeconomic reform in the 1980s, which had led to the approval of austerity 
measures, increased social dissent and protests, and the first attempts to reform 
property rights and introduce privatisation (Woodward 1995a; Unkovski-Korica 
2015). The war, however, came to play a crucial role. On the one hand, it interrupted 
the gradual reform process, while on the other it dramatically brought to completion 
parts of it, including the transfer of ownership from public to private hands (see 
Donais 2002). It has been pointed out, for instance, that there is a complex and 
interdependent relationship between the war and the development of criminal 
activities in BiH. The conflict offered the possibility to acquire wealth quickly through 
illegal means such as smuggling, and this then ‘contributed to the criminalization of 
the state and economy in the postwar period’ (Andreas 2004, 44). The new elites that 
acquired economic means and political power during the war were subsequently best 
placed to further increase it once the conflict was over, for instance by taking 
advantage of the privatisation process (Pugh 2002; Andreas 2004). Moreover, the war 
broke social and economic links in what was before a shared Yugoslav space. One of 
the consequences of this, particularly important for Zenica and Prijedor, was that 
Bosnia, and especially its regions that had been chosen to be the ‘industrial core’ of 
Yugoslavia (Hamilton 1964, 47, 57), lost this function in the much reduced BiH state. 
The socioeconomic impact of the war, therefore, was not limited to destruction and 
the destruction of livelihoods. The secure and orderly life of the socialist system was 
irremediably overthrown, although it persisted in the interviewees’ memories, 
providing a measure of contrast with the reality of post-socialism. Experiences of 
injustice suffered by local communities in Prijedor and Zenica should therefore be 
understood against such background. The following two sections discuss how the 
local population lived through these events in the two cities, and what concrete forms 






4.2.2 The white armband and beyond: socioeconomic injustice in Prijedor  
Experiences of socioeconomic injustice in Prijedor are related to the direct use of 
violence and actively pursued policies of discrimination on the part of the Bosnian 
Serb military and political elites who came to power in 1992. The war in Prijedor was 
violent and bloody, and socioeconomic discrimination and persecution were an 
integral part of the war strategy. The ultimate aim of such strategy was the removal 
of non-Serbs from the Prijedor territory, in order to facilitate its integration within a 
Serb-dominated area spanning from Bosnia to the bordering region of the Croatian 
Krajina (Greve 1994). Prijedor has been called an ‘ethnic cleansing laboratory’ for the 
rest of Bosnia (Wesselingh and Vaulerin 2005), due to the extent of the violence and 
the systematic removal of the local Muslim and Croat population, which was well 
under way already in 1992. The high number of civilian victims, including women 
and children, makes the Prijedor events one of the worst chapters of the war in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.  
The situation had been deteriorating since the 1990 elections that brought 
nationalist parties to power in the municipality, and even more since hostilities in 
Croatia started in 1991, spilling over to the region of Bosanska Krajina, where Prijedor 
is located. Already in 1991, Bosnian Serb elites started holding meetings of an 
alternative, Serb, municipal assembly and organising a parallel administration and 
police force. Other preparations, including taking control of television broadcasts and 
the local radio, creating road blocks and severing links to Sarajevo, culminated in the 
takeover of power on April 30, 1992 by the self-proclaimed ‘Crisis Staff of the Serb 
municipality of Prijedor’ (Greve 1994, see especially part one, paragraphs III and IX, 
and part two, paragraphs IV and V). After that moment, the living conditions of 
Muslims and Croats in Prijedor significantly deteriorated. Over the following 
months, the notorious prison camps of Trnopolje, Omarska (where the main iron ore 
mine was located), Keraterm, and Manjača were opened. Non-Serb civilians (both 
men and women) were taken there arbitrarily and exposed to harsh conditions and 
killings. Crimes committed in the Prijedor municipality have been the subject of 
numerous ICTY and national investigations, resulting in a number of convictions for 




of Radovan Karadžić.27 The interviews conducted in Prijedor shift the focus on 
socioeconomic injustice as an especially important yet understudied part of the 
general experience of violence and victimisation brought about by the war. At the 
same time, they show that this form of injustice was carried out in conjunction with 
or against the background of interethnic violence that later constituted the main focus 
of transitional justice mechanisms adopted in the former Yugoslavia.  
The first, most cited, form of socioeconomic injustice suffered by non-Serbs in 
Prijedor was the exclusion from the socioeconomic life of the town, which came in 
the form of dismissal from their jobs. Formerly a place of coexistence and shared life 
among the different Prijedor communities, the workplace came to represent injustice 
along socioeconomic and ethnic lines.  As the UN report notes, in the spring of 1992 
‘most non-Serbs were dismissed from their jobs, be it police, public officials, or even 
manual workers’ (Greve 1994, part one, paragraph IV). This was the first step of a 
campaign that would culminate with the ethnic cleansing of the town, which was to 
be accomplished through persecution and killings. The accounts of research 
participants stress how being fired represented the first form of discrimination and 
injustice they personally felt, following which everything changed. Suada used to 
work for the administration of RŽR Ljubija, Prijedor’s mining company. She worked 
until May 1992, until the Crisis Staff took power, and ‘and then us Bosniaks – even 
though we never called ourselves Bosniaks, we were Yugoslavs, and loved our 
Yugoslavia – got fired. First we were put on hold for one month, and then fired (…). 
We were all fired, my brother, my sister-in-law, all of my friends, all colleagues who 
were Bosniaks or Croats. In May 1992.’28 She subsequently had to abandon her house 
and flee with her daughter to Croatia first, and then Germany. Nefisa, a nurse, was 
one of the few Muslims to stay in Prijedor throughout the war, in order to take care 
of her mother, while many of her family members left. She remembers that one day 
the situation started to change and people began to hang out in groups at the hospital, 
separated by nationality. Nefisa recalls that they put up a list on the door at the 
Prijedor Hospital, and ‘who was on the list had to go. Who was on the list never came 
                                                          
27 The Karadžić judgement can be accessed here: <http://www.icty.org/case/karadzic/>. 
For an overview of crimes in Prijedor, see the ICTY resources linked to their interactive map, 
at <http://www.icty.org/en/cases/interactive-map>; and the OSCE map of war crimes 
cases, available at <http://www.osce.org/bih/118901>; last accessed 22 February 2017.  




back to work. One by one people were put on the list, but I never was.’ Probably 
because of lack of medical personnel, she continued to work even after the fighting 
started, despite her fears. One day her boss sent an ambulance driver to her home to 
advise her not to come to work, because the military was going to take her to the 
camp in Omarska if she showed up.29 She stayed home, and could never go back 
again. Belma, who started working for a small firm in Kozarac (a small town in the 
Prijedor municipality) in 1991, also lost her job in 1992, along with her husband who 
was then working for another Prijedor firm. One day they called her from Kozarac 
and told her not to go to work, because the military was in the town. ‘Then I stayed’ 
she says, ‘and I didn’t ever see anyone anymore. (…) Part of the workers of my firm 
died in the camps.’30 Other interviewees provided accounts of how they were fired 
on the basis of their ethnic belonging, subsequently imprisoned in the camps for some 
time and then forced to leave town, such as Mersad, who had worked for eight years 
at the Meso Promet firm before being fired ‘because I was a Muslim’.31 Sakib says 
that, after being expelled from Prijedor, he moved to Zenica, where he was 
temporarily employed at RMK thanks to connections he had there, dating back to 
when he was a university student at Zenica’s faculty of metallurgy. He later had to 
move to Sanski Most, and could only go back to Prijedor towards the end of the 
1990s.32 The policy of firing non-Serbs also hit those of mixed backgrounds, or who 
chose not to declare themselves as Serbs. Maja, daughter of a Serb man and a Muslim 
woman, got fired from her job in the administration of a high school because she 
married a Muslim man. She also had to leave Prijedor later on.33 
Being fired from the workplace, for no other reason than nationality, was the 
most prominent example of socioeconomic injustice suffered during the war, but not 
the only one. Economic hardship and social exclusion were also common. In addition 
to the loss of income related to dismissals, non-Serbs were also prevented from 
travelling freely and intimated to give up any weapons (including those held for 
hunting). Telephone lines for non-Serbs were cut off. Nefisa remembers that, ‘since 
telephones in Muslim homes were cut off, the doctor said that if he needed to tell me 
                                                          
29 Interview PR/15/13.  
30 Interview PR/15/15.  
31 Interview PR/15/16, worker from Prijedor (Mersad), 19 July 2015.  
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anything from the hospital he would send an ambulance driver at my place’. One 
night, when she was supposed to work a night shift, he came and warned her to stay 
home. When the war started, she says, ‘we went home’ and lived almost hidden until 
the end of the war.34 Curfews were introduced, and at some point Muslims were also 
asked to wear white armbands when walking on the streets. Civilian homes and 
religious buildings also became a specific target, and were often razed. In May 1992, 
for instance, in retaliation for a failed armed attack by an informal group of non-Serb 
militants, Bosnian Serb forces destroyed the Old Town of Prijedor, which was mostly 
inhabited by Muslims, and intimated people to leave (Greve 1994; see especially part 
one, paragraphs IV, V and VIII). Those who had left their homes intact often found 
them occupied by other families at the end of the war. Suada, Sakib and Maja had 
their homes occupied by Serb families until the end of the war, and Suada laments 
the loss of valuables and of her parent’s memories that were taken away and never 
returned after she got her house back. The city underwent a thorough cleansing. Serb 
media sources cited in the UN report estimated that by June 1993 the Muslim 
population in the municipality was reduced by 43.330 people, which meant that 
virtually everyone who could leave (and was not killed) had done so (Greve 1994, 
part one, paragraph II).  
From such accounts, it becomes clear that instances of injustice related to 
socioeconomic issues were felt deeply by the Muslim, Croat, and mixed community 
in Prijedor during the war. Far from being separated from their overall experience of 
the conflict, they appear connected to the other forms of violence including 
persecution, deportation and having to flee the city or country as refugees. Cultural 
and socioeconomic injustice overlap, and are difficult to disentangle from one 
another (Fraser 2009). While the workplace had represented an important part of their 
inclusion in society, and of their identity as workers during socialism, it was also the 
first to be damaged by the politics of exclusion enacted by Bosnian Serb elites in order 
to ethnically cleanse the area. The interviews show that experiences of socioeconomic 
injustice were an important part of the victimisation and violence suffered by the 
Muslim and Croat community in Prijedor. Their discrimination and persecution goes 
against the transitional justice and peacebuilding goals of rebuilding an inclusive 
                                                          




society. As the following section will discuss, however, the experience of 
socioeconomic justice protracted itself into the transition period. 
 
 
4.2.3 Endangered jobs and livelihoods in Zenica 
Differently from Prijedor, experiences of socioeconomic injustice described by 
interviewees do not overlap with interethnic violence and cultural injustice in Zenica, 
and have more to do with the deprivation and social marginalisation brought about 
by the war and in particular by the management of the steel plant during this period. 
The war in Zenica unfolded in a very different way compared to Prijedor. The city 
was under the control of the Bosniak forces throughout the duration of the conflict, 
but was shelled by the Croat HVO (Hrvatsko Vijeće Obrane, Croatian Defence 
Council). Moreover, fighting in close-by areas in central Bosnia was fierce and violent 
against the civilian population. While the city was not at the centre of such fighting, 
‘the war brings misery, grief, hunger, killings, and wounding to everyone’, as one 
interviewee said.35 Economic violence in Zenica shaped people’s experience of the 
war, and constitutes an important basis for understanding the development of justice 
claims related to redistribution, analysed in Chapter 5.    
Traumatic experiences of socioeconomic injustice were related to the loss of 
employment in Zenica, most notably in the steel plant that almost ceased production 
during the conflict. During the war only half of the employees remained in the plant, 
and production ‘was scaled down significantly, the primary objective being to 
preserve and protect the plant’s facilities’ (Slavnić et al. 2013, 42). The effects of this 
downsizing would be visible later on as well, as ‘the coke plant and blast furnaces 
remained closed for almost ten years’, and production was only restarted in 2004 
(Ibid.).  Interviewees in Zenica describe the process of reduction of the production 
and workforce that began with the war. Jakub laments that ‘the chimneys were shut 
off and stayed abandoned for four years in the sun, wind and rain’, ‘when the war 
started a majority of people went to defend the country, and only a few technicians 
stayed on the shop floor’.36 He was put on leave and subsequently also went to the 
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army. Many workers were enlisted in the military and were sent to the frontlines. 
Josip, for instance, continued working in the plant, only to leave when they started 
calling him to the army in 1995. He says that life at the factory during the war ‘was 
not good, there were people who always had work, and others who worked, in one 
year, two months, three months, one month, or none at all. They only worked when 
they were called’.37 Those working in the administration of Željezara also had to 
rotate, Zineta says, ‘so that everyone could receive some money to live on’.38 Josip 
complained that, even if you worked, compensation was not guaranteed or on time. 
An additional source of distress was caused by the termination of employment 
contracts. Zineta points out that when the war broke out people were getting fired 
for different reasons, such as not reporting to the factory for a certain period of time. 
According to her and other interviewees who used to work in the steel plants 
administration, if someone did not report back to the factory by the deadline and was 
not in the military, he or she had to take sick leave, and after being absent for two 
months workers were dismissed. Mediha, for instance, was fired after failing to 
report to the plant. She was given the responsibility to take the extended family’s 
children away from the war, to Croatia, and stopped reporting to Željezara when the 
trip back to Zenica became too dangerous. Zineta says that often this was done in an 
unjust way: ‘there was a woman who was the aide to the director (…), and because 
our offices had been bombed we had to sit in the same offices of the directorate. She 
calls me on the phone and says, Zineta, today you will report this and this person.’ 
Zineta answered that she would never do that unless it was a written instruction from 
her superior: ‘I would never authorise an injustice at work, because I cannot stand 
that someone tomorrow will say Zineta fired me, Zineta reported me’. She says: ‘a 
person needs to have basic means to survive, why did they not bother to leave their 
citizens their right to work?’.39  
Experiences of socioeconomic injustice in Zenica were also related to the 
scarcity of food and lack of other basic necessities. From Zijad’s perspective ‘to the 
workers from the steel plant the war brought great poverty and great misery. They 
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didn’t have anything. There was no money, every now and then a food parcel’.40 
Zineta recalls that working at the factory during the war was terrible, and that they 
did not have anything to eat. They were often given only a soup made up of water 
and cabbage, and a small piece of bread: ‘I had nothing to give to my children at 
home, to Senad who was 5 and Emir who was 8 years old. My husband was on the 
frontlines (…) but I didn’t get anything from the Armija BiH either. Only once I 
remember getting some flour, one kilogram of coffee and a bit of oil’. The only luck 
they had in Blatuša (a borough of Zenica) was that they had water, thanks to their 
proximity to the steel plant. Access to humanitarian aid was also difficult. She 
ironically recalls her mother, who had survived the Second World War, saying ‘God 
forbids the Red Cross feeds us’, and then, Zineta says, even ‘the Red Cross didn’t feed 
me’. 41 
Experiences of socioeconomic injustice in Zenica, therefore, are linked to 
extreme deprivation and social marginalisation, rather than being part of a broader 
war strategy for the removal of a specific group of the population. Feelings of injustice 
draw on socioeconomic concerns rather than cultural ones linked to ethnic relations.  
The impact of such experiences, as evidenced by the distress caused by remembering 
these events during interviews, was however profound. This can surely be 
understood if we contrast this state of deprivation with the city’s conditions during 
socialism. The situation of conflict and general insecurity prevented Zenica’s citizens 
from finding any form of redress, or ameliorating their situation in general. The end 
of the war, however, did not bring relief, but brought to completion the decline of the 
city and of its industrial complex. As discussed in the following pages, this furthered 
feelings of socioeconomic injustice among interviewees.  
 
 
4.3 After the war: transition or the continuation of injustice?  
While war itself makes redressing socioeconomic injustice impossible for a prolonged 
period of time, experiences of socioeconomic injustice were not just limited to the 
conflict. In Prijedor and Zenica, injustices that originated with the war continued or 
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were aggravated in its aftermath. In the interviewees’ minds, however, the concept 
of transition itself becomes blurred with the war and the period before the war. It 
does not coincide with definitions focusing on the temporal gap between one political 
regime and another (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986), or on the consolidation of 
democratic institutions (Linz and Stepan 1996). The case of the former Yugoslavia is 
complicated by the multiple transition processes at play (Kostovicova and Bojijc-
Dzelilovic 2013), and conceptual and temporal demarcations are irregular and not 
fixed in the minds of interviewees.  
Just like the war, however, the transition also had a different impact on the 
experience of socioeconomic injustice in Prijedor and Zenica. Interviewees from 
Zenica, whose case figures more prominently in this section, stress that the 
privatisation of the steel plain entailed the dismantling of the main source of 
economic development of the city, as well as a loss of identity for its inhabitants. The 
case of Zenica shows that experiences of socioeconomic injustice that originated from 
deprivation during the war fully developed during the transition. Feelings of 
marginalisation became entrenched, and the environmental conditions of the town 
worsened significantly. In Prijedor, interviews show that the experience of 
socioeconomic injustice continued after the war, given the impossibility of regaining 
employment, due to a hostile attitude from the RS authorities (the continuation of 




4.3.1 Transition in the eyes of locals 
Trying to disentangle experiences of injustice related to the war and the transition is 
quite challenging, because the perspective of interviewees on what transition means 
might fundamentally differ from that of academics and policy makers. This section 
analyses the meaning of transition according to research participants from Prijedor 
and Zenica, and supports two main claims. First, there is no clear demarcation line 
between the war and the transition, either temporally or conceptually. Second, the 
transition is often seen as comprehensive change, one that takes place in people’s 




According to interviewees, the temporal dimension of the transition in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina is extremely fuzzy. One important element that emerges from local 
views is that there are diverging opinions about when the transition started, and 
significant overlaps with the time of the war. While there are some who point to the 
signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995 as the beginning of the transition 
process, such as Belma from Prijedor, many others identify the starting point during 
the war or before it. One commonly held view is that the economic crisis in the 1970s, 
the reform process that followed it and the establishment of closer links with 
international financial institutions, before the war, initiated the transition process. 
Engineer Sakib highlights the role of the last Yugoslav President, Marković, in 
starting the privatisation process that he considers the cornerstone of the transition. 
This view is shared by the Director of the Zenica Developlment Agency ZEDA. 
Looking more at the impact on their personal conditions, Jasna said that ‘the 
transition started when the crisis began. That was in 1987, when I was working in my 
firm and the strikes began’.42 If we consider the transition primarily as a process of 
economic reform, it is definitely true that important changes were already under way 
when the war started. As Unkovski-Korica points out, the IMF granted its biggest 
loan so far to Yugoslavia in 1981, with the attached conditionality that led to the 
approval of austerity measures that had significant social consequences (Unkovski-
Korica 2015, 39). This implies that a complete separation of the experiences of 
socioeconomic injustice suffered by local communities in BiH during the war or the 
transition is not possible, and that analysing the former without the latter would only 
depict a partial picture.  
The account of the temporal dimension of the transition is further complicated 
by questions related to whether such process have even started or will ever start, 
echoing some of the new scholarship critical of the teleological nature of the concept 
of transition.43 Mersad, from Prijedor, says that transition in BiH ‘will never be’, 
because Bosniaks cannot fully participate in society. He adds that in Republika 
Srpska it is impossible to even get a job as a cleaner without connections to a political 
party. Transition, he says, involves one’s participation in the system, and this is 
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lacking. Ines, from Zenica, concurs that a real transition did not occur in BiH in the 
same way as in East European countries such as the Czech Republic or Poland. Other 
interviewees note that a process of change has started, but on the ‘wrong path’.44  
The second element that emerges from interviewees’ accounts is related to the 
meaning of transition, which goes beyond the reforms carried out to transform the 
political and economic system. Such transformation affected, although in an 
unfinished and imperfect way, ways of living, thinking and behaving. The beginning 
of the transition itself is related to how people ‘started to change’ before the war.45 
Belma says that transition involved ‘moving from a cuddled and dormant life to 
capitalism’, and that, while society finds itself dealing with this new system, ‘with 
our minds we are still in socialism somewhere’.46 Fatima also argues that the lack of 
a real, gradual process of reform left them no time to adapt, so that people still think 
through old, inadequate frameworks.47 Other interviewees also point to the difficulty 
of adapting to the dramatic changes brought about by capitalism, as Jadranko says, 
or to how that involved changing from being ‘a-national types’ to ‘extremely national 
types’.48 The transition is also negatively characterised as moving, involuntarily, from 
stability to chaos, from having an established system to being unable to fully 
introduce a new one, therefore leading to complete disorganisation, as both Nefisa 
from Prijedor and Zineta from Zenica point out. Research participants also highlight 
that elites took advantage of the transition to enrich themselves and were responsible 
for injustices occurred and for BiH taking the wrong path to reforms. As we can see, 
in the eyes of the interviewees the transition represented a process of deep social 
change, one that is more far-reaching, blurred and imperfect compared to how we 
would define it by looking at the political and economic reforms introduced in Bosnia 
after the war. In light of this composite and complex definition of the transition 
process from the perspective of local communities, the need to address the 
continuation of injustice from the war to the post-war period appears even clearer.  
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4.3.2 Loss of jobs, status and health in Zenica 
The transition did not lead to an alleviation of socioeconomic injustice in Zenica. 
Instead, the period following the war is crucial in order to understand the emergence 
of justice claims related to redistribution, which will be analysed in Chapter 5. The 
decline and privatisation of the steel plant was the primary cause of social grievances: 
while seemingly disconnected from the conflict, this process was actually only made 
possible by the conflict itself. Contrary to other Eastern European countries, and 
despite the reform process already initiated in the 1980s (Lavigne 1995; Donais 2005), 
it was the war that brought state socialism to an end in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Gilbert 2006). As already noted in section 2.1, the political economy of the war 
influenced the way in which the post-war economic system was reconstructed (Pugh 
2002; Andreas 2004). Privatisation was conducted at the entity level, contributing to 
the further fragmentation of the economic space of BiH, and to privatisation along 
ethnic lines, where the dominant ethnic group would also control economic processes 
in their area (Stojanov 2001, 55). In the FBiH, many of the employees who were on 
waiting lists at the end of the war would not be able to get the severance pay they 
were entitled to by law because employers could no longer afford it (Čausević 2001, 
78). Lastly, ‘external attempts to regulate welfare regimes in B-H (…) contributed to 
a diminution of the importance of social rights and social policy as a whole’ (Stubbs 
2001, 95), with particularly dramatic results in post-industrial towns that had lost 
their primary source of revenue and employment. Socioeconomic injustice in Zenica 
during the transition was thus felt primarily in conjunction with the decline and 
privatisation of the steel plant, leading to the crystallisation of social marginalisation 
and deprivation that had already been experienced during the war. It also brought a 
strong loss of identity, albeit one related to class rather than ethnicity.  
The economic impact of the fall of Željezara on the city was very notable. The 
workforce employed in the steel sector was reduced to one tenth of the approximately 
20.000 it had before the war, even though the privatisation contract signed by Mittal 
included an obligation to keep at least 4,514 workers (Slavnić et al. 2013, 43). As one 
report for the UK Department for International Development points out, ‘Although 
the town did not suffer from significant physical damage during the recent war it lost 
its markets for most of its products. The continuous steel processing plant ceased to 




industries’ (UK DfID 2002a, 16). The fall of the steel plant was not accompanied by 
the opening of new economic possibilities (foreign investments, expected by the 
international community, largely failed to materialise in BiH), and thus the economic 
situation of the city deteriorated substantially compared to the pre-war period. 
Interviewees reflect these feelings of decline and loss of status and rights. They felt 
that the situation started to change already during the war, but the transition brought 
such processes to completion, and allowed ‘capitalism to arrive’, ‘little by little’ until 
Mittal acquired control of the steel plant.49 The temporary closure and restructuring 
of the plant deepened the sense of injustice already felt during the war. Josip 
complains about the workforce reduction: ‘from that transition the workers did not 
get anything. When the new bosses arrived they just said “I need this amount of 
people and the rest can get severance pay”’. He adds that even those who managed 
to keep their post suffer from long working hours and low salaries.50 Zijad, on the 
other hand, says that ArcelorMittal is a good employer and that salaries are higher 
than before, although the standard of life of employees has worsened. RMK, he 
claims, employed more than twice the people it needed during socialism.51 Jakub, 
who had worked on the factory’s shop floor, ended up working as a guardian after 
being on a waiting list for 11 years. He now works for the part of the steel plant that 
has not been privatised, which only employs a few hundred people.52  
The economic hardship that had characterised the war turned into a chronic 
condition of deprivation and marginalisation during the transition. According to data 
from the Institute for Statistics of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2015), 
only about 24,000 out of 127,000 citizens in Zenica are formally employed.53 One 
interviewee says that the sale of Željezara left the citizens of Zenica ‘in hunger and 
misery’. During the war, it was easy for her to explain to their children that they could 
not eat because there was no food for anyone, but once the war was over and supplies 
became available she had no money to buy them. Due to an injury, she expected to 
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be reassigned to a less demanding post in the steel plant after the war, but after being 
‘on hold’ for several years she was offered a disability pension. 54 Such difficulties are 
still present even for those who are still employed in the steel sector. When he met 
me for the interview in June 2015, Jakub was waiting to receive the first half of his 
February salary to be paid on the following day: in his company ‘they got to a very 
ugly situation’ whereby, he claims, he risks being dismissed if he complains to the 
director.55  Families where both parents lost their jobs struggled, and were left 
without proper support from the state, as were those receiving minimal pensions.56 
If a pensioner earns 326KM per month and the consumer basket for one person is 
480KM, 57 ‘how can one pensioner as a single person survive?’ asks Zineta.58 Attempts 
to look for employment in other sectors are also fraught with difficulties and injustice, 
according to participants who denounce the need to have links to political parties in 
order to stand a chance of getting a job.59 Dismissals from jobs, loss of social and 
economic rights, and marginalisation from economic life were thus still very much 
present during the transition period, and constitute an important element for 
understanding experiences of socioeconomic injustice in Zenica.  
Heavy pollution is a second element that compromises the socioeconomic 
wellbeing of the city’s inhabitants. Steel production causes high emissions of sulphur 
dioxide (SO2), which causes long-term respiratory problems (UK Health Protection 
Agency 2010), and particulate matter (PM10). Being ‘small enough to be inhaled into 
the deepest parts of the lung’, these particles are particularly dangerous for health 
(UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural affairs, nd). The tension between 
the right to health and the right to work, posed by the very existence of the steel plant 
(Picheca 2014), emerges clearly from the interviews. On the one hand, interviewees 
complain about the situation, and believe that the pollution has gotten worse since 
the plant restarted working under Mittal’s management. On the other hand, they 
hope that new factories will open to compensate for the loss of jobs due to the 
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privatisation.60 The NGO Eko forum Zenica was established in 2008 as a result of the 
growing concerns for the health of the city’s population once the steel plant was 
privatised and the integral steel production restarted. According to their data, while 
since restarting the steel plant has only reached around 40% of pre-war production, 
pollution has reached 75% of 1980s levels. Levels of SO2 and PM10 in the air have 
been growing, and are constantly above the legal limit, since 2004. In 2015, the annual 
average concentration of PM10 in Zenica was 120 μg/m3. As a form of comparison, 
the legal limit set by the EU is 40 μg/m3. A daily concentration of 50 μg/m3 should 
not be allowed for more than 35 days in a year (European Commission 2015). Eko 
forum also highlights that the emissions of SO2 of other factories owned by 
ArcelorMittal in Europe are much lower despite producing more.  
The authorities’ response to environmental concerns has been quite weak in 
the post-war period.61 At first, Eko forum struggled to establish itself in Zenica. One 
of its founders says: ‘we definitely spent two or three years convincing people that 
we do not want to shut down the steel mill, rather [we want] that it works according 
to the agreements just like it does in every other country’.62  Once the pollution 
problem became apparent to all, and reached a dangerous peak, mass protests finally 
took place in 2012. The city then installed an air monitoring system, and a display 
was set up on a tall building in the centre of Zenica showing the concentration of SO2. 
Socioeconomic injustice in the form of environmental damage, such as in this case, is 
indicative of the relevance of ‘second-order’ questions of representation, or how 
justice claims are adjudicated (Fraser 2005). In post-war BiH, the scope for collective 
participation, especially in economic decision-making, is limited by the ethnicised 
and layered institutional system and constrained by the boundaries of neoliberal 
restructuring of the economy sponsored by international actors.63 According to Eko 
forum, the reason why international organisations are not providing much support 
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to NGOs working on the problem of air pollution is that this is not a priority for 
Western countries anymore. Having solved these issues during the 1970s, they do not 
see air pollution as an environmental priority, despite having provided funding to 
Eko forum for a project on chemical water pollution.64 Air pollution and the 
consequences that derive for the health of the citizens and the environment, therefore, 
constitutes an important facet of socioeconomic and political injustice related to the 
transition process in Zenica.  
Lastly, the effects of socioeconomic injustice linked to the fall of the steel plant 
go beyond material problems, and tap into feelings of identity linked to working class 
belonging. While it is clear that the different market conditions at the end of the war 
could not allow the factory to continue its work at the same levels as before (UK DfID 
2002b), such change had a profound impact that went much beyond the economic 
sphere. The industrial character of the city had been its very raison d’être, and citizens 
of Zenica identified with it, often feeling part of the working class before ethnically 
affiliated to one of Bosnia’s constituent nations (Croats, Bosniaks and Serbs).65 The 
sale of Željezara for only a small fraction of its value is often mentioned by 
interviewees as the source of much discontent, which is targeted at the political elites 
of the post-war period who profited from privatisations.66 In the opinion of one 
interviewee, deindustrialisation has led to a paradoxical situation: while every 
engineer graduate from anywhere in the world aspires to work in a big private 
company, in Bosnia they would like to work in the public sector, since there is no 
industrial production anymore. He further points out that the public sector has even 
physically occupied places of production: the government of the Zenica-Doboj 
Canton now resides in the RMK building.67 Interviews show that the restructuration 
of the steel industry and consequent loss of jobs also led to the loss of a working class 
identity for Zenica’s citizens, who turned into pensioners, unemployed (or informally 
employed), or left. Once proud of their contribution to Yugoslavia (Zineta remembers 
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how they even gave part of their salaries to fund the Sarajevo Winter Olympic Games 
in 1984), 68 Zenica’s citizens seem to believe that working class identity represented 
positive values, especially if contrasted with the sort of national identity that 
politicians talk about, because it conveys a sense of multiculturalism and tolerance, 
but are now convinced the working class does not exist anymore in their city.69 While 
cultural injustice related to interethnic violence was not a prominent feature of the 
interviewee’s accounts, experiences of misrecognition were still present, and linked to 
the working class identity of the city instead.70  
As we can see from the bleak accounts of Zenica’s citizens, the transition 
process further engulfed the city into a condition of socioeconomic injustice and deep 
loss. Zenica itself, as a post-industrial city, became marginalised. The feelings of 
injustice analysed in this section are crucial in order to understand the emergence of 
justice claims discussed in Chapter 5. For now, however, this chapter turns to the 
issue of socioeconomic injustice in Prijedor during the transition.  
 
 
4.3.3 The continuation of social exclusion in Prijedor  
Just like in Zenica, the aftermath of the conflict did not entail the end of 
socioeconomic injustice in Prijedor either. As noted above, the vast majority of the 
city’s non-Serb population became displaced during the war. When return 
programmes started, they involved the restitution of property, but limited attention 
and funding was directed towards income-generating activities (Black 2001; Haider 
2009). In Prijedor specifically, displaced persons began returning towards the end of 
the 1990s, at a time when international agencies still advised against doing so due to 
fears of backlash on the part of nationalist extremists (Belloni 2005). Returning ‘home’ 
implied, in the minds of many Bosnians, a return to a ‘normal life’ in addition to 
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regaining possession of one’s house or flat. Such ‘normal life’, in turn, ‘included 
health care, education, social welfare and – particularly – stable employment’ (Jansen 
2006, 191). The impossibility of being reinstated in their own places of work was 
further aggravated by the lack of economic opportunities characterising the post-war 
period, due to the deindustrialisation of the area. Lastly, this marginalisation seems 
to be linked, once again, to problems of political representation (Fraser 2005), as 
Muslims and Croats in the RS feel marginalised from the political as well as 
socioeconomic life of the town.   
Workers who were dismissed in 1992 were not reinstated once the conflict 
was over. It took years for most to regain possession of their homes, but once back in 
Prijedor their positions in the companies they worked for were no longer available 
for them. Suada had fled to Germany, but once she was asked to leave she had to 
move temporarily to Sanski Most, a town not far from Prijedor, but located in the 
Federation of BiH and not in the RS.71 Once she could move back into her home, 
however, she could not go back to work. She says that they were told they were not 
needed anymore and that there was not enough work at Rudnik Ljubija for them to 
be employed.72 Nefisa did not get her job back at the Prijedor Hospital, and suggests 
that none of her Muslim colleagues did.73 Sakib, who managed to find employment 
for a short period in Prijedor, was hired for a lower grade post than what would have 
matched his qualifications and experience as an engineer.74 Maja, who had been 
dismissed despite being partly Serb, tried to get her position back at the 
Elektrotehnička Škola (a specialised high school), but her request was refused. She was 
told that ‘they wouldn’t go back to those times’ before the war.75 Like many other 
returnees, she subsequently found a job in Sanski Most and travels there daily. Other 
displaced persons from Prijedor did not come back after the war, or did so for a few 
years only to emigrate again later on.76  
                                                          
71 This was a common experience for displaced people from Prijedor. See Belloni (2005) and 
Jansen (2006). 
72 Interviewee PR/15/4.  
73 Interview PR/15/13. 
74 Interview PR/15/8.   
75 Interviewee PR/15/7.  




Economic marginalisation was exacerbated by the transition process, which 
was characterised (similarly to Zenica) by deindustrialisation and problematic 
privatisations. The consequent reduction of jobs hit all of Prijedor’s inhabitants. 
According to estimates of the Prijedor Development Agency (PREDA), the overall 
number of workers in the municipality decreased from 27,000 to 16,000.77 Large firms, 
such as the paper mill that used to employ about 3,000 workers, shut down entirely. 
RŽR Lijubja, Prijedor’s mining company, was sold and restructured by ArcelorMittal, 
losing about four fifths of its employees. The mine in Lijubja is now not functioning 
anymore, while the Omarska mine, used as a prison camp by Bosnian Serb forces 
during the war, is still in operation. Radovan Karadžić is the most known high profile 
indictee to have been sentenced for crimes related to the operation of the Omarska 
camp (and other camps in the nearby territory). The recent ICTY judgement on his 
case outlines the unbearable conditions endured by Omarska prisoners until the 
camp was shut down in the summer of 1992 (ICTY 2016). ArcelorMittal has so far 
refused the request by victims’ associations to build a memorial on the site.78 Once 
again, the Prijedor case shows how socioeconomic injustices merge with issues 
having to do with recognition and identity.  
Lack of participation, in both the political and economic life of the city, is one 
further element characterising the experience of non-Serbs from Prijedor. A Muslim 
émigré to Sweden sums up his feelings: ‘when the return started we enthusiastically 
hoped that it will be better, that we will be equal citizens’, but those hopes did not 
materialise.79 While peacebuilding is also based on rebuilding social relations, 
including those pertaining to the workplace, this process was never set fully in 
motion in Prijedor. RS political elites are held responsible for the poor state of the 
economy,80 as well as for the lack of representation for the concerns of minorities. The 
residency status of non-Serb returnees in the RS has been the subject of disputes over 
the past years, since voting rights (Jahić 2015) and the status of the RS as a majority 
Serb entity (Perry 2015) rest on it. Ultimately, if in different ways compared to Zenica, 
Prijedor still suffered from socioeconomic injustice that did not cease with the end of 
                                                          
77 Interview with Boris Srdić, PREDA.  
78 ArcelorMittal did not respond to interview requests made by phone and via email. 
79 Interview PR/15/17. 




the war, but were protracted well into the transition period. Hostile attitudes on the 
part of authorities, as well as the social impact of privatisation and 
deindustrialisation, contributed to the persistence of feelings of injustice among 
interviewees.  
More in general, the analysis of interviews shows that for many Bosnians, in 
the aftermath of the conflict, their ‘predicaments raised questions that could not be 
reduced to their post-war character’ (Jansen 2006, 185). In order to grasp these, not 
only we need to look beyond ethnic cleansing, as Jansen suggests, but also broaden 
our scope beyond the temporal boundaries of the war, to understand how the conflict 
and post-conflict period are situated within the broader social transformation 
entailed by the post-socialist transition. 
 
 
4.4 Conclusion  
In the conclusion of his book on socioeconomic violence and transitional justice, 
Dustin N. Sharp (2014) warns that the expansion of transitional justice into new 
territory comes with risks and difficulties, and should be done cautiously. Any 
discussion of such expansion towards socioeconomic issues, however, should be 
grounded in the comprehension of the violations and crimes that are actually 
experienced by local communities, and how they lead to the formulation of justice 
claims based on redistribution as opposed to (or in addition to) recognition. By 
analysing such experiences of injustice in Prijedor and Zenica, this chapter lays the 
basis for understanding the development of conceptions of justice and justice claims 
that is treated in Chapter 5. It will be argued in Chapter 5 that justice claims develop 
through a process of interaction between memories of injustices suffered and the 
influence of international models and discourses on justice issues.   
A crucial part of the thesis’ argument is that economic violence was present 
during the war and constitutes an important part of the war experience, as recounted 
by interviewees. This chapter has strengthened the case for including socioeconomic 
justice within the transitional justice framework, and provided evidence that local 
Bosnian communities commonly experienced forms of injustice or violence that were 
related to socioeconomic, and not just interethnic, issues. Experiences of 




socioeconomic injustice was firstly experienced in relation to an active policy of 
discrimination and marginalisation aimed at the non-Serb population, whose effects 
protracted well after the end of the conflict. Socioeconomic injustice, thus, occurred 
along ethnic lines. In Zenica, the local working-class community emphasises feelings 
of injustice related to deprivation, marginalisation and exploitation.  
Prijedor and Zenica shared the same path to socioeconomic development, 
especially thanks to investment on the part of the socialist government. The cities 
were also linked in the production process: the mining company in Prijedor extracted 
iron ore, one of the raw materials used to produce steel made by the Željezara in 
Zenica. The same multinational corporation, ArcelorMittal, controls the mine and 
steel mill today. Building on the background provided by this comparison, Section 2 
and 3 provided a more direct answer to the question by analysing experiences of 
socioeconomic injustice as presented by interviewees. Interviews reveal the far-
reaching socioeconomic implications of the conflict and the transformations that 
followed it, and stress the differences between the experiences of Zenica’s and 
Prijedor’s inhabitants. The relation between the war and socioeconomic injustice is 
particularly visible in Prijedor, where non-Serbs were systematically marginalised 
and fired from their jobs. The transition contributed to the crystallization of injustice, 
due to the impossibility of returning to previously held positions and the lack of 
economic opportunities brought about by deindustrialisation. In Zenica, the war 
represented the beginning of the end for some industries, and most notably for the 
steel plant. The privatisation of the steel plant caused not only the loss of employment 
for a large portion of Zenica’s citizens, but also signified the loss of the city’s 
industrial and working class character.  
The chapter has ultimately showed that adopting the analytical perspective of 
socioeconomic injustice is necessary to fully comprehend the war and transition 
experiences of Bosnian communities. Far from marginalising justice claims that might 
relate to recognition or representation (Fraser 2005), it reveals interactions and overlaps 
between different dimensions of injustice. It also highlights the potential role played 
by internationally-sponsored economic reforms, privatisations, and return policies in 
aggravating some of these feelings of injustice. The following chapter, then, turns to 




conceptions of justice at the local level, while Chapter 6 will explore whether and how 







STRUGGLING TO BE HEARD:  





Building on the analysis of experiences of socioeconomic injustice conducted in 
Chapter 4, this chapter answers the question of how conceptions of justice emerge 
among local communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It builds on the theoretical 
framework presented in Chapter 2, and more specifically refers to the element of 
contestation that is inherent in the idea and practice of post-war justice processes. By 
turning to the analysis of local ‘paradigms of justice’, defined as ‘the sets of linked 
assumptions about the causes of and remedies for injustice’ (Fraser 2003, 11), this 
chapter shows that the construction of notions of justice is characterised by more 
complex dynamics of contestation, boundary-setting, and by the ‘frictions’ (Hinton 
2010, 9) existing between universal ideals of justice brought to bear on the specific 
post-conflict context and localised experiences of injustice.  
In addition to focusing on local justice claims, then, Chapter 5 also takes into 
account the role played by the international intervention – not in spreading specific 
justice norms through a ‘cascade’ process (Sikkink 2011), but in setting the context 
within which ideas about justice are adopted and used by local actors, often in ways 
that had not been foreseen by their international initiators. This chapter gives yet a 
different perspective on the relationship between justice and affected societies, by 
focusing specifically on how justice conceptions can have strong local roots: in this 
case, memories of socialism and experiences of wartime injustice. It also stresses, 
however, the role of the international intervention in shaping justice discourses, and 
promoting transitional political-economic arrangements that also affect the 
development of justice claims. Justice claims do not necessarily constitute a set of 
coherent arguments, but emerge from the interviews as themes that have to do with 




the interviewees’ conceptions of justice. Second, they relate these ideas about what 
justice should look like to the strategies or remedies proposed to address injustice.  
The cases of Prijedor and Zenica are once again compared to illustrate 
different ways in which local experiences of injustice can be articulated in relation to 
the international intervention. Unsurprisingly, the experiences of injustice analysed 
in Chapter 4 inform people’s understandings of socioeconomic justice. Moreover, 
Chapter 5 argues that, once again, justice processes are affected by the idiosyncratic 
interpretation of personal experiences and expectations built on the memory of 
socialism, as well as by the contextual elements shaping people’s ability to think and 
act within the context of the post-socialist transition. The intervention of external 
actors, in particular, has conflicting or ambivalent effects. While local conceptions of 
justice commonly include socioeconomic issues in both cities, the type of claims 
articulated by participants varies between Prijedor and Zenica. In Prijedor, where 
socioeconomic injustice overlapped with interethnic violence, justice claims can at 
least in part be related to the internationally-sponsored transitional justice discourse. 
This might offer some acknowledgment to local communities, but can only partly 
satisfy their feelings of injustice as socioeconomic issues are left aside. On the other 
hand, transitional justice discourses do not capture socioeconomic claims emerging 
from Zenica. This can limit the potential for redress, but also leave citizens freer to 
develop alternative, and more transformative, conceptions of justice as 
redistribution. Building on this last point, Chapter 5 also shows that local 
communities put more emphasis on redistributive reforms to address socioeconomic 
injustice, rather than the mechanisms suggested by some transitional justice scholars 
(such as truth commissions or trials; see Arbour 2007; Sankey 2014).  
The international intervention in justice processes is broadly understood to 
include transitional justice and political-economic reforms. While the latter is central 
to the thesis argument and has been discussed at length in Chapter 3, here we begin 
by discussing the configuration of transitional justice interventions in the cases of 
Prijedor and Zenica. Section 5.1 also shows how ‘paradigms of justice’ can only be 
understood by taking into account past experiences, and the expectations that stem 
from these. Sections 5.2 and 5.3 illustrate how these elements combine to inform 
conceptions of justice and justice claims at the local level. First, Section 5.2 finds that 




of employment, and social and class status. These themes are then contrasted to the 
international approach towards these problems. Section 5.3 turns to the strategies 
proposed in connection to the issues raised in the previous section, and highlights the 
differences between the prevalence of affirmative strategies in Prijedor, compatible 
with the transitional justice discourse and the Dayton framework, and transformative 
proposals in Zenica, clashing with the international community’s vision of BiH based 
on liberal democracy and market economy. The chapter concludes by summarising 
its contribution to the thesis, and making an explicit connection between these 
findings and the following, last substantial chapter of the thesis, which addresses the 
question of whether these socioeconomic grievances led to social mobilisation.  
 
 
5.1 Developing ‘paradigms of justice’ 
Although socioeconomic injustice was common during the war, transitional justice 
programmes gave priority to injustice linked to violations of International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL). In the case of the former Yugoslavia, information about 
IHL violations was compiled through NGO and UN reports (such as the UN fact-
finding mission’s report, UNSC 1994; see also Helsinki Watch 1992). Socioeconomic 
justice was given limited space as a form of material compensation for these wrongs. 
In other words, transitional justice put in the foreground injustice linked to recognition 
rather than redistribution (Fraser 1995, 2003), separating war crimes and ethnic 
cleansing from the political economy of the war. As the focus on legal redress and 
individual accountability for violations of IHL defined clear boundaries for debates 
around justice issues, socioeconomic justice remained outside the scope of justice 
debates around policies and remedies to be adopted, and socioeconomic problems 
were left to be addressed through market reforms. This section shows how injustices 
suffered during the war, memories of a ‘socially just’ past, and the protraction of 
injustice during the transition, coupled with the limitations posed by the transitional 
justice framework, can affect the development of conceptions of justice and justice 






5.1.1 The role of perceptions and memories of the past  
The establishment of the ICTY was thus the result of the problematisation of the 
conduct of armed forces in the war, and its impact on the civilian population, 
especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Shifting from recognition to redistribution, 
however, also requires taking into account the less formalised nature of experiences 
of socioeconomic injustice, and thus entails turning to the grassroots level, to local 
communities and their perceptions, as the source of ideas about what justice should 
look like and how it should be achieved. As the interview material discussed in 
Sections 5.2 and 5.3 shows, experiences of socioeconomic injustice occupy central 
place in the development of conceptions of justice and justice claims among local 
communities.1 These experiences serve as the first point of reference for 
understanding how, in a context dominated by transitional justice as cultural 
recognition, people developed alternative ways of thinking about the meaning of 
justice, where socioeconomic issues occupy a central place.  
Conceptions of justice might also rely on memories of the past, often 
considered a benchmark for the peaceful and stable life people strive to establish in 
the aftermath of war. Different theoretical approaches to transitional justice have 
stressed the importance of restoration and redress for victims, and promoted a 
holistic view of justice issues in post-war societies (Mani 2002). Based on a critique of 
conventional transitional justice mechanisms (such as trials and truth commissions), 
Mani’s idea of ‘reparative justice’ suggests an attempt to restore, as much as possible, 
the social conditions that would have existed if the violence had not taken place 
(Mani 2005, 522), although the harm may never be fully repaired (Ibid., 524). More 
recent works by Lambourne (2009, 2014) incorporate this reparative element within 
a transformative justice model. Differently from the concept of reconciliation, which 
is also premised on the return to a peaceful past but is marred by teleological religious 
connotations (Moon 2004) and places a heavy burden on communities supposed to 
‘reconcile’, the idea of restoring some of the features of socioeconomic life that 
characterised socialist Yugoslavia has some traction among victims of socioeconomic 
injustice in Prijedor and Zenica.  
 
                                                          




Table 5.1. Summary of socioeconomic injustices in Prijedor and Zenica 
PRIJEDOR 
Form of socioeconomic injustice Overlap with other forms of injustice 
Dismissal from jobs  
Overlap with internethnic violence, 
ethnic cleansing campaign  
Cutting off access to telephone lines and 
public services 
Destruction/occupation of dwellings  
Use of signs (white armband) to socially 
marginalise part of the population  
Cutting off road connections, TV and radio 
broadcasts  
Impossibility to regain lost jobs  Overlap with political misrepresentation 
(institutional system of Dayton; 
exclusion from socioeconomic reform 
process) 
Impossibilty to find alternative employment  
  
ZENICA 
Form of socioeconomic injustice Overlap with other forms of injustice 
Dismissal from jobs (war- related) 
No substantial overlap with interethnic 
violence Lack of food, material deprivation (war 
related) 
Dismissal from jobs (related to privatisation)  
Nonrecognition of class identity  
Loss of working class identity  
Heavy pollution  
Exploitation coupled with political 
misrepresentation (lack of accountability 
of political elites and ArcelorMittal) 
Material deprivation (minimal pensions; 
delays in payment of due salaries; lack of 
income)  
Lack of access to employment opportunities  
 
While the international community effectively put aside Bosnia’s socialist past 
in reconstructing the country (Gilbert 2006), returning to peace entailed, for many, 
the hope that stable employment, social security, health services and education 
would return to function in the way they did before the war (see Chapter 4, section 
4.1, and Jansen 2006). These expectations inevitably inform the way in which people 
conceive of justice, and the connections made between experiences of injustice and 
the type of redress sought. Moreover, the backward-looking act of remembering 




characterises Bosnia – as something to be recovered in order to build a fairer society 
in the future, and can thus even assume a forward-looking character. 
Lastly, the lack of redress, characterising the transition period, is often lived 
as a continuation of the injustice. This contributes to strengthening justice claims 
based on socioeconomic issues. The narrow definition of justice issues as those 
pertaining to serious violations of humanitarian law also entailed the creation of a 
categories of victims of injustice that did not encompass those suffering from 
socioeconomic wrongs. The concept of victimhood has been subjected to much 
critical scrutiny, with scholars pointing at the potential problematic implications of 
passivity inherent to the concept and the hierarchies produced between different 
categories of victims (Madlingozi 2010; McEvoy and McConnachie 2013, see also 
Helms 2013 on gender and victimhood). The analysis of experiences of socioeconomic 
injustice, and justice claims emerging from the ground, suggests that local 
communities be understood as the bearers of justice claims, entailing a more positive 
connotation compared to the term ‘victim’. Moreover, the bearers of justice claims 
can be defined in socioeconomic terms in addition to ethnic or cultural ones. By 
identifying the three major ethnonational groups (Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs) as 
‘constituent peoples’, though, the Bosnian institutional framework effectively pushed 
to the side alternative ways of defining social groups, including socioeconomic 
classes or other more ‘civic’ alternatives. The experience of the transition process is 
then lived, by these local communities who also identify themselves as workers, not 
only as a continuation of injustice, but also as a phase in which ‘boundaries are drawn 
in such a way as to wrongly exclude some people from the chance to participate at 
all in its authorised contests over justice’ (Fraser 2005, 76).  This lack of 
acknowledgement and redress has the potential to strengthen socioeconomic justice 
claims elaborated at the local level. 
 
 
5.1.2 The contextual element: international intervention in post-war justice 
processes  
Given the widespread reach of the international intervention in Bosnia, and its 
involvement with justice issues, conceptions of justice emerging from the local level 




(Fraser 2005, 82) does not only entail a rethinking of who, in terms of communities 
and groups, should be the subject of justice claims. It also entails a shift in the 
responsibility for responding to these justice claims, from nation-states to 
international actors, including international governmental and non-governmental 
organisations. This is especially true in those post-conflict settings where there is an 
expectation that a legal approach to transitional justice will be taken (Teitel 2003), 
under international supervision or sponsorship. The international intervention offers 
a publicly sanctioned narrative on the ‘causes, consequences, and solutions to 
violence in the country of intervention’ (Autesserre 2014, 33), to which citizens of the 
country can refer to in order to express their feelings of injustice. Justice is inserted 
within a universalising strive towards liberal democracy and liberal peacebuilding 
projects (Arthur 2009; Nagy 2008). Similarly, the intervention can also favour certain 
types of remedies of mechanisms. Critical scholars have often emphasised the 
dominance of legal approaches to dealing with the past or ‘legalism’ (Arthur 2009; 
McEvoy 2008), epitomised by the dominance of judicial mechanisms such as the 
ICTY, ICC and other national or hybrid courts. The legalism of transitional justice 
falls within a broader preference for strategies concerned with addressing and 
ameliorating the outcomes of injustice over transformative ones that aim at 
restructuring the system and thus removing the root causes of injustice (Fraser 1995, 
2003). Retributive justice, working through the provision of jail sentences to 
individual perpetrators of crimes, lacks transformative potential because of its 
limitations in dealing with the moral and political accountability of the state and 
social system that allowed for crimes to happen (see Drumbl 2005; Subotić 2011). 
While Chapter 3 has already discussed the most relevant dimensions of the 
international approach to socioeconomic issues, here we refer more specifically to the 
ways in which post-war justice processes have touched the cities of Prijedor and 
Zenica. The marginalisation of socioeconomic justice is apparent. This does not 
amount to first-order silencing or exclusion, ‘because the practice of excluding 
someone or some thing implies a tacit recognition of their presence’ (Dingli 2015, 725), 
but rather to a meta-level form of misframing (Fraser 2005, 76-77), where only some 
forms of injustice are recognised as such, thus limiting the ability of some 
communities to engage with the justice process. The role of the international 




conceptualised as that of selectively acknowledging injustice, and as a result 
distorting the socioeconomic justice claims put forward by affected communities. 
Rather than intentional exclusion, this process entails the metaphorical ‘occupation’ 
of post-war justice initiatives by internationally-sponsored justice processes, thus 
prompting local communities to engage on those terms. Those communities whose 
experiences of injustice are partially acknowledged, then, can mobilise the 
transitional justice narrative to their advantage, but this might affect their preference 
for remedies that remain in line with the affirmative nature of the transitional justice 
discourse prevalent in BiH. Where justice claims remain below the radar of the 
international community, and outside of the scope of action of transitional justice 
interventions, justice claims develop outside the limits of transitional justice, and can 
envisage more transformative remedies for socioeconomic injustice. Overall, 
conceptions of justice voiced by local communities are relational: they emerge from 
past experiences but meet political and economic forces that shape the context within 
which they can be effectively put forward and heard.  
 
 
5.1.3 Transitional justice interventions in Prijedor and Zenica  
The war in Prijedor was characterised by widespread wartime violence, where 
socioeconomic and cultural injustice significantly overlapped, but transitional justice 
efforts largely dealt with the latter and marginalised the former. Interventions in the 
field of transitional justice in Prijedor reflect the international community’s 
preference for legal mechanisms of dealing with the past.  The ICTY heard fifteen 
cases on wartime events related to Prijedor, including the high profile ones of 
Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić. The findings from the cases confirm that a 
systematic campaign targeting non-Serbs with the aim to expel them from the 
territory of the municipality was put in place by the Bosnian Serb wartime leadership. 
The Tribunal handed out convictions for violations of the laws and customs of war, 
including grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and crimes against humanity 
with respect to events that occurred within the city of Prijedor, its surroundings, and 
the prison camps of Omarska, Keraterm and Trnopolje (see Table 5.2). ICTY trials on 




civilians coming from the city, in 1992, strengthened the case for the establishment of 
the ICTY.2  
 
Table 5.2. ICTY cases on Prijedor and Zenica 
PRIJEDOR cases Prijedor-related events in the cases 
Banović (IT-95-14) “Omarska and Keraterm 
Camps” Kvočka et al. (IT-98-30/01) “Omarska, 
Keraterm and Trnopolje Camps” 
Mejakić et al. (IT-02-65) “Omarska and 
Keraterm Camps” 
Sikirica et al. (IT-95-8) “Keraterm Camp”   
Crimes committed in the prison camps 
around Prijedor. 
Brđanin (IT-99-36) “Krajina”  
Shelling of non-Serb villages, forcible 
transfer of non-Serbs.   
Karadžić ((IT-95-5/18) 
Krajišnik (IT-00-39) “Bosnia and Herzegovina”  
Mladić (IT-09-92) 
Plavšić (IT-00-39 & 40/1) “Bosnia and 
Herzegovina” 
Stakić (IT-97-24) “Prijedor”  
Talić (IT-99-36/1) “Krajina”  
Stanišić & Župljanin (IT-08-91) “Bosnia and 
Herzegovina” 
Participation in a Joint Criminal 
Enterprise to remove non-Serbs from RS 
territory, persecution of non-Serbs. 
Mrđa (IT-02-59) 
Killing of about 200 Muslim civilians on 
Vlašić Mountain on 21 August 1992.  
Tadić (IT-94-1) “Prijedor” 
Crimes committed in Kozarac, Prijedor, 
and the prison camps. 
ZENICA cases Zenica-related events in the cases  
Blaškić (IT-95-14) “Lašva Valley” 
Kordić and Čerkez (IT-95-14/2) “Lašva Valley”   
Shelling of Zenica of 19 April 1993. 
Hadžihasanović and Kubura (IT-01-47) 
“Central Bosnia” 
Crimes committed against prisoners of 
war in the Music School and the KP 
Dom (prison). 
Kupreškić et al. (IT-95-16) “Lašva Valley”  Discrimination against Croats in Zenica. 
 
Prijedor was also one of the cities selected for the cycle of conferences 
‘Bridging the Gap between the ICTY and communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 
                                                          
2 See ICTY (2013), Crimes before the ICTY: Prijedor, at <http://www.icty.org/sid/11341>, 




which was meant to address the perceived distance and misunderstandings between 
the Tribunal and its local constituencies (ICTY 2009). The then ICTY registar, Hans 
Holthuis, stated in his opening remarks that the conference aimed at discussing 
crimes against the non-Serbs in Prijedor as these were ‘the gravest crimes committed 
in this area’, and added that Serbs could not be accused of such crimes as a nation: 
‘Entire nations are never responsible for crimes. Just as each victim has a name, so 
does each perpetrator’ (ICTY 2009, 2). These statements are representative of the 
transitional justice discourse that focuses on interethnic violence as its focus and on 
legalism as its approach (McEvoy 2008; Bell, Campbell and Ní Aoláin 2007). 
Non-governmental work on transitional justice in Prijedor has adopted a 
similar approach, but has also looked at the broader impact of crimes on the 
community, including on former camp prisoners, families of victims and missing 
persons. Notable among these organisations is Izvor (Source), which has been 
offering psychological support to victims, promoting the rights of trial witnesses, and 
has taken part in the regional Initiative for RECOM.3 Associations of former camp 
detainees (logoraši) also work on transitional justice issues, from the specific 
perspective of those who experienced detention in the camps surrounding Prijedor 
(Dowling 2013). Their calls for public recognition of war crimes against non-Serbs 
and for the erection of monuments at prison camps such as Omarska (still operating 
as a mine under the control of ArcelorMittal) remain unheard to date, despite being 
supported by international NGOs and human rights activists (ICTJ 2013).  
Within this landscape, the efforts of the youth NGO Kvart, led by Goran Zorić, 
to build a different paradigm for addressing the denial prevailing in the city deserve 
separate mention. Kvart favours referring to ‘dealing with the past and culture of 
remembering’ (suočavanje sa prošlošću i kultura sjećanja), as it better captures the 
complexity of these processes compared to the term ‘transitional justice’, 
conventionally adopted by international organisations. Their approach contrasts 
sharply with – and represents a living critique of – the international community’s 
refusal to engage with anything that can be characterised as political, and its 
insistence on reconciliation and interethnic dialogue as cornerstones of the 
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transitional justice process (which Kvart believes entrench national divisions through 
their continuous demarcation in public discourse).4 Their approach seems to offer a 
transformative alternative to transitional justice, which attempts to achieve 
recognition through the deconstruction of differences rather than their affirmation 
(Fraser 2003). Their activities include a regional youth camp in Kozarac5 and other 
Prijedor based initiatives, and broaden their outlook beyond the current war to the 
legacies of the Second World War, antifascism and social activism. Predictably, their 
work encounters very serious obstacles in the politically sensitive context of Prijedor.6 
While supporting justice as transitional justice through the ICTY, the international 
community is wary of direct commitment in supporting politically controversial 
projects. Because of this, some of the most important peacebuilding initiatives on the 
ground, such as the Dan Bijelih Traka (White Armband Day, calling for a monument 
to children of all nationalities killed during the war, to be placed in Prijedor’s main 
square)7 or the camps and workshops organised by Kemal Pervanić of Most Mira 
(Bridge of Peace),8 occur at a very grassroots level and with little or non-existent 
institutional support. The White Armband Day uses explicitly civic and anti-
nationalist language, laying flowers on the ground to symbolise and commemorate 
the children victims of the war. Thus, in the complex transitional justice landscape of 
Prijedor, a recognition-based model of justice still dominates, although make good 
use of the space left for alternative activities.  
Moving on to the case of Zenica, Chapter 4 showed that experiences of 
injustice were common but did not overlap with interethnic violence to the same 
extent as in Prijedor. As a result, they stand in starker contrast with the framework 
provided by internationally-sponsored transitional justice. While Zenica was not 
                                                          
4 See Kvart’s website (http://centarzamladekvartprijedor.blogspot.co.uk/), and interview 
PR/15/18, Kvart activist, 21 July 2015.  
5 A neighbouring village to Prijedor where crimes against the local Muslim population were 
committed, situated in the vicinity of the Kozara National Park and its World War II 
monument to the revolution.  
6 On the visible effects of denial, from the perspective of researchers, see also Clark (2011, 74-
75).  
7 See the Facebook page of Jer me se tiče (Because it concerns me), which organizes the 
event, <https://www.facebook.com/jermesetice/>, and this overview by Selma 
Milovanović for Al Jazeera America, “Bosnians Mark a Painful Chapter with White 
Armband Day”, available at <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/5/30/for-
bosnians-whitearmbanddaymarkspainfulchapter.html>, accessed 3/08/2016.  




heavily hit by fighting as other major Bosnian cities and surrounding areas in central 
Bosnia, some events occurred within the city did become the target of war crimes 
investigations. The ICTY, in particular, discussed the shelling of Zenica occurred on 
19 April 1993, most likely by the Croat forces of the HVO (Hrvatsko Vijeće Obrane),9 
which killed fifteen and injured a further 50 people. The shells fell around Zenica’s 
main market, a busy pedestrian area with shops, street vendors and a mosque. In the 
trial judgment of the Kordić and Čerkez case (case IT-95-14/2), the ICTY attributed 
the shelling to the HVO, but did not impute the incident to the indictees (ICTY 2001). 
The Tribunal also heard about cases of discrimination against Croats in Zenica during 
the war (see case IT-95-16, Kupreškić et. al; ICTY 2000), and passed judgments for 
crimes against prisoners of war held by the Armija BiH (Army of the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina) in the city’s Music School and prison (KP Dom) (case IT-01-
47, Hadžihasanović and Kubura; ICTY 2006). A large part of Serbs living in Zenica 
also left the city, which is now 84% Bosniak. However, these cases of ethnically-based 
discrimination and IHL violations cannot be compared in magnitude and reach to the 
persecution of non-Serb civilians in the Prijedor area.  
With respect to non-governmental work, NGO activism on transitional justice 
issues in Zenica is characterised by the strong presence of organizations dealing with 
women’s issues. The most prominent NGO in the city is Medica Zenica, a self-defined 
feminist and anti-nationalist organisation (Helms 2013, 97), founded with the goal of 
offering psychosocial and medical support to victims of war and post-war violence.10 
The Center for Legal Help for Women (Centar za Pravnu Pomoć Ženama) also works 
on issues related to gender equality, and includes promoting the implementation of 
UN Resolution 1325 within its mandate.11 They are also part of a UNDP programme 
offering free legal help.12 In her review of women’s NGOs, Helms (2013, 100-103) also 
cites some conservative NGOs primarily aimed at Muslim women, some of which are 
no longer active, as well as Naš Most (Our Bridge). Naš Most had grown in size when 
                                                          
9 For a different view see Shrader (2003, 117-118).  
10 See the website of Medica Zenica, <http://www.medicazenica.org/>, accessed 
2/08/2016. 
11 Interview ZE/15/19, activist from the Centar za Pravnu Pomoć Ženama (email), 16 
September 2015. 
12 See the website of the project, Mreža Pravne Pomoći, at 




membership became a requirement to access a popular post-war microcredit scheme 
(Helms 2013, 100). Informal groups and NGOs also take part in transitional justice 
initiatives in other parts of the country. Groups from Zenica regularly attend the 
Srebrenica genocide commemoration in Potočari each July. More recently, smaller 
groups have also travelled to Prijedor on 31st May for the White Armband Day.13 
While not aiming at being comprehensive, this overview exemplifies what the 
international community, and the formal NGO sector, constructed as the realm of 
transitional justice interventions in Zenica. The conception of justice underscoring 
these efforts draws on ideas of individual accountability for war crimes, the 
protection of civil rights, and fighting discrimination. While these are widely valued 
components of the transitional justice process, they appear to tackle mostly the 
recognition dimension of justice while marginalising redistribution, reflecting a 
broader shortcoming of transitional justice approaches in Bosnia. The contrast with 
the views of those most affected by socioeconomic injustice in Zenica is thus striking, 
as interviews show.  
 
 
5.2 Socioeconomic issues and conceptions of justice  
In both Prijedor and Zenica, interviews show that the experience of socioeconomic 
injustice suffered during the war and the transition, as well memories of the socialist 
system, strongly influence the way in which people conceive of justice. At the same 
time, these conceptions of justice are not developed in a vacuum. This section outlines 
how socioeconomic justice claims emerging from local communities in Prijedor and 
Zenica fit or interact with the international intervention. In doing this, it shows how 
the international intervention selectively acknowledges injustices and legitimises 
justice claims.  
 
 
                                                          
13 While the organisers try to attract participants from Prijedor and the RS, a large part still 




5.2.1 Conceptions of socioeconomic justice in Prijedor 
While transitional justice processes in Prijedor capture the experiences of interethnic 
violence or injustice suffered by interviewees, they largely fail to address the 
socioeconomic component of their idea of justice. Three elements emerge most 
strongly from the interviewees’ accounts, and help us understand how they give 
concrete meaning to the abstract concept of ‘justice’ through their experiences. The 
influence of experiences of injustice during the war and transition, and memories of 
socialism, is clearly visible here. The first theme emerging from the interviews with 
research participants in Prijedor is the importance of work and employment in their 
understanding of justice.  Work is necessary to secure one’s own existence. This is 
how Belma explains the relevance of economic issues and work: ‘Everything comes 
from the economy. If a person is satisfied, if it has sufficient earnings, that’s my 
opinion, if my earnings are sufficient for me to be able to live normally, as a worthy 
person, who has its own worth, thank god. (…) If a person is economically secure, 
nothing else is necessary to her, right? She will get everything else. If there’s no 
economic security, she’s at the margins of society’.14 Belma’s statement highlights the 
interdependence between economic needs and a dignified existence. Jasna succinctly 
sums up: ‘Justice is the right to work, that is the most important right.’ She adds: ‘I 
cannot just sit still and say that that is life. I don't have anything, I don't have money, 
I don't have possibilities, I don't have employment.’15 Work is highly valued not only 
for economic reasons, but also because work (or the lack thereof) contributes to 
defining a person’s place in society,16 and their own worth. Suada, for instance, 
argues that worst aspect of the injustice she survived was ‘humiliation’: ‘We survived 
humiliation, and that’s terrible. My uncle (mother’s brother) was in the camps, and 
when he left it he only said, the worst thing is humiliation.’ She added: ‘Someone can 
insult you, I can tell you something bad, and that you will forget. But if I humiliate 
you, you will not forget that.’17 The experience of being dismissed from work 
interacted profoundly with interethnic violence in Prijedor. The decline of Prijedor’s 
industrial area, anticipated by the crisis during the 1980s, only became dramatically 
                                                          
14 Interview PR/15/15. 
15 Interview PR/15/12. 
16 See interview PR/15/16; Interview PR/15/14, worker from Prijedor (Kemal), 19 July 2015.  




visible to the non-Serb population with the takeover by the Prijedor Crisis Staff and 
the ensuing dismissal of Muslims and Croats from their jobs. Sakib, for example, was 
working on the new plans to open a steel mill in Prijedor, which were abandoned 
towards the beginning of the economic crisis. At the time, however, a skilled worker 
like him was unlikely to rmain unemployed, and he was quickly hired at the ceramics 
factory. It was only with the beginning of the war and ethnic cleansing that the 
downfall of RŽR Ljubija (the mining company), the paper mill, the ceramics industry 
and the other companies that had once employed thousands of workers (without 
regard to ethnic belonging) became a serious concern for the interviewees. At that 
time, interviewees lost their socioeconomic status as workers as well as their position 
as equal Muslim and Croat citizens. In a now Serb-dominated area, the international 
intervention, gave sanctioning to the latter aspect of the injustice suffered, while their 
experience as victims of socioeconomic injustice remains unrecognised, and workers 
remain a subaltern group to ethnicity within post-war Prijedor. 
Secondly, interviewees emphasise that a just society is also characterised by 
an adequate level of social spending and equal access to welfare. This theme emerges 
in the comparison between the pre-war situation and the transition period. Chapter 
4 already gave an overview of the interviewees’ perspective on the merits of Yugoslav 
spending on public services, including schooling, pensions, and healthcare. The 
comparison between socialism and post-war Bosnia juxtaposes the unity and equality 
of access to certain services with the fragmentation linked to the current ethnicity and 
entity based system. Schooling is now viewed as of lesser quality, and more 
expensive. In some cases, children from small towns cannot afford going to school 
because of the high costs of bus fares, sometimes prompting fundraising on the part 
of the school staff to help out.18 Interviewees also suffer from the loss of a unified 
health care system. In her account of what justice means to her, Maja says that while 
every Yugoslav citizen was once covered for free treatment wherever they needed to 
go (in the rest of Bosnia, but also more developed republics like Croatia, Slovenia), 
now health insurance is linked to their place of residence. This becomes problematic 
for residents of Prijedor who, like her, failed to get back their job in the city after the 
                                                          
18 Interviewee PR/15/1, activist from NGO Progetto Prijedor (Sladjana Milijević), 9 July 




war and found employment in Sanski Most, which is on the other side of the Inter-
Entity Boundary Line, in the Federation of BiH.19 Even when, during the 1980s, the 
mining company was starting to put people on waiting lists from time to time, 
employees still had full contributions made towards healthcare and othe rsocial 
services. This was not the case anymore after 1992. Conceptions of justice among non-
Serbs in Prijedor also connect the social marginalisation suffered during the war to 
the call for better access to public services. Moreover, the transition period, far from 
bringing redress, is making things harder and strengthening social justice claims. 
Suada dramatically contrasts the current situation in Bosnia with Germany, where 
she was a refugee during the war: ‘In our country you can die from hunger, and no 
one will help you. If my neighbour is hungry, I will offer her bread. But social services 
won’t help her.’20 Both Jasna and Sanja make a direct connection between the poor 
state of the economy and privatisations and the insufficiency of public help for 
weaker categories of the population. Sanja clearly argues: ‘Social justice only works 
on the basis of the economy’; if contributions to the state budget are lacking because 
people are not employed, the state will lack resources for social transfers and public 
services.21 
 
Table 5.3 Developing justice claims from experiences of injustice (Prijedor) 
Experience of injustice Justice claims 
Dismissal from jobs  
Reinstatement of Muslim employees, 
compensation. 
Cutting off access to telephone lines and 
public services; cutting off road 
connections, TV and radio broadcasts 
Equal rights and social participation of non-
Serbs in Republika Srpska. 
Destruction/occupation of dwellings Restitution/compensation. 
Use of signs (white armband) to 
discriminate against the non-Serb 
population  
Recognition of one’s ethnic identity; Equal 
rights for Muslim and Croat citizens within 
Republika Srpska. 
Impossibility to regain lost jobs (and find 
alternative employment)  
Stronger welfare support from the state.  
                                                          
19 Interview PR/15/7. 
20 Interview PR/15/4.  





Lastly, non-Serb citizens of Prijedor are concerned with their social status in 
the city and in the entity of Republika Srpska. The war, by depriving people of their 
job, homes, and social position, marginalised Muslims and Croats, while the lack of 
redress during the transition period aggravated their grievances. A call for social and 
political equality emerges from this experience of marginalisation. Samir, for 
instance, argues that justice entails ‘being equal in all respects’, ‘universal equality’. 
When the return began his expectation was that they would be ‘equal citizens’, but 
he argues that this is not the case for Muslims living in the Serb entity.22 This situation 
of inequality contrasts sharply with the picture interviewees give of equality during 
socialist times where people could look at a person ‘just like a person’23 rather than 
on the basis of ethnic belonging as they do now.24 From this point of view, justice for 
interviewees in Prijedor entails a call for equality that is based on the respect of 
differences and guarantees for their group – now defined in terms of ethnicity for 
most interviewees – thus combining calls for redistribution and recognition.25 The 
relevance of ethnic grouping as the basis for developing justice claims transpires 
often from the interviews conducted in Prijedor. In a significant fragment quoted in 
Chapter 4, for instance Suada says ‘and then us Bosniaks – even though we never 
called ourselves Bosniaks, we were Yugoslavs, and loved our Yugoslavia…’.26 A 
multi-ethnic or overarching national identity has thus given way to the ethnic one 
prevailing during the war, which is also enshrined in the transitional justice approach 
of the international community, and in the Dayton institutional framework. While 
the experience of socioeconomic injustice leads to calls for social equality and 
economic provisions, the predominant justice model provides a point of reference for 
expressing justice claims that is based on their ethnicity rather than on their working 
class identity.  
The institutional set-up of post-war Bosnia, where ethnic belonging and 
territorial divisions are closely linked, further entrenches their position as bearers of 
                                                          
22 Interview PR/15/17. 
23 Interview PR/15/16. 
24 Interviewee PR/15/17; Interview PR/15/16. 
25 Interview PR/15/13; Interview PR/15/4. For an exception see interview PR/15/7 (Maja), 
she also talks about ‘nations’, but does not inscribe herself within one of them. 




justice claims as an ethnic group. One simple example of the lack of political 
participation of non-Serbs in Republika Srpska is the requirement for its residents to 
elect a Serb member to the country’s tripartite presidency, and five Serb 
representatives to the country-level House of Peoples.27 Non-Serb citizens are not 
fully included in political decisions of the community to which they belong (Fraser 
2005, 76). The calls for social equality voiced by interviewees in Prijedor, then, best 
illustrate the interrelated nature of redistribution (putting an end to economic 
marginalisation), recognition (defending the rights of non-Serbs), and participation 
(guaranteeing their equal political status in the RS). Only part of these complex 
experiences of injustice that were simultaneously cultural, socioeconomic and 
political is fully acknowledged. While the interethnic dimension of their experience 
of injustice can be captured through the transitional justice framework, 
socioeconomic violence is left out. As the following section will show, in Zenica 
socioeconomic concerns are also attached to the meaning of justice. The striking 
difference, though, lies precisely in the impossibility of being acknowledged as the 
bearers of justice claims through the transitional justice narrative, as an ethnic group.   
 
 
5.2.2 Conceptions of socioeconomic justice in Zenica  
Three issues, emerging from the interviews, are crucial to understand socioeconomic 
conceptions of justice in Zenica. First, the development of justice claims is strictly 
connected with the importance of work. The individual experience of being 
dismissed from work during the war or privatisation process, and the collective 
experience of loss of the city’s main economic provider strongly influenced the way 
in which conceptions of justice formed in post-war Zenica. Ratko, a former worker 
and activist, argues that justice has two main dimensions. One is ‘legality’ (zakonitost), 
which entails respecting laws, and the second one is ‘righteousness’ (pravednost), 
related to whether the laws themselves are just. Both are lacking in Bosnia, but the 
latter is particularly concerning for him. He argues that the whole political system is 
unjust in that respect, and cites employment as the most relevant example of this 
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problem: ‘For instance, the human right to work, no one will say that there is no right 
to work, but will say you have the right, so find a job… That is not sufficient, one 
cannot by himself find a job. The system should make more jobs available. That is 
what the state does, politics should make sure that this is how it works.’28 On the 
contrary, the neoliberal transformation of the post-war period entailed a reduction of 
the role of the state in the productive economy. As Pugh (2006b, 282) notes, 
international organisations in Bosnia ‘counted upon FDI and privatisation to 
somehow substitute for an employment policy’. The lack of an active industrial policy 
and the reliance on privatisations were accompanied by the uncontrolled and 
clientelistic expansion of the public sector, which amounted to 27% of the workforce 
in BiH in 2013 (European Commission 2014, 27). Interviewees in Zenica, however, are 
more concerned with regaining employment in the productive industrial sector, as 
well as their working class status.29 People in Zenica seem to resent the expansion of 
the public sector at the expense of industry.30 They also resent the fact that ethnicity 
is used as a factor for consideration when hiring civil servants, in line with the 
consociational spirit of Dayton.  
Such justice claims related to work clash with the international community’s 
approach to the issue of employment in post-war BiH. Convinced that this should be 
mostly prompted by foreign direct investment and the growth of small and medium 
enterprises,31 the international community came to regard the attitude of the former 
working classes as irrational nostalgia for the old system rather than a social justice 
problem (EU Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina 2014). In the spring and summer 
of 2015, when the process of drafting a new Labour Law (zakon o radu) was under way 
in the Federation of BiH, interviewees expressed concerns for the conditions of 
workers and of Zenica as a workers’ city, which they believed would be further 
penalised.32 They explicitly linked the issue of socioeconomic justice to the 
responsibility of the international community for presenting solutions to the 
                                                          
28 Interview ZE/15/4, worker/activist from Zenica, 12 June 2015.  
29 Interview session ZE/15/2 and ZE/15/3.  
30 This also includes the physical occupation of the RMK building by the Cantonal 
government. 
31 Interview SA/15/5, international official, Sarajevo, 14 May 2015. 
32 Interviewee ZE/15/8; Interview ZE/15/4. Observations carried out at Zenica Plenum 




employment problem that – in their view – will constitute a further injustice by 
heightening job insecurity and exploitation. Josip for instance, says that ‘now this 
Labour Law needs to be approved, the EU set it up and it must be approved. That 
law does not protect the worker at all, it does not protect him, it protects those who 
put in the capital, that’s who it protects.’33 
A second element composing conceptions of justice voiced by interviewees in 
Zenica concerns the provision of social support. When discussing the difference 
between zakonitost and pravednost, Ratko points out that people in Zenica, and in 
Bosnia overall, had much more ‘justice’ of the second type before the war, when ‘laws 
were much more favourable toward common citizens, a certain standard was 
respected, and the right to education, health, freedom of movement, and many more 
rights were respected’.34 Ratko’s comments reveal that the socialist system is indeed 
used as a standard for redress, in order to restore the conditions previous to the 
injustice suffered. The decline in standards has been dramatic, and has occurred at a 
time when a record number of citizens were in need of state services due to the 
consequences of the war and the impact of privatisation (Donais 2005, 143). In the 
eyes of interviewees justice entails access to a unified set of welfare measures that 
give equal worth to citizens. Zineta, for instance, survives on a minimal pension, and 
points at the difference between the Federation entity and Republika Srpska, where 
pensions are on average even lower (see also Jukic 2014). Moreover, within the 
Federation benefits for pensioners are decided at the Canton level. If she lived in the 
Sarajevo Canton, Zineta would be entitled to free transportation. Following the back 
injury due to which she was sent to early retirement, her freedom of movement in the 
city is severely impaired.35 The right to health, another important social justice issue 
for citizens of Zenica, is also impaired by the reformed health care system. This now 
relies on 13 different health funds, one for each entity and the Brčko district, and ten 
for each of the Federation Cantons (Cain et al. 2002). This has a series of negative 
effects including, for instance, higher costs for medications due to the inability of 
small health funds to negotiate with large pharmaceutical providers.36 Having seen 
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34 Interview ZE/15/4.  
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the environmental conditions of the town deteriorate, citizens of Zenica feel entitled 
to claim a functioning health service. This call is amplified by the perceived health 
danger posed by the steel mill: over the past few years, crops grown in areas adjacent 
to the plant were often declared non edible. A doctor (and founding member of Eko 
forum) claims that, while data about the effects of pollution are difficult to gather, 
there are indications that respiratory and other related diseases are higher than 
average in Zenica.37 The interviewees’ idea of a universal right to health, then, 
contrasts with the reformed system, based on compulsory or private health 
insurance, which substituted the universal health care of the socialist period. Once 
again, the content of justice claims voiced appears to be outside of the scope of 
international engagement on justice issues, and to contrast with reforms 
implemented under international supervision in BiH.  
The third element composing conceptions of justice in Zenica is an expanded 
concept of accountability. Once again, conceptions of justice are rooted in their 
experiences of injustice and memories of the past. Firstly, accountability entails 
bringing to justice those responsible for irregular or failed privatisation process, 
including war profiteers who benefitted from those privatisations, and the political 
elites connected to them. As field visits to the surroundings of industrial cities like 
Tuzla, Zenica or Prijedor make painfully clear, many privatisations in Bosnia resulted 
in asset stripping and the closure of industrial facilities.38 In Zenica, the sale of 
Željezara to ArcelorMittal guaranteed the restart of production and the possibility to 
keep about a tenth of the original workforce of the steel plant. However, political 
elites are often accused by interviewees of creating an unfavourable environment for 
the privatisation, leading to the sale of the plant for a fraction of its value.39 This 
contributes to creating an appearance of impunity in the eyes of interviewees, one 
that is considered particularly problematic because of its consequences on the 
socioeconomic distress of Zenica and of Bosnia as a whole. At the beginning of the 
privatisation process, the then director of the factory was quoted saying that the 
international community’s unwillingness to support large public investment projects 
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38 Author field visits to Zenica (various dates, June-July 2015), Prijedor (various dates, July 
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makes international actors complicit in the reduction in the workforce and 
production of the steel plant (Buchan 1998). Very seldom is accountability for 
economic crimes included within the remit of transitional justice programmes, and 
this was not the case in BiH. Economic crimes committed during the war were 
amnestied (Donais 2005, 102; see also Andreas 2004), thus creating a fertile 
environment for continued economic criminality after the end of the war.  
 
Table 5.4 Experiences of injustice leading to socioeconomic justice claims 
(Zenica) 
Experience of injustice Justice claims 
Lack of food, material deprivation (war-
related) 
Payment of fair salaries to workers and 
right to work to earn a living during the 
war. 
Dismissal from jobs (related to war or 
privatisation) 
Fair access to pensions and compensations, 
including those linked to the privatisation 
process. 
Material deprivation during the transition 
(minimal pensions; delays in payment of 
due salaries; lack of income and basic 
necessities) 
Stronger support for weak categories of the 
population, equal throughout BiH. 
Lack of access to employment 
opportunities 
Fair access to work; creation of 
employment opportunities on the part of 
the state. 
Loss of working class identity Opening of factories in Zenica. 
Heavy pollution 
Accountability of ArcelorMittal; opening of 
firms with lower environmental impact. 
 
Domestic political elites have been quite successful at dodging international 
scrutiny on this, while the interveners’ policies did not prioritise establishing 
accountability for economic crimes as part of rule of law promotion or transitional 
justice programmes. Secondly, citizens in Zenica demand accountability for the 
environmental damage linked to the presence of the steel plant. The risks that high 
levels of SO2 and PM10 entail for the city’s population health conditions are very 
serious.40 In addition to the right to health care, activists lament ArcelorMittal’s denial 
                                                          





of responsibilities, and several interviewees mention accountability of those 
responsible for pollution in Zenica as an important part of their conception of 
justice.41 This expanded notion of accountability for environmental justice and 
economic crimes contrasts, once more, with the conception of accountability 
promoted by the international community’s approach to justice.  
To conclude, justice claims in Zenica are developed in clear connection with 
the experience of socioeconomic injustice suffered during the war, and with the 
memory of socialism on the background. Conceptions of justice emerging from the 
interviews, then, conform more closely to the socioeconomic dimension of their 
experience of the war and the transition period, thus remaining unintelligible to the 
international community. Justice claims voiced by citizens of Zenica contrast with the 
principles guiding economic reforms promoted by the international community. 
Lacking an interethnic dimension, these conceptions of justice are not addressed by 
transitional justice interventions, and are seen by international actors as the by-
product of the transition process (or even as the result of an old, nostalgic part of the 
society that does not want to give way to the future). While we have seen that 
socioeconomic justice is central to the justice claims in Prijedor and Zenica, in the 
former case the presence of an interethnic dimension offered at least partial 
acknowledgement. The differences observed between the two cities are further 
amplified when we consider the justice claims and remedies for injustice proposed in 
the following section. 
 
 
5.3 Form and expression of justice claims  
Paradigms of justice, as defined by Fraser (2003, 11), are the ‘sets of linked 
assumptions about the causes of and remedies for injustice.’ Voicing justice claims 
thus means, on the one hand, specifying what the basic components of a just society 
are. Section 5.2 illustrated these elements as they emerge from interviews conducted 
in Prijedor and Zenica, and in how they relate to the international intervention in BiH. 
On the other hand, making a claim also entails expressing preference for certain 
approaches to remedy socioeconomic injustice. Claims to socioeconomic justice in 
                                                          




Prijedor and Zenica broadly relate to ‘economic restructuring of some sort’ (Fraser 
1995, 73), while in Prijedor they also overlap more often with the need for cultural or 
symbolic change aimed at affirming the recognition of difference among ethnic 
groups. Remedies for socioeconomic injustice encompass ‘redistributing income 
and/or wealth, reorganising the division of labor, changing the structure of property 
ownership, democratizing the procedures by which investment decisions are made, 
or transforming other basic economic structures’ (Fraser 1995, 73). The analysis of the 
strategies proposed to redress injustice reveals differences between Prijedor and 
Zenica. While Prijedor, as shown in the previous section, seems advantaged by the 
fact that local understands and experiences are at least partially acknowledged by the 
international intervention, this could also limit the range of justice remedies that local 
communities understand to be part of post-war justice processes. In other words, the 
transitional justice framework also has constraining effects. This becomes visible in 
the scope of the claims proposed, and in their temporal outlook, which is geared 
towards the present more than towards the future. In Zenica, on the other hand, local 
experiences are not compatible with the conventional transitional justice narrative. 
This leaves the city substantially marginalised in post-war justice processes, but at 
the same time it allows for the emergence of more transformative ideas concerning 
remedies for socioeconomic injustice.  
 
 
5.3.1 Justice claims in Prijedor  
Interviewees in Prijedor focus their justice claims on remedies concerning the 
redistribution of income and democratisation of decision-making. Being able to refer 
more directly to the overarching transitional justice narrative seems to make 
interviewees in Prijedor more likely to favour affirmative remedies that remain 
compatible with the direction and thrust of the transition process. Living in an entity 
that treats them as second-class citizens, interviewees from Prijedor seem mostly 
concerned with remedying the consequences of ethnic cleansing in the present than 
with future-oriented redistributive policies. 
Section 5.2 highlighted the importance of work in conceptions of justice 
developing in Prijedor. The call for redistributing of income or wealth is directly 




Croats as part of the economically active population in the city as a remedy for 
socioeconomic injustice. A strikingly clear formulation of this is offered by Nefisa, the 
nurse who risked being deported to Omarska had the doctor not warned her to stay 
at home instead of going to the hospital for her scheduled night shift.42 She says: 
‘Justice should have been done immediately once the war was over, so that all 
Muslims could go back to work.’43 Other interviewees agree that being re-employed 
in Prijedor would be an important form of redress for injustice, and some of them 
tried, but failed, to get their jobs back at the end of the war.44 Interviewees also argue 
for the equality of treatment by employers, something that has lacked since the 
beginning of the war. Sanja, who voluntarily stopped working and went on the 
waiting list in 1992 before the dismissals began, was sent home with 30% of the pay, 
while Serb colleagues received full salaries (minus contributions for meals, travel and 
other benefits that were usually included during socialist times). At the end of the 
war they did not let her back to work. The reason she was not readmitted was not 
lack of work, given that her company had hired new employees in her office, but the 
accusation that, being part-Croat, she had supported the Croat side during the war. 
Despite presenting formal complaints to the labour inspectorate, she was never 
readmitted to work, but managed to get compensation by being sent to early 
retirement with the pension of a higher grade than the one she had before 1992.45 
Calls for reinstating non-Serb employees in order to remedy injustice show that the 
restoration of conditions as similar as possible to the pre-war period is crucial to 
understand justice claims emerging from the local level (Mani 2005). However, the 
Labour Law of Republika Srpska offered very limited opportunities for 
compensation due to unjust dismissals during the war, and did not extent to 
reintegrating returnees within the local workforce. Moreover, according to the 
Prijedor branch of the NGO Vaša Prava, there have been substantial delays and 
evidence of inefficiency in processing these compensation claims.46 By focusing on 
the employment status of non-Serbs in Prijedor (as opposed to the broader issue of 
widespread unemployment due to deindustrialisation), interviewees seem to favour 
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remedies that tackle the specific consequences of the injustice for their community. 
Their affirmative approach focuses on the reinstatement of rights that were denied. 
With reference to the second point discussed in section 5.2, social services, 
interviewees believe that increasing social spending is necessary in order to remedy 
injustice. Interviewees feel entitled to receive payments from the state, such as 
pensions, after working and accumulating contributions. Nefisa says, for instance: 
‘Muslims here do not have any rights. Let me tell you. None. The only thing they give 
us are pensions, they give what they have to give, because I earned that with 28 years 
of work and no one can take that from me, neither Dodik nor God.’47At the same time, 
they believe the public sector is falling short of expectations, and compare it with 
private efforts that are often better targeted. One example of this is the situation 
occurred in the aftermath of the 2014 floods, when private citizens mobilised in a 
quicker and more efficient way than the state.48 In another instance, one of Suada’s 
guests from the Bosnian diaspora made a generous donation to a humanitarian 
organisation so that they could pay for an extra lunch for the poor in Prijedor. The 
authorities, she says, will not help them, and Bosnia is not ‘a social country’ 
anymore.49 Privatisations and the transition process in general are blamed for 
allowing groups of criminal elites to get very rich, and leaving their communities in 
a socially unsustainable situation.50 Suada also believes that if Bosnia gets into the EU 
it will be even harder to increase social spending. The concern for social spending on 
the part of the state is indicative of two things. First, interviewees seek remedies that 
envisage an active role on the part of the state, reflecting expectations constructed 
around the Yugoslav socialist system where public authorities played a great role in 
determining the wellbeing of citizens. Second, interviewees suggest a redistribution 
of income through transfers to the weaker sectors of the population, which is an 
affirmative remedy that tackles the consequences of poverty in the present, rather 
than the originating causes and its future implications. While critical of the current 
situation and the transition, the remedies proposed do not push towards a radical 
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change of the direction of the transition, but demand adjustments that would make 
it more bearable. 
Lastly, the democratisation of decision-making is strictly connected to the 
affirmation of non-Serbs’ right to participate equally to the socioeconomic 
development of the town. As we have seen in Section 2.1, socioeconomic 
marginalisation during the war and the transition also takes the form of exclusion 
from political participation. Democratisation, in Sakib’s view, can only be achieved 
by removing the privileges of politically powerful figures linked to the Bosnian Serb 
elite governing the municipality.51 During his time as an employee of the waste 
management municipal company, he claims to have witnessed wrongdoings that 
were never properly investigated because the directors were part of the same political 
party as Prijedor’s mayor.52 Other interviewees also share a concern for the equal 
participation of different groups in government, to be achieved by implementing the 
principles of power-sharing among different ethnic groups in a more equitable way. 
Belma, a former bank employee, now works with a political party trying to improve 
the condition of the Muslim minority in the Serb entity.53 Mersad argues that 
remedying injustice requires having equal shares of Muslims, Croats and Serbs in 
government.54 While before the war nationality was not used as criteria for 
categorising people, he now seems to have internalised the need for basing the 
institutional set up of Bosnia on the collaboration of separate ethnic groups. This need 
to have guarantees for the rights of different ethnic groups contrasts quite sharply 
with memories of the socialist past as a period of unity, as outlined in Chapter 4. Non-
Serbs in Prijedor, given the overlap between the socioeconomic injustice they suffered 
as workers and the cultural injustice they suffered as non-Serbs, are influenced by the 
way in which international organisations framed the war as an interethnic conflict, 
and justice as the need to reconcile different ethnic groups (while marginalising their 
claims as workers). Interviewees seek the affirmation of their status rather than 
transformative remedies for socioeconomic and political injustice.  
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Addressing socioeconomic injustice through affirmative remedies entails, for 
non-Serbs in Prijedor, both the reaffirmation of the importance of ethnicity in post-
war BiH and acceptance of a system that – albeit imperfectly – guarantees the rights 
of different groups. They make use of international justice discourses to establish 
their position in the post-war society, but still suffer from the marginalisation of 
socioeconomic justice issues. One striking features of justice claims emerging in 
Prijedor is then, their concern with the present. They look back to the war and to the 
injustice suffered, and seek remedy for its direct consequences, which are visible 
today. Socioeconomic justice claims thus do not assume the ‘forward-looking’ 
character that is often attributed to it as a project of social transformation (Torpey 
2003; Lambourne 2014).   
 
 
5.3.2 Justice claims in Zenica 
Contrary to Prijedor, socioeconomic injustice in Zenica was not perpetrated along 
ethnic lines, and relating to the transitional justice framework was thus more difficult. 
Justice claims in Zenica thus developed outside of the limitations of the transitional 
paradigm with a stronger concern for the systemic causes of the injustice rather than 
the simple redress of its outcomes. Remedying socioeconomic injustice in Zenica, 
then, will still entail a reorganisation of the distribution of income, the division of 
labour and property ownership, and the democratisation of decision-making (Fraser 
2009, 13), but interviewees articulate their justice claims in a way that is more geared 
towards addressing the root causes of injustice, and establishing the basis for a fairer 
society in the future, rather than implicitly accepting the current system by calling for 
its reform. 
The importance of employment was the first and most relevant element 
emerging from interviews conducted in Zenica. Instead of focusing on the restitution 
of jobs to those dismissed, or the restoration of workers’ rights, interviewees in Zenica 
tend to address more directly what they consider the root cause for socioeconomic 
justice: the privatisation process and the transformation of the economic system. 
Josip’s story and accounts are emblematic of the generalised distrust towards 
privatisation and concern for worker’s rights. When the war began, Josip kept his job 




in pay and threats of losing his job if he left the city to protect himself from the 
conflict. In 1995, when the war was almost drawing to an end, he was called to report 
at the Bosnian army and decided to leave Zenica for a while, and stopped working 
for a few years. Once back at work the conditions had changed dramatically, because 
of the impending privatisation and sale of the steel plant to Mittal. The lack of 
specialised employees and competent directors, and the growing disrespect for 
previously established rules and workers’ rights made the steel plant a very different 
work environment compared to the pre-war period in Josip’s eyes. He was finally 
sent to early retirement as part of a reduction in workforce linked to the privatisation 
process. According to him, the workers should have been justly compensated and 
involved in deciding the future of the steel plant.55 Other interviewees also ask for 
the reassessment of those privatisations that were conducted as ‘robberies’56, and for 
giving workers’ a stake in the factory’s management.57 Workers in Zenica seem 
opposed to the influence of ‘big business’58 in privatisation processes and running 
former socially owned firms, and argue for the state to take an active role in opening 
up factories and restarting the economy.59 Interviewees are aware of the 
environmental risks associated with the presence of heavy industry, but they are not 
ready to sacrifice neither their health nor their socioeconomic wellbeing.60 
With respect to the second theme emerging from conceptions of justice 
analysed in Section 5.2, the call for redistributing income or wealth does not solely 
translate in the demand for improved social services. Interviewees in Zenica argue 
for remedying injustice through much more radical redistributive measures. 
Following the collapse of the steel plant, interviewees in Zenica, just like in Prijedor, 
are concerned with the redistribution of income, and especially the fairness of salaries 
and pensions. Moreover, those who still work, or worked after the war, suffered from 
deteriorating work conditions that sometimes jeopardised their own safety in the 
risky environment of the steel mill.61 The remedies they propose for injustice, 
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however, have a more transformative nature in Zenica compared to Prijedor. 
Interviewees advocate for a deeper change in the system and the way in which 
contributions are made and salaries awarded. This includes, for instance, giving 
higher pensions to those who did the toughest jobs on the factory shop floor. Azra 
argues that the difference in salaries between the lowest paid jobs, such as cleaners 
or bakers, and qualified positions such as engineers, are not justified: after all, she 
says, the engineer cannot work without a clean office and bread.62 Kadir advocates 
for the equitable distribution of resources and for a ‘Robin Hood’ approach,63 where 
the state takes from the rich (through heavier taxation, for example), and gives to the 
poor. Where socioeconomic injustice was not recognised as such by the international 
community, remedies proposed for injustice also seem to lie outside of the 
boundaries of the international approach to justice. They also run counter economic 
reforms introduced in the post-war period. Reducing inequality through a radical 
redistributive approach contrasts sharply, for instance, with Bosnia’s fiscal system. 
Since the end of the war, BiH has a flat income tax rate of 10% (FIPA 2013),64 which 
was introduced as part of a set of measures promoted by the international community 
with the aim of attracting foreign investments. Most importantly, international 
organisations engaged in fighting poverty and promoting better socioeconomic 
conditions in Bosnia do not perceive unemployment and social marginalisation as a 
matter of social injustice, and fail to understand how people’s feelings of 
socioeconomic injustice might be linked to the war and the end of the socialist system. 
International reports often refer to socialist Yugoslavia with negative connotations, 
especially with reference to its legacy in the labour market (IMF 2015; World Bank 
2015), or do not reflect sufficiently on the causes of social malaise and dissatisfaction 
(Konrad Adenauer Stiftung 2009; European Training Foundation 2006).   
Lastly, the concept of expanded accountability put forward by interviewees 
corresponds to a call for democratising political and economic decision-making. Two 
aspects are particularly important here. Firstly, interviewees argue for more 
transparent policy-making at the national level, in such a way that prevents stronger 
international actors dictating Bosnia’s economic and investment decisions, as well as 
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labour regulations. Some interviewees express critical opinions on the presence of a 
large number of foreign banks.65 This is due to the early liberalisations of the financial 
system promoted by international financial institutions after the war. Financial 
liberalisation increased the availability of credit, which was however mostly used for 
consumption purposes rather than in economically productive ways.66 Several 
interviewees also express opposition to the continuous reliance of the government on 
external support, such as loans from the IMF. Josip, for instance, says: ‘a child is not 
even born, will be born in 10 or 5 years, but already has debts to repay. And for 
whom? For those who take loans from the International Monetary Fund to pay for 
their salaries, nothing else. We work for them and people suffer.’67 IMF contributions 
to BiH, conditioned upon progress in meeting certain conditions and carrying out 
reforms (such as new labour laws to be adopted at entity level), are paid directly into 
the country’s budget, and thus contribute to the disbursement of public salaries (as 
well as pensions).68 The threat of cutting financial help, then, effectively translates 
into a threat that the state will not be able to pay salaries and pensions (which are 
often late anyway) as of the following month. This contributes to tightening Bosnia’s 
dependence from IFIs, and the IFIs’ commitment to Bosnia’s macroeconomic stability. 
For people in Zenica, remedying socioeconomic injustices linked to the lack of 
accountability requires remedies that fall outside of the scope of transitional justice 
concerns, and that are in line for the preferences for transformative remedies that 
challenge the way in which the transition process has been conducted. 
Second, political democratisation is also presented as a transformative justice 
claim. Democracy, as argued by Kadir, cannot be reduced to the practice of voting.69 
Changing voting preferences is not sufficient to bring about the transformation 
needed to redress socioeconomic injustice. Since the origins of the injustice lie in the 
war and in the system that came out of that war, it is that system that should be 
changed. Many interviewees support the idea that the political institutional structure 
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established with the Dayton Peace Agreement is no longer viable.70 Abolishing 
Dayton would involve removing the two entities as levels of government, which are 
perceived as corrupt and as eating up the country’s resources instead of contributing 
to its wellbeing and development. The two entities, Republika Srpska and the 
Federation of BiH, are institutionally responsible for carrying out privatisations in 
BiH, and for approving the new Labour Laws that were being discussed at the time 
of my fieldwork in the summer of 2015. It is therefore understandable that 
interviewees in Zenica feel particularly strongly against the institutional framework 
deemed responsible for the continuation of socioeconomic injustice throughout the 
transition period.  
Transforming Dayton, for many interviewees, would also entail getting rid of 
the ethnic differences between Bosniaks, Croats, Serbs enshrined in the 
Constitution.71 As Josip puts it: ‘We were used to that system, we were used to being 
all together and to help one another. That is the way forward.’72 The frustration with 
ethnic divisions within the country and the transformative aspiration to make them 
irrelevant in a united Bosnia illustrate the underlying tension arising from the clash 
of socioeconomic justice, promoting a politics of equality, and cultural justice, 
promoting a politics of difference (Fraser 2009, 10). In this respect, the limited reach 
of the transitional justice discourse among those who suffered socioeconomic justice 
in Zenica might have impaired the development of a pluralist perspective on the 
makeup of Bosnia’s post-war society. From a political standpoint, calls for uniting 
Bosnian citizens are often interpreted as an attempt of cultural domination on the 
part of the majority Bosniak (Muslim) group in BiH over Serbs and Croats and 
therefore resented by the two latter groups. The call for being united as ‘Bosnians’, 
often emerging from socialist memories of ‘brotherhood and unity’ from the point of 
view of interviewees, becomes enmeshed with nationalism in the political landscape 
characterising the country.  
These three types of justice claims also show that achieving socioeconomic 
justice in Zenica is understood as a forward-looking endeavour (drawing on Torpey 
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2003 and 2007). They not only call for addressing the consequences of the recent past 
in the present ‘transitional’ phase, but for the establishment of a fairer society that the 
post-socialist transition has not been able to deliver. Given the mismatch between 
their experiences and the justice narrative promoted by the international community, 
people in Zenica focus more on the faults of the system generating socioeconomic 
injustice. Remedying socioeconomic injustice here requires actions that go well 
beyond addressing the outcomes of the war and privatisation processes. Instead of 
advocating for political changes within the Federation, or the BiH state, citizens in 
Zenica take issue with the post-war set as a whole. The entity system is challenged, 
as is the role of political elites and the international community in perpetuating 
power relations that disempower local communities in cities like Zenica. Lacking 
reference to a broader justice narrative, justice claims and remedies seem to develop 
within the specific context of the city, and seek the future-oriented transformation of 
those aspects of liberal democracy and market economy that have disempowered and 




While from the perspective of the international community, doing justice in post-war 
Bosnia entailed prosecuting war criminals through the work of the ICTY and Bosnian 
courts, experiences of injustice were much broader and included socioeconomic 
violence that could not be addressed through a retributive approach. Conceptions of 
justice developed by interviewees, recalling the importance of work, socioeconomic 
redistribution and welfare, thus fall largely outside of the transitional justice 
framework. Despite the arguments advanced by some scholars who maintain that 
transitional justice efforts represent only a ‘set of tools for effecting social change’, 
which ‘can make an important contribution to it but will not bring about a radical 
transformation of society’ (Duthie 2010, 255), and thus question the relevance of 
socioeconomic justice for its framework, the findings presented here call into 
question the predominantly legalistic and recognition-focused approach often 
implemented in the aftermath of conflict. They suggest that more careful 




communities should play a more relevant role in defining the content and scope of 
justice interventions in transitional contexts. 
The chapter stresses once again the differences between the cities of Prijedor 
and Zenica. In Prijedor, where socioeconomic injustice occurred along interethnic 
lines, the work of transitional justice mechanisms still seemed more relevant, in the 
eyes of the interviewees, in order to address injustice. The discourse of remedying to 
interethnic violence could be transposed on to their experience of socioeconomic 
injustice, and referred to by interviewees when expressing their ideas of what justice 
means for them and how it should be achieved. They could make more use of the 
transitional justice discourse, but socioeconomic justice claims that mattered to them 
still remained unaddressed. In Zenica, on the other hand, experiences of 
socioeconomic injustice were entirely separate from the justice issues identified by 
the international community and addressed through ICTY trials. Their 
socioeconomic grievances were understood as the unfortunate short-term 
consequence of the transition to capitalism, to be addressed through economic 
policies and further reform. Citizens of Zenica propose bolder and more future-
orientated remedies for socioeconomic injustice, while participants from Prijedor can 
make more use of the international attempts to remedy interethnic violence, and the 
remedies they propose do not necessarily challenge the boundaries of the transition 
process. The chapter also shows that Bosnian people hold inclusive and holistic 
conceptions of what justice means, and that these conceptions often sit uneasily with 
the universalising narratives reducing justice to common standards and mechanism 
applied across different contexts. The common narrative of justice as remedying 
interethnic violence, for instance, does not fit the experiences of all communities (or 
might fit one’s experience as a Muslim, but not the same person’s experience as a 
worker). Dismissal from a job could be interpreted through the transitional justice 
framework if linked to interethnic discrimination, but cannot if related to the 
privatisation process.  
Justice, as Hinton (2010, 17) says, ‘is always enmeshed with locality’. 
Conceptions of justice, including socioeconomic ones, vary greatly, both in their 
content and in the remedies deemed necessary to address injustice. They are linked 
to specific experiences of injustice, which vary from city to city, and depend on the 




local contexts. This specificity of the city/town context will be visible in the justice 
claims brought forward by the 2014 protest movement, discussed in Chapter 6. The 
civic and non-nationalist nature of the movement is concerned with raising issues 
that, while often affecting the BiH territory as a whole, often concern their cities or 
towns in particular ways. This also allowed for the development of a greater 
connection between the movement and common citizens, which was an important 
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CHAPTER 6 
MOBILISING FOR SOCIOECONOMIC (IN)JUSTICE: 




This chapter turns to analysing the relationship between socioeconomic justice and 
agency, by addressing the key question of whether experiences of injustice and 
conceptions of justice can represent the basis for the expression of social mobilisation 
and protest. Chapter 6 contributes to the overall argument of the thesis by showing 
how social mobilisation for redistribution can indeed be interpreted as the expression 
of unsettled and persisting socioeconomic injustice. The origins of the 2014 protests 
can thus, at least in part, be traced back to socioeconomic injustice experienced during 
the war and transition, and to the situation of post-industrial cities and towns. Justice 
claims of redistribution in the 2014 protests also contributed to the growth or 
strengthening of a type of social activism that differentiates itself from the work of 
established NGOs. At the same time, and in line with what is argued throughout the 
thesis, the protests also illustrate the limitations of the international intervention in 
making sense of socioeconomic claims as justice issues, and its role in shaping the 
discourse on socioeconomic reforms and in delimiting public participation to formal 
interlocutors – even when faced with a largely informal and civic movement of 
citizens. It is precisely in social struggles such as the 2014 protests, and outside formal 
political institutions, that the links between transitional justice, peacebuilding and 
neoliberal economic reform become particularly visible, and where conceptions of 
justice have been most contested. 
This thesis’ focus on the concept of socioeconomic justice, as previous chapters 
have already indicated, requires taking post-socialism in serious consideration for 
understanding social mobilisation around socioeconomic issues. While we must give 
credit to transitional justice and peacebuilding scholars for pointing out the gap 
existing between international institutions and the local communities (see for 
instance Belloni 2007; Orentlicher 2007), thus prompting international actors to rely 
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more on ‘local ownership’ (Donais 2009), and for offering in-depth insights into the 
relationship between international mechanisms and local constituencies (see for 
instance Subotić 2009; Nettelfield 2010; Ivković and Hagan 2011), much less attention 
has been dedicated to civic movements. A number of works on the non-governmental 
sector, including associations of victims and veterans, have been published in the past 
years (see for instance Fagan 2005; Delpla 2007; Helms 2013), but the literature on 
social movement studies has been gathering momentum over the past few years (see 
Fagan and Sircar 2013; Horvat and Štiks 2015, Milan 2015 and 2016). Moreover, while 
connecting the critical literature on peacebuilding and transitional justice (and its 
liberal thrust; Sriram 2007; Leebaw 2007; Nagy 2008) is instrumental to show how 
complex international interventions can marginalise experiences of socioeconomic 
injustice (and thus potentially contribute to the emergence of popular discontent), the 
influence of socialist legacies and of the fall of the socialist system on the development 
of social activism still demands greater attention. This chapter brings together these 
concerns in analysing the origins, emergence and aftermath of the 2014 Bosnian 
protests, prompted by workers’ protests in Tuzla and quickly expanding to the rest 
of the country.   
Chapter 6 begins by tracing the material and ideational sources of the 
mobilisation around socioeconomic justice, and focuses on the situation of post-
industrial towns and previous experiences of mobilisation in Bosnia and around the 
region. The second section of this chapter gives an overview of the protests, followed 
by an analysis of the justice claims advanced by the activists. This section concludes 
by connecting the issue of political participation and transformative strategies to the 
participatory approach of the protest movement, and remarking its differences with 
the professional NGO sector. The last section of this chapter situates the development 
of socioeconomic justice claims within the framework of the international 
intervention. Socioeconomic justice claims, this chapter shows, could not be 
understood within the parameters of transitional justice and peacebuilding as 
defined by the international community in the Bosnian setting. The international 
community responded to the protests by reframing the issues raised as 
socioeconomic problems to be solved through the implementation of reforms that 
would complete Bosnia’s transition towards a market economy (Majstorović et al. 
2015). Intersecting with a process of partial dissolution and partial consolidation of 
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the groups that took part in the protests, the international intervention also favoured 
a model of social engagement more similar to the civil society envisaged in the liberal 
peace paradigm, over the more horizontal and direct forms of participation used by 
the protesters that are more resembling of new forms of political engagement 
emerged in the post-2008 crisis period elsewhere in Europe (Kaldor and Selchow 
2015). A different approach to supporting activist groups has been adopted by the so-
called Austrian Initiative, prompting questions over the potential of alternatives to 
conventional donor support for civil society groups. Chapter 6 concludes by 
reflecting on the implications of the protests and their aftermath for understanding 
the complex relationship between transitional justice and socioeconomic justice, 
between local conceptions of justice and international ones, and between local 




6.1 The sources of discontent and the struggle to mobilise  
Given the bleak social situation of the country, and the fall in the standards of living 
compared to the socialist period, the 2014 protests seemed to arrive quite late. This 
section analyses their origins, both material and intellectual, as well as the potential 
obstacles to social mobilisation posed by the transition itself. In doing this, it also 
shows the relevance of the socialist legacy for understanding both those elements that 
facilitated social mobilisation (especially on the part of the workers and the 
progressive left), and those that might have hampered the organisation of dissent. 
 
 
6.1.1 The material sources of the protests: Bosnia’s post-industrial towns  
The 2014 protests had their origins in the industrial city of Tuzla, in eastern Bosnia. 
While the protest movement gathered strength in the capital Sarajevo, as well as in 
smaller towns, industrial cities like Tuzla, Zenica, or Mostar, and their population of 
frustrated and alienated workers represented the backbone of the protests. The 
material sources of discontent lie precisely in social and economic problems that are 
present throughout Bosnia, but particularly visible in its industrial centres. These can 
be traced back to the war, to the subsequent establishment of the Dayton institutional 
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framework, and to the economic reforms promoted during the transition process. 
Zenica and Prijedor, whose cases this thesis takes in particular consideration, fall 
within the remit of this discussion and exemplify many of these problems.  
The Bosnian war affected industrial cities to varying extents, depending on 
their location and strategic importance for the conflict. In some cases, the war did not 
physically destroy industrial facilities. The city of Tuzla, for instance, was shelled by 
Serb forces during the war, but there was no direct fighting within the city. Its 
industrial complex did not suffer physical damage (Bojicic and Kaldor 1999, 103). 
Similarly, fighting was fierce in rural areas near Zenica, but – while the city centre 
was shelled by Croat forces during the war – there was no fighting within the city 
itself. On the other hand, Mostar was heavily damaged by the conflict, which saw 
Serb forces attack first, followed by clashes between Croat and Muslim forces that 
ended in the separation of the city along ethnic lines. Industrial facilities around 
Prijedor mostly ceased production as a result of the conflict, and were in some cases 
used as prison camps by the Crisis Staff, as in the case of the Omarska iron ore mine 
and the Keraterm ceramics factory. Overall, according to one estimate reported by 
Bojicic and Kaldor (1999, 94), Bosnian industry operated to five or six percent of its 
capacity during the war. Regardless of the physical damage of the war, the industrial 
sector in Bosnia was, indeed, severely hit by the loss of markets that came with the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia (World Bank 2015), and by the internal fragmentation of 
the country itself. The social consequence of this was a dramatic increase in 
unemployment, also linked to participation in the war effort, especially by the male 
adult population. By 1998, the productive sector employed only 53% of the workforce 
it did in 1991 (Jahović 1999, 94).  
At the same time, the end of the war did not necessarily reverse its negative 
consequences on the economic system, especially in industrial areas. The new BiH 
Constitution included in the Dayton Peace Agreement crystallised the division 
between a Serb-dominated part of the country (the RS entity) and Muslim-Croat 
territory (the FBiH entity), and thus failed to create a single economic and political 
space. According to Divjak and Pugh (2008), such fragmentation prevented the 
establishment of a social contract between citizens and the state and consequently 
contributed to the emergence of local patron-client relations and corruption practices. 
Corruption poses further obstacles to economic recovery, because foreign investors 
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are reluctant to expose themselves to such illegal activities and the risks they entail 
(Divjak and Pugh 2008, 377). Paradoxically, the international presence for 
peacebuilding and statebuilding purposes also intertwined with illicit practices, such 
as involvement in arms trafficking and black market economy, in a ‘symbiotic 
relationship’ that continued after the war (Andreas 2009). 
The side effects of the Dayton framework, such as corruption and lack of 
institutional transparency, posed serious challenges for the economic recovery of 
industrial centres, for instance by slowing down and obfuscating the regularity of 
privatisations. Before the war, the Bosnian economy was mostly driven by 12 
conglomerates, which allegedly produced about 35% of its GDP (World Bank 2015, 
2). When the war ended, many of the large public enterprises, which constituted the 
main source of employment for industrial towns, were in acute need for restructuring 
(Pugh 2005b, 451), but international organisations argued for privatising firms first. 
This drove the value of the companies down and created difficulties in finding 
interested investors. It also attracted buyers with little interest in restarting 
production, leading to asset-stripping and the consequent closure of facilities (Donais 
2005, Stojanov 2001). In the meantime, a large part of the workforce was left 
unemployed or on ‘waiting lists’ while employers would still have to pay 
contributions for them. According to the labour law approved in 1999, ‘waiting lists’ 
were to be cleared by May 2000: at that point, the employer had to either recall 
employees back to work or give severance pay. As mentioned in Chapter 3, this 
provision, however, proved extremely difficult to implement due to lack of funds.  
While the privatisation process has already been discussed in Chapter 3, here 
it will be sufficient to say that the decision to adopt the voucher model1 led to the 
concentration of resources in the hands of powerful and politically well-connected 
individuals through the secondary trading of certificates, often sold for a fraction of 
their nominal value (Donais 2002). At the same time, citizens struggling with 
economic difficulties and unemployment turned to other available forms of credit, 
either through informal debt or microcredit. Microcredit often worked alongside 
informal debts as a survival mechanism for the Bosnian lower and middle classes 
                                                          
1 See Federal Agency for Privatization, Model of Privatization, 
<http://www.apf.com.ba/model-privatizacije/Default.aspx>, accessed 29 August 2016. 
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(Jasarević 2012). Aside from the inflated growth of the reconstruction period in the 
immediate aftermath of the war, and the temporary employment associated with it, 
the transition process did not alleviate the medium- or long-term decline of industrial 
cities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Given the high rates of unemployment, and the 
dramatic decline in living conditions compared to the socialist period, it is not 
surprising that industrial cities were the nucleus and material source of the 2014 
protests. The following section turns to the ideological and historical roots of the 
protest movement.  
 
 
6.1.2 The intellectual origins of the protest movement  
Despite the common claim that the Bosnian society is characterised by a certain 
‘political passivity’ (Weber 2014, 10), historical evidence challenges this simplistic 
depiction. Working class cities such as Tuzla had their first organised strikes already 
at the beginning of the twentieth century (Kurtović 2015, 652), while later on many 
Bosnian citizens took part in the partisan resistance in the Second World War. Even 
during socialist times, despite political control and limited opportunities to organise 
forces outside of the system, workers’ protests became increasingly common during 
the economic crisis of the 1980s, as in the rest of Yugoslavia (Lowinger 2009).2 
Andjelic (2003, 81-83) notes that, during the 1980s, student protests and youth 
political activism were gaining strength in Sarajevo, while in Zenica and Tuzla 
citizens started protesting against pollution caused by the metallurgy plans. In one 
instance, in January 1989, ‘around 40 citizens took to Zenica’s streets to protest 
against the pollution. They even went to the local radio and government buildings to 
protest’, something which nobody had dared to do in the past (Ibid., 83). In the run-
up to the war (and even as the war went on), peace activism emerged in Bosnia as in 
other former Yugoslav republics, as extensively documented by Bilić (2012). While 
not providing a comprehensive overview of social activism in Bosnia over the past 
decades, this section suggests that some recent instances of mobilisation, and contacts 
among activists from the Southeast European region, ‘prepared the territory’ for the 
2014 protests.  
                                                          
2 This is also frequently mentioned by interviewees in Prijedor and Zenica.  
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First, the 2014 protests occurred after other instances of civic mobilisation 
taking place in different parts of Bosnia over the previous years. In 2012, citizens in 
Banja Luka protested against the proposed development of a public park, with 
thousands taking the streets facing police repression. As Štiks (2015) notes, this 
protest can be seen in line with other similar instances in Croatia and Serbia, and part 
of a broader movement for the ‘right to the city’ (pravo na grad). Most relevantly, it 
represented an important instance of civic activism and helped the formation of 
networks and groups that fight for broader social justice issues in Banja Luka.3 
Following the Banja Luka protests, Sarajevo witnessed in 2013 the largest 
demonstrations of the post-war period (until the 2014 protests). In this case, citizens 
began protesting after the national parliament failed to make changes to the Law on 
the unique citizen ID number (Jedinstveni Matični Broj Građana, JMBG), which the 
Constitutional Court had requested two years before. As a result of this failure, babies 
born after February 2013 could not be assigned citizen numbers and were thus not 
able to exercise some important rights, and get passports (Armakolas and 
Maksimovic 2013). The protests – usually referred to as JMBG protests or ‘bebolucija’, 
from beba (baby) and revolucija (revolution) – began in early June 2013, when the 
parents of seriously ill babies who needed to travel abroad for treatment made public 
pledges to the government and fellow citizens. Between 5 and 6 June, MPs were 
prevented from exiting the parliament building by protesters, who threatened to stay 
until a solution was found.  
The ‘baby revolution’ was, remarkably, characterised by an anti-nationalist 
character, and a bottom-up approach reflected in the spontaneity of the mobilisation 
and the absence of leaders (Keil and Moore 2014). In this, it resembled other forms of 
mobilisation of the post-socialist left in other former Yugoslav countries (Štiks 2015). 
The 2013 protests weakened the nationalist rhetoric of the political elites by ‘giving 
political meaning to what they strived to destroy – namely the common citizenship 
of all Bosnians and Herzegovinians’ (Keil and Moore 2014, 58), and by showing to 
those very elites that the Dayton framework had lost social legitimacy. This newly 
acquired ability to unite citizens around socioeconomic concerns, and against the 
                                                          
3 See the Environmental Justice Atlas, <https://ejatlas.org/conflict/the-park-is-ours-banja-
luka-bosnia-and-herzegovina>, accessed 1 September 2016. 
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ruling ethno-nationalist elites, represented a key antecedent for the 2014 protests. 
According to Armakolas and Maksimovic (2013, 10), who consider the protests an 
instance of ‘civic awakening’, the JMBG issue was both a trigger for expressing 
political discontent, and the basis around which a ‘deeper and bottom-up socio-
political consciousness’ could develop. 
Second, the wave of small and medium-scale protests that characterised the 
Southeast European region in the aftermath of the financial crisis was supported by 
the emergence of networks of activists, mostly from the progressive left. The contacts 
among them, and the intellectual work done around some key themes common to 
post-socialist countries, is also pivotal for understanding the character of the 2014 
protests. In May 2012 and 2013, the Balkan Forum brought together in Zagreb 
activists from the progressive, post-socialist left, allowing them to gather and 
exchange ideas. Supported by the Rosa Luxembourg Foundation, activists split into 
different working groups that reflected on issues of social justice, workers’ rights, 
struggle for the commons, and the ‘crisis of electoral democracy and the need for 
deep democratization of Balkan societies’ (Bibić et al. 2014, 10). The themes explored 
by these working groups, and their conclusions presented at the 2013 Forum and 
published in a short volume, anticipate some of the issues that will take centre stage 
during the 2014 protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The working group on workers’ 
struggles, for instance, noted the ‘very unfavourable’ conditions created by 
privatisations, inequality and precarity (Working Group on Workers’ Struggles 2014, 
36). It discussed the role of trade unions in protecting workers and the negative 
legacies of the Yugoslav period, while also noting that the ‘sense of confidence’ and 
‘feeling of a shared collective fate’ that characterised the socialist working class are 
aspects upon which workers’ struggles can be rebuilt today (Ibid., 40). The Commons 
Working Group (2014, 13-18), on the other hand, focused on the dispossession of 
public goods, public space, and the environment, common within the context of post-
socialist privatisation, and calls for joining social justice and environmental justice 
struggles. Lastly, the Forum advocated for the strengthening of political 
participation, for instance through the practice of direct democracy (Democratisation 
and participation Working Group, 2014). Decent work and pay, the right to the 
commons, and direct democracy, as Section 6.2 will show, are key themes of the 2014 
protests, connecting under the umbrella of social justice. Before moving to the 
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analysis of the protests, and the role of socioeconomic injustice in engendering them, 
it is important to clarify the position of those workers from Prijedor and Zenica who 
personally suffered from it. 
 
 
6.1.3 Workers in Prijedor and Zenica: survival strategies and ‘getting by’ 
The 2014 protests, as the previous sections show, were long in the making – both from 
a material point of view and because of the longstanding engagement of progressive 
activists on the left. Political discourses by elites (sometimes supported by 
international rhetoric) tend to label positive opinions of socialism as ‘yugonostalgia’ 
(Lindstrom 2005; see also Calori 2016), which is seen as contributing to social 
immobility, representing a symbol of being stuck in the past and refusing to change.4 
The previous two sections, as well as the rest of this chapter, however, show that the 
legacy of socialism is an extremely important factor of mobilisation for social justice 
in BiH. In order to help understand why such mobilisation only materialised on a 
large scale in 2014, this section reflects upon the role of workers from Prijedor and 
Zenica and brings to light some empirically observable elements that might have 
hampered this process.  
It is particularly telling that workers in Prijedor and Zenica, whose stories 
were presented in Chapter 4 and 5, mostly shun active involvement in protests. 
Several factors appear to be related to this. Age and generational change is one of 
these elements: ‘we need young people to get up from internet, to get up from the 
cafes and become active and change things’.5 Another interviewee, from Prijedor, 
concurs: ‘Those who came back [after the war] are now all older people, maybe they 
can get by with their pensions. Young people are rebellious and that is good. Older 
people are not rebellious. Young people organise a few protests, we older people 
participate, (…) but we do not organise them’.6 Similar opinions were voiced 
                                                          
4 See for instance: EU Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Compact for Growth and Jobs, 
available at <http://europa.ba/wp-
content/uploads/2015/05/delegacijaEU_2014090816171626eng.pdf> accessed 10/09/2015.  
5 Interview ZE/15/8, worker from Zenica (Josip), 30 June 2015. 
6 Interview PR/15/4, worker from Prijedor (Suada), 12 July 2015. 
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frequently by interviewees, and by informants outside of interview settings.7 On the 
other hand, the potential for mobilisation is also being diminished by people’s ability 
to ‘get by’ (snalaziti se), as they say, while on minimal pensions,8 working in the grey 
economy,9 working one’s own small lot of land and often selling fresh produce,10 or 
– very commonly and often in addition to these – relying on remittances from the 
Bosnian diaspora.11 The latter finding is not surprising, if we take into account that 
many Bosnians who became refugees during the war settled in the countries that 
hosted them. The total number of emigrants from Bosnia holding BiH citizenship was 
estimated at 1.2 million by the state Ministry of Security in the year 2011 (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Ministry of Security 2012). Remittances into Bosnia accounted for 11.1% 
of the GDP in 2015.12 In 2014, $1,567 million were received by Bosnian residents in 
personal transfers from abroad.13 Receiving sufficient financial support from relatives 
abroad, combined with other survival strategies such as growing vegetables or fruit 
for local markets, might contribute to maintaining social peace in Bosnia. As one 
interviewee puts it: ‘it will pass, if we have enough for the bread, we won’t rebel’.14 
The recent changes in visa regimes with respect to European countries represent a 
further relief valve: Bosnian citizens are allowed visa-free travel to the Schengen Area 
for stays of up to three months (within a six-month period).15 As several interviewees 
                                                          
7 See for instance interview PR/15/8, worker from Prijedor (Sakib), 14 July 2015; interview 
PR/15/12, worker from Prijedor (Jasna), 16 July 2015.  
8 Interview PR/15/13, worker from Prijedor (Nefisa), 19 July 2015.  
9 Interview PR/15/12, worker from Prijedor (Jasna), 16 July 2015.  
10 Interviews ZE/15/5, worker from Zenica (Zijad), 13 June 2016; ZE/15/15, workers from 
Zenica, 2 August 2015; PR/15/7, worker from Prijedor (Maja), 14 July 2016; ZE/15/14, 
workers from Zenica (Azra), 1 August 2015.  
11 As some interviewees point out, emigration due to the war also meant that many people 
who used to be employed did not seek to return to their jobs after the war, see Interview 
ZE/15/14 and Interview ZE/15/5. Almost all interviewees mention remittances from the 
diaspora as a key survival mechanisms for Bosnian residents.  
12 Including compensation of employees and personal transfers. Source: World Bank, 
Personal remittances, received (% of GDP), World Bank staff estimates based on IMF 
balance of payments data, and World Bank and OECD GDP estimates, available at 
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?end=2015&locations=BA
>, accessed 11 August 2016.  
13 Data for 2015 are not yet available. Source: World Bank, Migration and Remittances 
Factbook 2016, available at <http://go.worldbank.org/QGUCPJTOR0>, accessed 11 August 
2016.  
14PR/15/15 
15 See DG Migration and Home Affairs, Visa Policy, at <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-policy/index_en.htm>, accessed 1 
September 2016.   
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point out,16 people use this as an opportunity to (informally) work in Germany or 
Austria and support their families in Bosnia with their income for several more 
months. If they could, some interviewee argue, people would not return from their 
temporary jobs to Bosnia: ‘if they opened the borders here, no one would be left, no 
one’.17 Beyond voicing justice claims, as we have seen in Chapter 5, the dissatisfaction 
of workers – and many other Bosnian citizens – is expressed in terms of social and 
economic survival rather than protest. In addition to this workers do sometimes 
engage in visible acts of a political nature, including the expression of solidarity or 
criticism towards the protests.18 Some of them took the streets in February 2014,19 or 
say they support local actions organised by younger groups, such as the White 
Armband Day in Prijedor. In this respect, it is important to note the difference 
between Zenica, where the 2014 protests saw the participation of thousands of 
citizens, and Prijedor, where social mobilisation occurred, but on a much smaller 
scale.20  
The presence of an extensive welfare system and the role of trade unions as 
interlocutors of, rather than opponents to, the management and the government, had 
already somehow ‘lulled’21 people into being socially inactive. However, it is also true 
that workers’ protests had become more and more common as the economic crisis hit 
Yugoslavia during the 1980s, and actually represented the basis for shifting the 
background of the mobilisation from socioeconomic to nationalist issues ahead of the 
war. If, after the war, any feeling of passivity was present as a legacy of socialism, the 
new Constitution approved at Dayton further aggravated the situation. The division 
of competences between levels of government (state, entity/district, canton, and 
municipal) leaves citizens unsure as to what the target of their claims might be, as it 
also emerged during the 2014 protests (see Section 6.2). In addition to that, the 
electoral and institutional systems incentivising ethnic voting have resulted in the 
diffusion of patronage and clientelism, with a consequent reduction in accountability 
                                                          
16 Interviews PR/15/7; PR/15/17, worker from Prijedor, 19 July 2015; ZE/15/14. 
17 Interview ZE/15/8. 
18 See Interview ZE/15/8. 
19 A few interviewees continued to be engaged with Plenum Zenica for a while.  
20 This is due, in part to differences between the Federation and Republika Srpska. See 
Section 6.2.  
21 Interview ZE/15/14 (Mediha). 
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on the part of the politicians towards the citizens (Divjak and Pugh 2008). Lastly, the 
international community also played a role. While not being electorally accountable 
to Bosnian citizens, the politically liberal and economically neoliberal spirit of the 
intervention effectively diverted the scope of debates and agency away from 
socioeconomic justice issues.  
 
 
6.2 The 2014 protests  
This section turns to the analysis of the 2014 protests, of the justice claims they raised 
and the forms of participation they employed. From this analysis it appears evident 
that socioeconomic justice concerns that had been marginalised were at the heart of 
the protests, and that they built on experiences of socioeconomic and political 
injustice to envisage a transformative approach to redressing injustice; and that the 
mobilisation involved common citizens and activists that did not form part of the 
civil society as defined and shaped by the international commitment to 
peacebuilding. Before moving to the analysis of justice claims and forms of 
mobilisation taken by the 2014 protest movement, a brief account of the protests will 
be given below, with the aim of providing a background for the substantial 
discussion that follows.  
 
 
6.2.1 From Tuzla to the plenum movement: the February 2014 protests in brief 
The 2014 protests originated in Tuzla, a city developed thanks to the industrial sector 
during the Yugoslav period, but that had been facing deindustrialisation, failed 
privatisations and rising unemployment throughout the transition period. While 
strikes and small protests had been happening in Tuzla for years as a result of this 
situation, in February 2014 a demonstration organised by frustrated workers in front 
of the cantonal government building managed to gain national attention. After police 
reacted forcefully to the escalation of tensions on February 5th, with dozens of people 
arrested and injured, an even greater number of demonstrators went on the streets 
on the following day, and protests started occurring in solidarity with Tuzla in 
Sarajevo, Zenica, Mostar and other Bosnian cities and towns, particularly in the 
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Federation entity. Originated from the claims of workers of failed companies in 
Tuzla, the scope of the protests quickly broadened, with demonstrators calling for the 
resignation of governments at the cantonal, entity and state level, the revision of 
privatisation agreements, as well as an end to privileges accorded to political elites 
and to corruption.22 The Prime Minister of the Tuzla cantonal government presented 
his resignation on February 7th, soon to be joined by three more cantonal PMs over 
the following days (Jukić et al 2014; Mujkić 2015, 631). The events were remarkable 
as they saw the participation of thousands of citizens throughout Bosnia, and because 
citizens decided to take the protest forward by organising open assemblies where 
they could discuss and elaborate their demands to politicians.  
In almost each city where demonstrations were held, groups of citizens 
established a ‘plenum’, defined as a ‘an assembly of all the members of a group’, a 
‘public place for debate and discussion, without prohibitions and without any 
hierarchy amongst the participants, at which decisions are made’.23 The first plenum 
meetings in Tuzla and Sarajevo were held on the 12 February and continued over the 
following days and weeks, with the participation of hundreds of citizens filling the 
Tuzla National Theatre and the Dom Mladih (youth centre) Skenderija in Sarajevo.24 
Other plenum meetings were held in Brčko,25 Mostar,26 Zenica,27 Bugojno,28 and 
                                                          
22 See Section 2.2 for a comprehensive discussion of the protest demands and how they 
relate to socioeconomic justice issues.  
23Announcement of the Citizens Plenum in Tuzla, 12 February 2014, BH Protest Files, 
available at <https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/12/announcement-of-the-
citizens-plenum-in-tuzla/>, accessed 1 September 2016.  See section 2.3 for a comprehensive 
discussion of the transformative form of mobilisation taken by the plenum movement. 
24Announcement of the Citizens Plenum in Tuzla, 12 February 2014, BH Protest Files; 2nd 
Declaration of Sarajevo Citizens’ Plenum, 10 February 2014, BH Protest Files, available at 
<https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/10/2nd-declaration-of-sarajevo-citizens-
plenum-sarajevo-4/>, accessed 1 September 2016.   
25 Announcement: First meeting of the Brčko District Citizens' Plenum, 11 February 2014, BH 
Protest Files, available at 
<https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/11/announcement-first-meeting-of-the-
citizens-plenum-of-brcko-district/>, accessed 1 September 2016.   
26 Demands of the Citizens’ Plenum of Mostar, 13 February 2014, BH Protest Files, 
<https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/13/demands-of-the-citizens-plenum-of-
mostar/>, accessed 1 September 2016.  
27 Zenica Protestors Deliver Their Demands, 10 February 2014, BH Protest Files, available at 
<https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/10/zenica-protestors-deliver-their-
demands-to-cantonal-government-zenica-1/>, accessed 1 September 2016.  
28 Second Bugojno Citizens’ Plenum: Declaration, 12 February 2014, BH Protest Files, 
available at <https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/13/second-bugojno-citizens-
plenum-declaration/>, accessed 1 September 2016.  
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others.29 Protests and assemblies also took place in Banja Luka and Prijedor,30 
although overall demonstrations were more concentrated in the Federation than in 
Republika Srpska. Stricter social control and manipulation on the part of nationalist 
propaganda are partly to blame for the lack of momentum behind social mobilisation 
in the Serb entity.31 Despite this, groups of activists from RS remained active after the 
protests, built networks with activists from the Federation, and took part in follow-
up activities such as the Austrian Initiative (see Section 6.3).  
The protests also brought physical damage to government buildings in 
several cities. In Tuzla, already on February 6th protesters threw stones and eggs at 
the cantonal government building, which had formerly hosted SODASO, one of the 
companies that used to be a major employer in the area during socialist times. The 
building was then set on fire and badly damaged.32 During mass protests in Sarajevo 
on February 7th, the building of the cantonal government was set on fire, while the 
nearby state presidency building and cars parked in the area were also hit (Dzidić 
2014a; Ikić Cook and Jukić 2014). The police was also responsible for excessive use of 
force against protesters, journalists and passers-by. Human Rights Watch 
documented 19 cases of police violence occurred in Sarajevo and Tuzla between 
February 5th and 9th (Human Rights Watch 2014). Activists reacted to accusations that 
the protests were led by violent ‘hooligans’, by condemning violence and pointing at 
the Bosnian authorities’ responsibilities. The statement of the Ženska Mreža Bosne i 
Hercegovine (Women’s Network of Bosnia and Herzegovina) argues that ‘Bosnia and 
Herzegovina has become a country which does not guarantee the basic social, 
economic, and political rights’, and that the young people responsible for what 
happens during the protests ‘are not hooligans or vandals, but the product of the 
                                                          
29 Highlights of the week ending Sunday, 2 March 2014, BH Protest Files (3 March 2014), 
available at <https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/03/03/highlights-of-the-week-
ending-sunday-2-march-2014/>, accessed 1 September 2016.  
30 Banja Luka: New Protests on Saturday – “We will call all poor people to come out to the 
streets”, 19 February 2014, BH Protest Files, available at 
<https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/19/banja-luka-new-protests-on-saturday-
we-will-call-all-poor-people-to-come-out-to-the-streets/>; Prijedor Citizens’ Demands, 10 
February 2014, BH Protest Files, available at 
<https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/10/prijedor-citizens-demands-prijedor-
1/>. Both accessed 1 September 2016.  
31 See Interview PR/15/18, Activist from Prijedor, 21 July 2015.  
32 The Tuzla Cantonal Government has since moved their offices to another building in 
Tuzla. 
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Bosnian-Herzegovinian state and society’ (Ženska Mreža Bosne i Hercegovine 
2014).33 
 






























Workers protest over unpaid salaries and 
contributions in Tuzla. 
6 February 
A larger demonstration occurs in reaction to forceful 
police attempts to quash the protests on the day 
before. 
7 February 
Demonstrations in solidarity with Tuzla take place in 
several Bosnian cities, including the capital Sarajevo. 
Government buildings are damaged. 
12 February 2014 
The first plenum meetings are held in Sarajevo and 
Tuzla, followed by other cities. 
13-20 May Floods in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
26-27 June The Forum for Prosperity and Jobs is held in Sarajevo. 
24 July Presentation of the Compact for Growth and Jobs. 
8-10 September 
Conference ‘Civil Society as a Factor for Change in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’, Vienna. Beginning of so-
called Austrian Initiative. 
Spring 
The Federation of BiH begins discussing the new 
Labour law (inspired by the Compact for Growth and 
Jobs), prompting trade union protests. 
May-June  
Initiative of the EU Delegation “Šta znači Sporazum 
za rast i zapošljavanje? Razgovori sa građanima” 
(What does the Compact for Growth and Jobs mean? 
Conversations with the citizens). Meetings take place 
in 15 cities in BiH. 
July 
The first implementation phase of the Austrian 
initiative begins. 
January-April 
The new labour laws in the FBiH and RS come into 
effect. 
July 
End of the funding for the first phase of the Austrian 
Initiative. 
 
                                                          
33 See also Eyewitness account of a protestor: “We are neither vandals nor hooligans”, BH 
Protest Files, 13 February 2014, available at 
<https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/13/eyewitness-account-of-a-protestor-we-
are-neither-vandals-nor-hooligans/>, accessed 2 September 2016.  
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Politicians from both entities made controversial and unfounded statements 
regarding the fact that the protests were aimed at concealing Bosniak war crimes, 
destabilising the Serb entity, or that they were led by Bosniak nationalists – all while 
hinting at the possible risk of a new war (Dzidić 2014b). Unprofessional media 
coverage of the protests was also publicly condemned by the Association of BiH 
Journalists (Udruženje BH Novinari).34 One of the most remarkable aspects of the 
protests was actually its decidedly anti-nationalistic character, attempting to unite 
around socioeconomic issues citizens that the political system had divided based on 
ethnicity. The international community condemned the attempt to instrumentally use 
the protests in order to further ethnic divisions in the country, and expressed support 
for the right to protest of Bosnian citizens.35 Some statements, such as the remarks by 
the High Representative Valentin Inzko regarding the possible use of international 
troops to stop violence on the streets (which he argues were misrepresented), also 
sparked controversy and somewhat compromised the image of the international 
community in the eyes of demonstrators.36 
Small-scale protests and plenum meetings continued for a couple of months 
after the February protests. In mid-May 2014, Bosnia and Herzegovina was hit by 
catastrophic floods which affected approximately one third of the country, left 27 
people dead, displaced almost 90,000 people and affected hundreds of thousands 
more.37 It was the most catastrophic event in the country’s recent history after the end 
of the war, and the efforts of the Bosnian civil society, including activists and citizens 
who had been taking part in the plenum meetings, were redirected towards 
                                                          
34 See Apelmedijima i novinarima u BiH, 11 February 2014, available at 
<http://www.bhnovinari.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=603%3Aap
el-medijima-i-novinarima-u-bih&catid=62%3Asaopenja&Itemid=240&lang=bs>, accessed 15 
August 2015.  
35Statement by the Ambassadors of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, 11 
February 2014, <http://www.ohr.int/?p=31892&lang=en>; accessed 27/04/2016. 
36Večer: Interview with HR Valentin Inzko, Office of the High Representative, 12 February 2014, 
<http://www.ohr.int/?p=31864&lang=en>;accessed 27/04/2016. 




ahead.html>, accessed 17 August 2016; Elvira M. Jukić, Hundreds Still Homeless After 
Bosnia Floods, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/hundreds-still-homeless-after-
bosnia-floods>, accessed 17 August 2016. 
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providing aid to those most in need. The international community also set up 
emergency programmes that included funds and loans targeted for disaster relief and 
prevention. Ultimately, the floods represented the second element pushing the 
international community, and especially the EU, to take a more active approach 
towards socioeconomic issues in BiH while setting aside (at least temporarily) some 
of the most controversial issues hindering the process of EU integration.38 
 
 
6.2.2 Socioeconomic justice claims: a transformative approach  
For the first time in the post-war period, the February 2014 protests brought 
socioeconomic justice at the forefront of public debate. In the words of one activist, 
‘the combinations of notions of “social” and “justice” had been virtually unknown 
among local intellectuals, activists and the social scene’ (Hakalović 2014, 7). The 
protesters identify social justice as their ultimate goal. A declaration published by 
Sarajevo demonstrators on 9 February reads that, following the release of fellow 
protesters by the police, ‘we can then ask for the start of conversations and actions at 
all levels of government in order to establish a more socially just order for all social 
strata; and for all those whose human dignity and material basic needs have been 
endangered or destroyed by the transitional theft, corruption, nepotism, privatization 
of public resources and an economic model that favors the rich, and financial 
arrangements that have destroyed any hope for a society based on social justice and 
welfare’.39 Social justice, as it was declined during the protests, effectively turned the 
experiences of socioeconomic injustice and justice conceptions expressed by former 
workers in cities like Prijedor and Zenica into a public and political issue, for the first 
time since the end of the war. The claims raised by the protesters and discussed in 
the plenum meetings elaborate on the themes of socioeconomic redistribution and 
                                                          
38 This was the spirit behind the establishment of the Forum for Prosperity and Jobs (see 
Section 3.2), and the British-German Initiative following from that. See Elvira M. Jukić, 
Balkan Insight, UK, Germany Launch Joint Initiative on Bosnia, 
<http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/uk-germany-propose-bosnia-s-renewed-eu-
perspective>, accessed 17 August 2016.  
39 Declaration of Sarajevo Protestors, 9 February 2014, BH Protest files, available at 
<https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/09/declaration-of-sarajevo-protestors-
1/>, accessed 2 September 2016.  
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political participation that emerged in Chapters 4 and 5, and are mostly 
transformative, and forward-looking, in nature.  
 
Table 6.2 Protest slogans 2014-201540 
Economic issues/anti-
nationalism 
Political/institutional issues Privileges and corruption  
Gladni smo na tri jezika (We 
are hungry in three 
languages)   
Je li ovo pravna država? (Is this 
a state of law?) 
Pljačkali ste 20 godina i dosta 
je (You stole for 20 years 
and that’s enough) 
Jedna ljubav za radničku BiH 
(One love for a 
working/workers’ BiH) 
Građani koji poginju glavu pred 
ovim banditima nisu zašluzili da 
imaju državu (Citizens who 
bow their heads in front of 
these bandits do not deserve 
to have a state)  
Korupcija je habitus vlasti 
BiH (Corruption is a habit 
of the BiH government) 
Nacionalisti u službi 
krupnog kapitala 
(Nationalists at the service of 
big business) 
Ovo je tvoja zemlja! Uzmi je 
nazad (This is your country! 
Take it back) 
Dosta: - lopovluka; - 
kriminala; - korupcije; - 
nepotizma 
(Enough with the theft, 
criminals, corruption and 
nepotism) 
Smrt nacionalizmu (Death to 
nationalism) 
Kad nepravda postane zakon 
otpor postaje dužnost (When 
injustice becomes law, 
resistance becomes a duty) 
Posao u telekomu 15.000 
BAM, elektru 10.000 (A job 
in telecom is 15.000 KM, in 
the electric company 10.000 
KM) 
BiH nije srpska, ni hrvatska, ni 
muslimanka (BiH is not Serb, 
nor Croat, nor Muslim) 
Stop represiji (Stop repression) Pare narodu a ne strankama! 
(Money to the people and 
not to political parties!) 
Smrt kapitalizmu, sloboda 
narodu (Death to capitalism, 
freedom to the people)41 
Tražimo promjene (We are 
looking for change)  
 
Sloboda je moja nacija 
(Freedom is my nation) 
  
 
Experiences of socioeconomic injustice in Prijedor and Zenica revolve around 
the loss of work. Dismissal based on different grounds was often the first experience 
                                                          
40 Sources: Author’s pictures; Zenica Plenum Bilten, Broj 1 (Bulletin of the Plenum Zenica, 
no. 1, on file with the author); Kurtović 2015.  
41 This is a play on words with the World War Two partisan slogan Smrt fašizmu, sloboda 
narodu (Death to fascism, freedom to the people).  
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of injustice during the war, and was followed by the impossibility of regaining 
employment in its aftermath.  Activists concur that work, the rights connected to 
work and the political issues linked to this prompted the protests in the first place.42 
The first declaration of protesters in Tuzla, dated 7 February 2014, asked for the 
resolution of all questions related to the privatization of several local firms, trials for 
economic crimes, the revision of all privatisation agreements, and for returning 
factories to the workers.43 A similar call for the revision of privatisation agreements 
was made by the Plenum in Sarajevo on 14 February,44 while demonstrators from 
Mostar added further demands on the right to work and resolving the status of 
workers from destroyed companies.45 While in several cases workers asked to take 
back control of the factories, activists point out that there were also many that wished 
for successful privatisation that would guarantee them work and a stable income.46 
Similar demands related to failed privatisations and to the status of workers were 
presented in Zenica, Prijedor, Zavidovići, and Bihać.47 The importance of 
socioeconomic issues, and most importantly work, is also visible in the slogans and 
chants seen and heard during the demonstrations. These again build on experiences 
                                                          
42 Interview SA/15/3, Activist, Sarajevo 5 May 2015; Interview ZE/15/1, Activist from 
Zenica, 7 May 2015; Interview SA/15/24, NGO activist (FOD), 4 November 2015; Interview 
SA/15/7, Activist from Sarajevo (Jer me se tiče), 21 May 2015.  
43 Tuzla’s Declaration of Citizens and Workers, 7 February 2014, BH Protest Files, 
<https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/07/declaration-of-citizens-and-workers-
in-tuzla-1/>, accessed 1 September 2016.  
44Asim Mujkić on Sarajevo’s Plenum: “I attended a celebration of democracy”, 14 February 
2014, BH Protest Files, <https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/14/asim-mujkic-
on-sarajevos-plenumu-i-attended-a-celebration-of-democracy/>; Citizens’ Demands to the 
Sarajevo Cantonal Assembly Adopted, 14 February 2014, BH Protest Files, 
<https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/14/citizens-demands-to-the-sarajevo-
cantonal-assembly-adopted/>. Both accessed 2 September 2016. 
45 Mostar citizens’ demands, 11 February 2014, BH Protest Files, 
<https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/10/mostar-citizens-demands-mostar-1/>; 
Demands of the Citizens’ Plenum of Mostar, 13 February 2014, BH Protest Files, 
<https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/13/demands-of-the-citizens-plenum-of-
mostar/>. Both accessed 1 September 2016.   
46 Interview SA/15/3.  
47 Zenica Protestors Deliver their Demands, 10 February, BH Protest Files, 
<https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/10/zenica-protestors-deliver-their-
demands-to-cantonal-government-zenica-1/>; Prijedor Citizens’ Demands, 10 February 
2014; Demands of the Citizens of Zavidovići, 11 February 2014, 
<https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/03/05/demands-of-the-citizens-of-
zavidovici-february-11-2014/>; Bihac Citizens’ Demands, 10 February 2014, 
<https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/10/bihac-citizens-demands-bihac-1/>. All 
accessed 2 September 2016.  
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of marginalisation, exclusion and exploitation exemplified by the stories of 
interviewees in Prijedor and Zenica. Even when the wave of protests had ended, and 
when the plenum meetings in several cities had stopped, socioeconomic issues 
remained pivotal for social mobilisation, especially in the trade unions’ mobilisation 
against the new Labour Law, which was being discussed in the Federation in the 
spring and summer of 2015. One of the groups established during the protests, the 
Sindikat Solidarnosti in Tuzla, organised a demonstration on May Day 2015 against 
the proposed Labour Law that threatened the status of employees on permanent 
contracts and reduced guarantees for newly hired personnel on short term contracts. 
The protests’ focus on privatisations and on regaining control of the economic process 
shows the transformative nature of the demonstrators’ demands: they are asking to 
subject to justice logics something that was – throughout the transition – subject only 
to economic and market logics.  
If economic issues started the protests, the transformative character of 
demands made it necessary for activists to address the connections between the 
socioeconomic and political realm. An activist from Zenica says: ‘we started off with 
the economic issues. So people don’t have jobs, they can’t find a job because they’re 
being forced to go into a political party or they’re being forced to say that they’re a 
Bosniak, a Croat or a Serb. And people don’t want that and are trying to fight against 
that, but at the same time they want to live a decent life. Now we have kind of looked 
for where is the real problem. It’s all gone way back to the system. In Plenum we have 
a saying that the foundation, the constitution of our country is rotten’.48 Another 
activist from Sarajevo argued that even if the economic situation got better and 
unemployment decreased, the institutional setting of the country would prevent 
meaningful change.49 Just like experiences of injustice in Prijedor and Zenica went 
beyond socioeconomic issues, and touched upon political matters that had to do with 
participation in the political life of the country, the protests were also directed against 
an institutional system that limits citizens’ agency and furthers privilege and 
corruption.  
                                                          
48 Interview ZE/15/1. 
49 Interview SA/15/7. 
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By calling for resignations of governments at all levels (cantonal, entity and 
state) and for non-partisan governments, the activists were pointing at the 
fundamental weaknesses of the Dayton Constitution and the party system that 
favoured nationalist elites. Among other things, the protests were a civic display of 
opposition to the ethnonationalist character of post-war Bosnia. In the words of a 
Sarajevo activist: ‘the plena demands had nothing to do with ethnicity. It had all to 
do with the position of an ordinary citizen in this system’.50 While the protests were 
seen as important because they overcame the ethnic barrier separating citizens in 
Bosnia, some protesters also felt that the issue of interethnic relations needed to be 
addressed in order for socioeconomic justice to be achieved.51 A NGO activist who 
took part in the protest in personal capacity adds: ‘in this case they are really showing 
that there could be some people, a united front of the people, and I think that the best 
message from the protests was that, you know, be afraid, we are not going to stand 
this anymore’.52 While ethno-nationalist elites (and to a certain extent the 
international community) see Dayton as a guarantee of stability and of their power, 
the 2014 protests show that there is no social consensus around the constitutional set 
up of the country. Rather, citizens seem to believe that the achievement of social 
justice is hampered by the constraints to political participation imposed by the 
Dayton framework (in the words of an interviewee ‘a straightjacket’)53.  
Compounding this critique towards the system was the perception of the 
political elite as enjoying great privileges at a time when the country’s economy, as 
well as the majority of its population, were struggling. Plenum demands in most 
cities, thus, also included the abolition of such privileges and especially of the ‘white 
bread’ (bijeli hlijeb), which refers to the additional salaries and compensations paid to 
politicians, including life-long ones.54 In many cases, activists demanded the 
                                                          
50 Interview SA/15/7. 
51 Interview SA/15/26, NGO ativist, Centar za Nenasilnu Akciju, Sarajevo, 5 November 
2016.  
52 Interview SA/15/19, NGO activist (YHIR), Sarajevo, 16 September 2015.  
53 Interview SA/15/26.  
54 Proclamation of the Plenum of Citizens of the Tuzla Canton, 13 February 2014, BH Protest 
Files, <https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/13/announcement-of-the-plenum-
of-citizens-of-the-tuzla-canton/>; Citizens’ Demands to the Sarajevo Cantonal Assembly 
Adopted, 14 February 2014; See also Kurtović 2015; author’s observations at 2015 May Day 
protest in Tuzla. The Sindikat Solidarnosti symbolically left loafs of white bread (and a 
roasted lamb) in front of the new seat of the cantonal government.  
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reduction of salaries for government functionaries, the end to compensations for 
additional posts held in commissions, or matching the salaries of politicians and high-
level public officials to those of the productive industrial sector.55 They also 
demanded the end of corruption practices, and prosecution for corrupted politicians. 
Drawing on grievances already expressed by interviewees in Chapter 4 and 5, 
activists contrast the privileges of the elites with the lack of public services and 
welfare, as well as with the decline of the industry in the country. While being a 
nation-wide problem, political privileges and corruption are also very much linked 
to the city. Many of the demands emerging from the plenum meetings focused on 
cases of mismanagement, corruption or failed privatisation in their specific town or 
region.56 In the case of Zenica, for instance, protesters’ demands and discussion in the 
local plenum revolved around the state of the steel mill and the pollution it causes. 
Generalising narratives of social justice based on redistribution need to take into 
account the specificity of the local context in order to remain meaningful and 
grounded in the communities’ experiences. The importance of the protests, then, lies 
also in the realisation that a country-wide civic movement concerned with 
redistribution needs to be based on a network of local activists that are in touch with 
the problems of their own communities,57 and rely more on this rather than on the 
international support and formal structures that characterise NGO work.   
The analysis of justice claims emerging from plenum demands and protests 
clearly shows a strong connection to the experiences of injustice and conceptions of 
justice expressed by interviewees in Prijedor and Zenica. They are concerned with 
redistribution and socioeconomic issues in general, and adopt an actively anti-
                                                          
55 See for instance: Citizens’ Demands to the Sarajevo Cantonal Assembly Adopted, 14 
February 2014; Mostar Citizens’ Demands, 11 February 2014; Bihac Citizens’ Demands, 10 
February, Zenica Protesters’ Demands, 10 February.  
56 On privatisations, see this text re-published in the BH Protest Files blog and circulating at 
the time of the protests: ‘The Root Cause of the Rebellion: Top Ten Privatization Plunders in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’, 10 March 2014. 
<https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/03/10/the-root-cause-of-the-rebellion-top-
ten-privatisation-plunders-in-bh/>, accessed 1 September 2016.  
57 See also interview ZE/15/13, Activist from Zenica, 30 July 2015, who says: ‘Yes, so this 
networking is important precisely because of that. No matter how much we talk to each 
other, until you go to the city you don't know what kind of problems they are facing and 
every town is different. Even one town from the other is different. But then Cantons, 
Cantons are even more different. And Travnik and Zenica are so close, you can practically 
walk from one city to the next, but because it's a different Canton you've got a whole new 
set of issues. And again we have to pull together.’ 
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nationalist approach. Just like workers in the two cities, protesters also connected 
socioeconomic justice with political justice. The removal of barriers for citizens to take 
part in managing the collective good and greater political accountability figured 
prominently in the demands. Two significant points can be drawn from this 
discussion. First, in order to make sense of the protests, it is necessary to bear in mind 
that socioeconomic issues in BiH represented the basis for legitimate and important 
justice claims. Second, these claims always pertain to multiple dimensions of 
justice/injustice, reflecting both the variety of lived experiences of injustice, as well 
as the multi-faceted nature of the concept of justice.  
 
 
6.2.3 New forms of political participation: the ‘plenum’ 
At the same time as bringing to light socioeconomic justice as a relevant political 
issue, the 2014 protests allowed for experimentation with new forms of social 
participation. In particular, these differed from international expectations that 
participation is always positive or constructive (Mac Ginty 2012), while the 
commitment to civil society-building is linked to the support of ‘certain kinds of 
market arrangements or individual rights which suggest that what is really being 
advocated or defended is a particular associational life’ (Williams and Young 2012, 
9). Before engaging directly with the international involvement in the protests, here 
we focus on the characteristics of the protest movement and its detachment from 
formal structures and the organised civil sector.  
After the transition had disempowered them economically and politically, the 
protests represented ‘an escalation of the social discontent of workers, who 
established themselves as the political subject of the post-socialist transition, and, 
also, at the very least, as ordinary people who expected social justice (Husarić 2014, 
67). The first element characterising the protests was thus the presence of common 
citizens, exemplified by the groups of workers and unemployed who got the 
mobilisation started in Tuzla. Similarly to the bebolucija, the protest was not organised 
by any specific group or organisation, and was characterised by lack of leadership, 
horizontality, assemblies, distrust of politics and political institutions (Mujkić 2015, 
632), among other things. In contrast with the post-war ethnicisation of politics and 
professionalization of civil society initiatives, the protest gatherings were open 
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spaces, composed of common citizens. Activists explain that in several cases it took 
time for citizens to overcome their fears and take part in the protests and assemblies. 
People were apparently afraid of criticising the constitution, or to go against 
politicians for fear of repercussions. According to an activist from Zenica, pensioners 
formed an important part of the movement ‘one because they are least afraid of what 
they could lose, and two because they remember the time when they were active’.58 
Intellectuals stressed they would participate in, but not lead, the articulation of 
demands (Nedimović 2014; Sicurella 2016). While this drew criticism on the part of 
some observers for curbing the potential of the protest movement (Weber and 
Bassuener 2014), it can be argued that the horizontality and absence of formal 
structures of the movement was integral to its approach based on direct democracy 
exercised through the ‘plenum’.  
‘Plenum’ meetings are defined as ‘public gatherings, open to any citizen, 
through which collective decisions and demands can be made and action taken, 
beyond guarantees of leadership. They are open, direct, and transparent democracy 
in practice’ (Arsenijević 2014, 47-48). Only members of political parties were, in most 
cases, banned from participating in plenum meetings.59 Just like the protests, 
plenums (or plena, plural of plenum) do not have leaders, nor spokespersons. Each 
member has one vote, and assemblies are conducted by appointed moderators who 
do not have the right to represent the plenum outside of the assembly.60 Usually, the 
first meeting was called and organised by a group of activists that would dissolve 
itself at the first general meeting.61 According to Arsenijević (2014, 48), this setting ‘is 
crucial to fight corrupt privatization and the fear it instils when it comes to making 
decisions about the commons. The plenum model of work creates a different public 
language by enabling people, who, as a result of war, have withdrawn from public 
life and the so-called “transition to democracy,” to have a say about the matters that 
                                                          
58 Interview ZE/15/13. 
59 See for instance Announcement: First Meeting of the Brcko District Citizens’ Plenum, 11 
February 2014; Sarajevans Invited to First Meeting of Citizens’ Plenum, 11 February 2014, 
BH Protest Files <https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/11/sarajevans-invited/>. 
For an exception, see Annoucement of the Citizens’ Plenum in Tuzla, 12 February 2014, BH 
Protest Files, <https://bhprotestfiles.wordpress.com/2014/02/12/announcement-of-the-
citizens-plenum-in-tuzla/>, accessed 2 September 2016.  
60 Announcement of the citizens’ Plenum in Tuzla, 12 February 2014. 
61 2nd Declaration of Sarajevo Citizens’ Plenum, 10 February 2014. 
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concern them in everyday life’. Acting through the plenum, protesters in different 
parts of Bosnia sought to radically transform the conditions of political participation 
in the country, opening the way for deeper democratisation than what was sought 
through the peace- and state-building process. The difficulty of acting in a politically 
effective way through the plenum became evident as time passed, and some activists 
became critical of this approach: ‘… plena people could have gathered international 
community representatives but did not. They did not because they got stuck in the 
process. The same thing in what we call the Occupy Wall Street syndrome: they are 
so stuck in the process to ensure that nobody, no person involved in the plena is 
actually a representative of the plena, so nobody has the authority to represent the 
plena when discussing the issues with any other interlocutor, and that is bad.’62 
Despite the best efforts of the activists, the open nature of the plenum also made 
altercations between participants possible: an activist has recalled been attacked for 
talking about feminism, by someone claiming this had nothing to do with the 
protests.63  
Importantly, grassroots engagement during the 2014 made visible the 
separation between the formal NGO sector and the spirit of the protests. While some 
activists were themselves members of NGOs, many soon came ‘to the conclusion that 
the organisations of the civil society cannot at that time produce a shift, so much 
unrest among people, to encourage start expressing, en masse, their social 
dissatisfaction’.64 Informal groups and horizontal structures were considered best 
suited to include common people and bring them to the streets. The perception of the 
civil sector among the population is, in fact, not very good, as many people have the 
impression that ‘organisations work on the basis of the policies of the donors without 
regard for how useful they are, how effective they are at the local level’.65 Another 
activist from Sarajevo went further in arguing that ‘Sarajevo is saturated with NGO 
activities, but those activities only feed the NGOs themselves.’66 Moreover, NGOs 
focus their activities on specific topics, while ‘the Plenum does not have a specific 
aim. It does have an aim, but it is so broad, it is not like an NGO which deals with a 
                                                          
62 Interview SA/15/7. 
63 Interview SA/15/17, Fondacija Cure, Sarajevo, 15 September 2015.  
64 Interview PR/15/18. 
65 Interview PR/15/18. 
66 Interview SA/15/7. 
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specific problem. (…) we want social justice. No country in the world has social 
justice. It's an aim that is out there. And there are so many elements to social justice 
that basically just it's a space that…let's just try and get it as much as possible’.67  NGO 
activities are also influenced by the policies of their international donors who ‘do not 
touch anything that is politically radioactive’.68 International officials are aware of 
this perception, and partly share the view that NGOs have become too detached from 
the Bosnian society.69 This constituted one of the reasons why they tried to reach out 
to some of the activists (with controversial results, see Section 6.3). In the second 
phase of activism without mass protests, which followed the February events, 
surviving plenums and other informal groups would still refuse to receive funding 
subject to conditionality, and opt for alternative arrangements instead. Overall, the 
forms of social mobilisation used by the protests represented a rupture with formal 




6.3 Between dissolution and institutionalisation? International engagement with 
the protest movement  
Section 6.3 situates the development of socioeconomic justice claims within the 
framework of the international intervention. That the February events were of 
interest to the international community became evident very soon, as shown by the 
statements by the OHR and other international officials mentioned earlier. Beyond 
that, some international actors, and the EU in particular, took the protests as the 
starting point for a renewed process of socioeconomic reform in the country. The 
international community understood that socioeconomic problems linked to 
privatisations and asset-stripping (as well as general dissatisfaction) were the basis 
for the protests,70 and that rule of law reforms prior to privatisation might have been 
instrumental for avoiding failed privatisations.71 However, the engagement of 
international actors with the protest movement shows that they largely failed to 
                                                          
67Interview ZE/15/13. 
68 Interview SA/15/7. 
69 Interview SA/15/1, International official, 30 April 2015. 
70 SA/15/5, International official, 14 May 2015. 
71 SA/15/1, International official, 30 April 2015. 
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understand these socioeconomic demands as justice claims, and that they could not 
successfully engage with the broad-based civic movement that emerged during the 
protests. Their reaction was, rather, characterised by the promotion of a 
socioeconomic reform agenda aimed at completing Bosnia’s transition towards a 
market economy, and by attempts to inscribe the protest movement within 
recognisable forms of agency, which ultimately contributed to its partial dissolution. 
While several international organisations participated in efforts to establish a 
dialogue with the protesters and the citizens, this section focuses on those led by the 
EU, as they were the most organised and sustained through time.72 It then presents 
the alternative approach taken by the Austrian Initiative. 
 
 
6.3.1 The EU-led Compact for Growth and Jobs 
The EU engagement with the protest movement is indicative of the broader tendency, 
displayed by international actors, to support discourses on economic reforms that 
allegedly addressed the protestors’ concerns, but were actually in line with the 
international economic agenda for BiH. Socioeconomic justice claims were thus 
reformulated as problems to be tackled through internationally-sponsored economic 
reforms, rather than as justice issues, thus reproducing the ‘invisibility’ of 
socioeconomic problems in transitional justice efforts (Miller 2008). EU-led efforts in 
this direction began in the aftermath of the protests and the floods that devastated 
the country in May 2014, when the European Union started perceiving socioeconomic 
problems as closer to the concerns of ordinary Bosnian citizens, compared to the 
institutional issues upon which Brussels had previously focused its efforts (EU 2014, 
2). It was within this spirit that the EU Delegation in BiH, in close cooperation with 
other international organisations and financial institutions, organised a two-day 
event in Sarajevo called ‘Forum for Prosperity and Jobs’, with the aim of developing 
                                                          
72 The OSCE for instance also attempted to set up meetings between plenum activists and 
government representatives. One official reports that after a while activists seemed not to be 
really interested in this type of dialogue, and after a few months the plenum groups 
dissolved themselves (Interview SA/15/9, International official, 27th May). The latter detail 
is however not entirely correct, as some plenum groups active in the protests are still 
currently operating (although not in Sarajevo).  
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a set of key priorities for socioeconomic reform in BiH.73 The process of organising 
the Forum and drafting the Compact shows that socioeconomic justice issues were 
marginalised in favour of economic reforms aimed at completing Bosnia’s transition 
towards a market economy, while also channelling political participation towards 
structured events and discussions around set agendas.  
The Compact for Growth and Jobs was presented in July 2014. Championed 
by the EU Delegation, which wanted to maintain a lead role in its promotion,74 the 
Compact was actually elaborated in conjunction with – and with the financial support 
of – the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) present in Bosnia.75 There was, 
according to international officials, a convergence of interests between the EU and 
the IFIs, especially regarding achieving the macroeconomic stability necessary for 
Bosnia’s integration in the single market.76 The Compact highlighted six areas where 
measures should be taken: taxes on work, to be lowered; barriers to jobs, to be addressed 
through the flexibilisation of the labour market; business climate; enterprise, focusing 
on the completion of the privatisation process; corruption; and social protection, to be 
reconfigured towards a needs-based system rather than the current status-based 
arrangement.77 While presented as a response to the socioeconomic grievances 
expressed by the protest movement, as well as to the floods that devastated the 
country in May 2014, the measures proposed in the Compact for Growth actually 
built on previous international commitments and agendas,78 with the broader aim to 
further Bosnia’s transition towards free market capitalism. The Compact represented, 
indeed, a shift in the international – and especially European – discourse towards 
Bosnia, from a phase of ‘political’ to one of ‘economic restructuring’ (Majstorović and 
Vučkovac 2016), and formed the basis for the development of the current Reform 
Agenda.79  
                                                          
73 EU Delegation to BiH, Forum for Prosperity and Jobs starts in Sarajevo, 26 May 2014, 
<http://europa.ba/?p=18008>, accessed 25/05/2015.,  
74 Interview SA/15/8, international official, 21 May 2015; Interview SA/15/9, international 
official, 27 May 2015.   
75 Interview SA/15/2, international official, 5 May 2015; EU Delegation to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Compact for Growth and Jobs. 
76 Interview SA/15/5. 
77 EU Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Compact for Growth and Jobs. 
78 Interviews SA/15/1 and SA/15/2. 
79 See the website of the Reform Agenda 2015-2018, <http://reformskaagenda.ba/>, last 
accessed 24 February 2017.  
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The protesters’ requests to determine accountability for the mismanagement 
of public resources, including irregular privatisations, were side-lined, and justice 
issues were separated from economic ones. The EU only addressed these, in its 2014 
Progress Report for Bosnia, through ‘the inclusion of additional rule of law matters, 
in particular the fight against corruption’ within the Structured Dialogue on Justice 
(EU 2014, 1). Moreover, the issue of employment for young people, which had 
represented one of the key mobilisation factors in the protests, was tied in the 
international discourse to the necessity of cutting the privileges of public sector 
‘insiders’ with secure jobs, and of the ‘cadre of ghost workers who are just clinging 
on to the past’, for which ‘no contributions are made’ but who ‘still hope to receive 
social benefits’,80 such as former factory workers whose concerns where at the heart 
of the protests. Economic issues were, in other words, treated as problems that could 
only be addressed by dispensing completely with socialist legacies, in line with 
international attitudes that had marginalised the socialist experience in shaping 
Bosnia’s transition. The February protests, thus, while putting socioeconomic issues 
at the centre of public debate, did not manage to change the international economic 
agenda. Rather, they offered a chance to push for its realisation. 
From the perspective of the activists, the Compact did not represent a solution 
to the deep-rooted socioeconomic injustice they were protesting against, and could 
jeopardise the rights and working conditions of Bosnian people to the advantage of 
big international companies.81 The first step of the new reform agenda was, in fact, 
passing Labour Laws that introduce flexibilisation in the labour market and attempt 
to curb the influence of trade unions in the Federation and Republika Srpska.82 It 
would have been easy to anticipate that the process of drafting and approving the 
Labour Laws was certainly going to be very controversial, and could potentially 
jeopardise the reform agenda as a whole. While opinions on the Labour Law among 
the activists vary, with some accepting that unemployed people might welcome 
                                                          
80 EU Delegation to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Compact for Growth and Jobs. 
81 Interview SA/15/3; interview ZE/15/4, Activist from Zenica, 12 June 2015.  
82 Labour laws fall within entity (and not state) competencies in BiH. See the following pages 
<http://www.fbihvlada.gov.ba/bosanski/zakoni/2016/zakoni/5h.html>, and 
<http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/102220/123487/F-
1030013146/BIH-2015-L-102220.pdf>, both accessed 1 September 2016.  
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flexibilisation if that entails greater chances of accessing the labour market,83 another 
more important criticism of the Law and of the Compact is that the proposals are not 
sufficiently transformative. Even if the reforms managed to restart growth and 
reduce unemployment, this would leave the system intact, and would not make 
politicians more accountable to the citizens.84 It would thus not change the fact that 
one’s access to the labour market (as well as other public services) often depends on 
connections (veze) to politically important figures (Brković 2015). In the words of an 
activist from Zenica: ‘politicians own the labour market, that’s perhaps their biggest 
source of power’.85 Another activist, from Sarajevo, sums up the limitations of the 
Compact by saying that ‘it’s basically giving an aspirin to a cancer patient’.86 The lack 
of transformative proposals in the Compact and related reform agenda is thus even 
more important in order to understand how calls for socioeconomic justice advanced 
by the protesters were displaced and effectively muted by the international 
intervention. 
The EU-led intervention also had the effect of legitimising certain forms of 
participation over others, and of establishing specific fora within which debates on 
socioeconomic problems could be conducted around set agendas. The Forum for 
Prosperity and Jobs represents one such instance. International officials were aware 
that the grassroots character of the protest movement conferred it a greater degree of 
legitimacy in the eyes of Bosnian citizens compared to the established civil sector. 
However, they were perceived as lacking the capabilities and skills that NGOs had 
developed through years of international training and project work.87 One of the 
distinctive characteristics of the movement – open participation to all citizens and 
lack of formal structures – was seen as somewhat confusing and problematic by 
international organisations and some external observers (Weber and Bassuener 2014, 
Weber 2015). Due to this, and to the explicit refusal of protesters to appoint leaders, 
international organisations turned towards those they could ‘recognise’ and speak to, 
                                                          
83 Interview ZE/15/1.  
84 Interview SA/15/7.  
85 Interview ZE/15/1.  
86 Interview SA/15/7. 
87 Interview SA/15/1. 
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such as individuals with good knowledge of English.88 For instance, while the 
meetings of the Forum for Prosperity and Jobs, where the Compact was drafted, were 
supposed to be a platform for all the citizens of this country’,89 interviewees raised 
doubts as to whether activists from the Plenum were actually present, and whether 
those who were there represented the spirit of the protests or rather ‘a part of the civil 
sector that was chosen’ by the international community.90 The themes to be addressed 
at the Forum were determined in advance by the EU Delegation, which organised the 
work in five separate workshops.91  After the publication of the Compact, the EU took 
a similar approach when organising the series of ‘Conversations with the citizens’ 
(Razgovori s građanima) in the spring and summer of 2015, intended to ‘promote public 
debate on socio-economic reforms’ and discuss ‘with local people (…) a common 
agenda of economic opportunity for all’.92 Again, one activist argued that the actual 
intent behind the Conversations was to explain the Compact to the citizens, and 
convincing them of its usefulness, rather than engaging in a real discussion about the 
reforms to be undertaken in order to stimulate growth and employment.93 If one 
response to the critique of liberal peacebuilding as a top-down endeavour had been 
the promotion of ‘local ownership’ (Donais 2009), the international engagement on 
the Compact for Growth bears a greater resemblance to techniques of government 
aimed at establishing discursive boundaries and meanings, influencing individual 
preferences and behaviour (Lazzarato 2009). The agency of protesters with respect to 
discussing socioeconomic justice issues with the international community was, thus, 
effectively limited by the scope of the international agenda, and the lack of 
                                                          
88 Interview SA/14/1, Activist from Sarajevo, 17 June 2014; interview SA/15/10, Activist 
from Sarajevo, 1 June 2016.  
89 EU Delegation to BiH, Opening remarks by the Ambassador Sorensen at the Forum for 
Prosperity and Jobs in Bosnia and Herzegovina<http://europa.ba/?post_type=post&p=18002>, 
accessed 25 May 2015. 
90 Interview SA/15/3; see also the interview with the Dutch Ambassador to BiH Jurriaan 
Kraak conducted by Nidžara Ahmetašević, 
<http://bosniaherzegovina.nlembassy.org/news/2014/august/interview-with-
ambassador-kraak.html> , accessed 29 August 2015.  
91 EU Delegation to BiH, Conclusions of the Forum for Prosperity and Jobs, 29 May 2014, 
available at <http://europa.ba/?p=17978>, accessed 14 August 2016. See also interview 
Svjetlana 
92 EU Delegation to BiH, New initiative of the EUSR Office in BiH helps stakeholders explore 
practical reforms to create jobs, <http://europa.ba/?p=16883>,  accessed 25 May 2015 
93 Author’s observation at the Conversation with the Citizens in Istočno Sarajevo, 28 May 
2015; Interview SA/15/10.  
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6.3.2 An alternative model for civil society building? The Austrian Initiative 
Compared to the EU-led efforts surrounding the Compact for Growth, the so-called 
Austrian Initiative might represent a different model for international engagement 
with activist groups. The origins of this project can be traced back to 2014, when the 
staff of the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute of Human Rights in Vienna, a research 
institute, entered in talks with Austrian diplomats and EU representatives around the 
need to support civic activism in Bosnia and keep the momentum of the protests and 
Plenum going. In September 2014, the Institute, together with the Erste Foundation 
and the EU Delegation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, organised a conference in Vienna 
with the aim of providing a ‘platform for exchange to the citizens in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in order to formulate demands for a better future based on democracy, 
the rule of law and human rights’ (Ludwig Boltzmann Institute 2014, 1). Participants 
were selected through an application process, and included many activists who had 
taken part in protests and plenum meetings, coming from all over Bosnia.  
The conference represented a controversial start for the initiative. Some 
activists were very critical of international interference with the protest movement,94 
while others criticised the selection process for bringing to Vienna people who were 
not committed to the success of the event.95As already pointed out, distrust towards 
international organisations was common among activists and citizens, as most 
donors are perceived as interested in furthering their own agendas. The discussion at 
the conference, moreover, was conducted in working groups around themes that 
seem to leave out some of the most radical socioeconomic justice demands raised 
during the protests.96 The conference conclusions do mention the difficult situation 
and socioeconomic rights, but display a shift, or an attempt to mediate between the 
protesters’ demands and the international community’s discourse. For instance, in 
calling for the ‘respect of human rights, workers’ rights, socio-economic rights’, the 
                                                          
94 Interview SA/15/10.  
95 Interviews SA/15/7 and ZE/15/1.  
96 Interivew SA/15/10.  
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final recommendations go beyond the liberal focus on civil and political rights, and 
this is an indication of an increased acceptance of socioeconomic issues within the 
public debate. On the other hand, the conclusions link justice issues to the ‘reform of 
the judiciary and law enforcement agencies’ and the fights against organised crime’ 
(Ludwig Boltzmann Institute 2014, 2), leaving out demands related to the failed 
privatisation processes and economic crimes that had sparked the protests in the first 
place. Following the event in Vienna, the EU Delegation left the initiative, and 
decided to focus on supporting the Compact for Growth and Jobs. 
 
Table 6.3. Austrian Initiative participants 
Activist groups  City and entity 
Banjalučki Socijalni Centar, BASOC (Banja Luka 
Social Centre) 
Banja Luka, Republika Srpska 
Mreža 5f7 (Network 5f7) Bosnia-wide network  
Neformalna Grupa Građana ‘Srebrenik je naš’ 
(Informal citizen group ‘Srebrenik is ours) 
Srebrenik, Federation of BiH 
Neformalna Grupa Za Socijalnu Pravdu (Informal 
Group for Social Justice) 
Prijedor, Republika Srpska 
Plenum Zenica  Zenica, Federation of BiH 
Plenum Bosanska Krupa  Bosanska Krupa, Federation of BiH 
Pokret Građana Gračanice (Civic movement 
Gračanica) 
Gračanica, Federation of BiH 
Sindikat Solidarnosti (Workers’ union Solidarity) Tuzla, Federation of BiH 
 
The limitations of the Vienna conference notwithstanding, the Austrian 
Initiative managed to continue, and effectively shifted its approach to meet the 
demands of local activists. While some groups of activist in the Network 5f7 
continued to oppose external funding, others recognised that while it was ‘hard to 
get away from thinking about the motives of the Austrians’, the initiative could be ‘a 
good chance to start creating (…) a different relation with donors’.97 Eight groups 
continued to take part in the activities of the initiative ‘Supporting informal citizens’ 
groups and grass-roots initiatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2015’ (Ludwig 
Boltzmann Institute 2016; see Table 1). The new approach of the Austrian Initiative 
                                                          
97 Interview PR/15/18.  
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differentiates itself from the one adopted by the EU, and from conventional donor 
policies, on the basis of three fundamental elements. It can be argued that the 
Initiative’s openness towards informal groups, the abandoning of formal 
requirements and funding conditionality, and personal relationship of trust 
established between the organisers and Bosnian activists contributed to the survival 
of grassroots groups that had been very active during the February 2014 protests, and 
that do not conform to the model of NGO-based civil society promoted by the 
international intervention and donor policies.  
Firstly, the Austrian Initiative remained opened to informal, non-registered 
groups of citizens emerged during the February protests. While international officials 
pointed at the gap in skills and professionalization between NGOs and activist 
groups, and argued that formal structures and leadership were necessary to avoid 
the failure of the movement,98 the Austrian Initiative made the decision to focus their 
efforts on informal groups and target their funding towards them.99 This flexible 
approach is praised by some of the activists,100 who remark the difference between 
the project work of NGOs, linked to having a specific scope and focus, and civic 
activism broadly aimed at achieving social justice.101 This decision was therefore 
more suited to the protesters’ own willingness to maintain the Plenum and protest 
groups as informal, and more connected to the local citizenship compared to 
professional organisations of the civil society.102 
Secondly, the Austrians demonstrated flexibility in distributing funding with 
the groups without a specific conditionality attached. According to one of the 
organisers of the Initiative, Nina Radović, groups could ask for financial assistance 
based on what they felt was most important for their communities, rather than apply 
                                                          
98 Interview SA/15/1; Interview SA/15/24. See also Weber and Bassuener (2014, 5), 
characterising the protest movement as ‘without political direction, leadership and 
guidance’. 
99 Interview VI/15/1, Nina Radović, Coordinator of the Austrian Initiative, 9 November 
2015 (Skype); Interview PR/15/18; Interview ZE/15/13.  
100 Interview PR/15/18; Interview ZE/15/13; Interview PR/16/1, Activist from Prijedor, 24 
April 2016; Interview ZE/16/1, Activist from Zenica, 30 April 2016. 
101 Interview ZE/15/13.  
102 However, some of these organisations later decided to register formally. Last autumn, the 
Plenum Zenica justified this decision by saying that they wanted to make the work of the 
Plenum more collegiate rather than dependent on a single person, and improve the 
administration of their finances.  
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through calls that impose conditions and restrictions on the use of funds, and require 
the achievement of measurable targets – all of which would be impossible for 
informal activist groups.103 The only condition posed by the Initiative was that the 
activities had to promote the strengthening of civil society in BiH. According to an 
activist from Zenica, this approach is best suited to the needs of groups like the 
Plenum: ‘donors have made a mistake, the mistake of deciding what society needs. 
For me it is the other way around (…). The Austrians just said: we want to help you, 
tell us how…but the dialogue started off with us’.104 The activist also mentions an 
instance where her willingness to apply for international funding was curbed by the 
stated requirement that they should have cooperated with the local authorities that 
their group intends to oppose.  
The Austrian Initiative, on the other hand, represents a significant change 
from the conventional modes of operation of civil society funding in BiH, and one 
that poses fewer limitations to the way in which funds are used. Donor policies have 
represented a problem for local groups operating in sensitive contexts, where 
organisations have avoided funding potentially controversial initiatives.105 Some of 
the groups part of the Austrian Initiative have indeed used the allocated funds in 
ways that further social activism and radical thinking on socioeconomic issues that 
would have hardly received consideration from other international donors. The 
Workers’ Union Sindikat Solidarnosti, for instance, in 2015 organised protests (such 
as the demonstration for Labour Day on May 1st) that were very critical of the new 
Labour Law, which is part of the reform agenda supported by the EU and IFIs.106 The 
social centre in Banja Luka, BASOC, situated in a partially restored Bosnian house 
that used to host the Muslim charity Merhamet, has organised talks on solidarity with 
refugees, a ‘by-weekly [sic] feminist coffee’, and ‘a Marx reading group that evolved 
into a critical reading group with occasional movie screenings’, among other 
activities (Ludwig Boltzmann Institute 2016, 23-24). A non-conditional approach to 
funding allows groups to remain flexible and respond to events developing in their 
community, rather than having to stick to activities that were planned and approved 
                                                          
103 Interview VI/15/1.  
104 Interview ZE/15/13.  
105 Interview PR/15/18.  
106 Author field observations, Tuzla, May 1st 2015; see also Kurtović 2015.  
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months in advance, and allows for a broader range of civic, social and cultural 
initiatives that aim at mobilising citizens socially and intellectually.  
Lastly, the Austrian Initiative worked on the basis of informality and 
reciprocal trust rather than a formalised relationship. After securing funds from the 
Erste Foundation, the Ludwig Boltzmann Institute acted as an intermediary with the 
Bosnian groups that are not registered and thus cannot receive direct financial 
support.107 The funds are then allocated to the activists through a person of reference 
that receives the amount and is responsible for managing accounts and expenses.108 
According to the organisers, the groups remain free to ‘do whatever they want’, as 
long as they keep the Austrians updated through written reports and photographs.109 
As pointed out by several interviewees, such trust was absent at the time of the 
Vienna Conference in September 2014.110 Whereas the presence of other international 
organizations at the Vienna meeting, such as the EU Delegation to BiH, might have 
contributed to the diffidence expressed by some activists,111 follow-up meetings 
conducted in Bosnia with a reduced number of participants were more successful. 
The Ludwig Boltzmann Institute recognised that the disengagement of the EU 
Delegation was important for the establishment of a positive collaboration between 
them and the grassroots activist groups.112 This element of informality and the 
freedom left to local groups is crucial in order to understand the difference between 
conventional donor policies and the Austrian Initiative. The stated intent of such an 
approach is to maximize local input while minimizing external control over the 
activities and choices of the groups. The report on the first implementation phase 
makes the following point: ‘Initiative refers to the fact that Austrian partners were 
among the first to be willing to provide support to informal civic movements. 
Initiative does in no way mean that activism was initiated by the conference or follow-
up activities and that it did not exist before’ (Ludwig Boltzmann Institute 2016, 3).  
The analysis of the Austrian Initiative also reveals some of its potential 
limitations. Just like participants in the protests were divided over the potential role 
                                                          
107 Interview VI/15/1.  
108 Interview ZE/15/13.  
109 Interview VI/15/1. See also Ludwig Boltzmann Institute 2016.  
110 Interview SA/15/10; interview VI/15/1; interview ZE/15/13. 
111 Interview SA/15/10; interview VI/15/1.  
112 Interview VI/15/1. 
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of the international community, activists split on the issue of whether an externally-
driven process could genuinely support the development of grassroots activism in 
Bosnia.113 While the Initiative supported the continuation of civic activism in some 
cities, groups in other cities, such as the Plenum in Sarajevo, were no longer active by 
2015. The impact of the project beyond the cities and towns directly involved in it 
could therefore be questioned. However, interviewees do recognise that the first 
conference in Vienna, while displaying divisions among groups, allowed activists 
from different parts of the country to meet for the first time. The opportunity to forge 
networks, especially across entities, is one of the positive outcomes of the protest 
movement started in February 2014. Such networks have already played a role in 
giving national prominence to local causes and potentially represent a future basis of 
mobilisation.114  
Another critical point might be related to the fact that the Austrian Initiative 
remains, at least for now, a small scale project. Most of the groups received small 
amounts that were used in order to rent an office, buy office supplies, or cover 
printing and travel expenses.115 One activist from Sarajevo who was not involved in 
the project expressed disillusionment at the Initiative because of the very basic 
character of the funded activities.116 The organizers from Vienna and some of the 
activists involved point out the importance for groups to have a space to meet, 
something that is often taken for granted in Sarajevo where more options are 
available. The Plenum Zenica, for instance, until September 2015 held its meetings in 
the offices of the former mining company, in the same building that hosts the cantonal 
government. They could access a meeting room without printers and office supplies, 
only after 5pm, and had to sign in with the security guard at the entrance.117 Renting 
an office space in the centre of the city, which is equipped, accessible and open to the 
                                                          
113 Interviews SA/15/7 and SA/15/10.  
114 Interview ZE/15/13. In the summer of 2015, plans to build a hydroelectric power plant 
on the Una river in Northern Bosnia were blocked, also thanks to country-wide support 
mobilized by activists from Bihać. In another relevant instance, a detergent factory from 
Tuzla managed to restart production and overcome bureaucratic and political obstacles 
partly due to popular support gathered for their cause. 
115With the exception of BASOC, which received a higher amount to help cover renovation 
costs for the traditional Bosnian house that now hosts the center.  
116 Interview with SA/15/7.   
117 Author’s field observations, Zenica, June-July 2015.  
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public, represented an important step ahead.118 On the one hand, the Austrian 
Initiative enabled the survival of civic activism in some of the most peripheral 
Bosnian cities, especially post-industrial urban centres now in decline. On the other 
hand, some of its features, such as its informality and trust-based nature, might 
prompt questions about the applicability of this model on a larger scale. Overall, 
however, the Austrian Initiative well illustrates the differences between the 
traditional model of international intervention in the civil society sector and a 
different, grassroots-based approach that seems to offer greater chances to informal 




Beyond proving the relevance of socioeconomic issues for understanding justice and 
injustice in post-conflict settings, this chapter has also shown that socioeconomic 
justice can represent the basis for social mobilisation. As socioeconomic concerns still 
struggle to find their place within the transitional justice framework (Duthie 2010; 
Sharp 2014), the findings presented here contribute to demonstrating their relevance. 
First, it becomes apparent that experiences of socioeconomic injustice (Chapter 4), as 
well as alternative conceptions of justice where social and economic components take 
central place (Chapter 5), effectively represent the basis and inform the grievances 
expressed during the 2014 Bosnian protests. The protesters’ focus on work, 
privatisations, and political participation mirrors the themes already highlighted 
elsewhere in this thesis. Second, while the protests were long in the making, they 
were the product of post-industrial, declining Bosnian towns like Zenica and 
Prijedor. They also stemmed from a growing engagement, on the part of activists 
from the progressive left, with social justice issues and with alternative forms of 
political participation, such as direct democracy, which build upon and overcome the 
legacy of socialism (Štiks 2015).  
 The chapter also contributes to our understanding of the relationship between 
socioeconomic justice and transitional justice as it is often implemented in post-
conflict contexts. While societies definitely demand transitional justice in this 
                                                          
118 Author’s field observations, Zenica, November 2015.  
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traditional sense, the Bosnian case shows that this is not sufficient, and that focusing 
efforts on one type of justice while neglecting all others can be damaging, as it 
discourages and silences alternative discourses on justice issues. Moreover, the 
empirical material presented in the chapter shows that the grassroots level of social 
mobilisation represents a very good vantage point from which to observe how 
conceptions of justice are put forward, negotiated and contested between local actors 
and international ones. The international intervention seems, in this case, to be unable 
to process socioeconomic justice claims as justice issues. While offering 
socioeconomic remedies to address the protesters’ demands, these do not include and 
are not framed around the concept of justice. At the same time, international actors 
struggled to recognise workers and common citizens as the legitimate bearers of such 
claims, and looked for recognisable and organised interlocutors. The chapter thus 
contributes to showing the potential limitations of the international intervention in 
dealing with socioeconomic justice/injustice, especially from the perspective of local 
actors involved in the protests. 
  To conclude, the chapter shows that looking beyond the institutional aspect 
of post-war transformations is necessary in order to see how justice processes are 
situated in the lived experiences of affected societies, such as socioeconomic injustice 
affecting post-industrial areas (and Bosnia as a post-industrial country). In the 
specific case of BiH, this led to the expression of political discontent through protests 
in 2014. The protests were informed by the specific political conditions of Bosnia’s 
post-war and post-socialist transition, but also resemble the struggles of other 
contemporary movements against neoliberalism, characterised by horizontal 
participation and social justice claims (Castells 2015). What is specific about Bosnia 
(and perhaps the former Yugoslav region) is that while social movements can draw 
from the socialist experience, nationalist public discourse has often discredited leftist 
ideas and marginalised the socialist past, thus making it harder for activists to 
mobilise around certain themes and ideals.119 Looking beyond 2014, one of the 
legacies of the protests has certainly been the creation of a civic basis for future action 
around social justice issues that may now be ‘dormant’, but which is ready to be 
mobilised in the future. In this respect, the role of powerful international actors in 
                                                          
119 See interview SA/15/3. 
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empowering or de-legitimising local communities as bearers of justice claims is 
bound to be controversial.120 
                                                          
120 Earlier versions of a few paragraphs from Chapter 6 were published in my article 
‘Transitional Justice and Its Discontents: Socioeconomic Justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina 








Key findings  
This thesis has been driven by the questions of what is the role of socioeconomic 
justice and injustice in war and transition, and how do societies deal with 
socioeconomic injustice. The answer proposed, based on the evidence emerging from 
the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, indicates that socioeconomic injustice does play 
an important role for understanding how societies experience war. In Prijedor and 
Zenica, these experiences of socioeconomic injustice defy conventional transitional 
justice approaches, as they were not necessarily linked to interethnic violence and 
often crossed the temporal boundary between the war and the post-war transition. 
Their perception was also shaped by memories of the socialist past, which played an 
important role in the development of specific conceptions of justice and justice claims 
based on redistribution. Within this context, the international intervention 
acknowledged experiences of injustice selectively (marginalising those grounded in 
the political economy of the war), and distorted the development of justice claims in 
Prijedor and Zenica. As the country embarked on an internationally-led process of 
political and economic reform, post-war socioeconomic issues were understood by 
the international community in a limited way, either as war-related payments to 
victims of physical violence, or as something to be addressed within the context of 
economic restructuring inspired by neoliberal (rather than justice-related) principles. 
The effects of such marginalisation of socioeconomic justice are visible not only in the 
development of justice claims that challenge – to different extents depending on local 
circumstances – the character and direction of the transition process, but also in the 
forms of social mobilisation that have increasingly assumed socioeconomic, civic and 
transformative traits as in the case of the 2014 protests.  
Justice processes in post-conflict societies are complex endeavours, and often 
count on the support of international organisations that set up and/or fund 
transitional justice mechanisms. The most prominent of these mechanisms in the 
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former Yugoslavia was the ICTY, whose work has been supported by domestic war 
crimes prosecutions. These mechanisms, which are not under scrutiny in this thesis, 
reflect the international community’s concern for interethnic violence, genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. This project has instead analysed the 
socioeconomic aspect of transitional justice policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
found that their implementation did not reflect a concern with socioeconomic 
violence, nor an understanding of socioeconomic justice as redistribution. Rather, 
restitution or compensation was seen as a means to redress the most serious crimes 
or physical violence suffered during the war. The restitution of property to refugees 
to facilitate their return home, and in particular minority return1, could have had 
transformative effects on the post-Dayton ethnically divided communities, but it was 
not supported by adequate employment policies, social and material infrastructure. 
It is worth noting that returnees who had been dismissed as a result of ethnic 
discrimination were not granted the right to be reinstated at work by the new Labour 
Laws.2 In turn, reparations in Bosnia are not paid as part of a collective scheme, but 
assessed on the basis of one’s status as a civilian or veteran victim of the war. Only 
civilian victims with quite high levels of war-related disability can access the 
payments. It has also been noted that these schemes represent a hybrid between 
reparations and social security payments (Popić and Panjeta 2010; Hronešová 2016), 
and that international financial institutions tend to regard them as part of the latter 
category.  
This is illustrative of a broader tendency, emerging from the analysis of 
internationally-sponsored economic reforms: what interviewees regard as 
socioeconomic justice issues is often understood by international actors as problems 
to be tackled through market reforms and liberalisation. Privatisation processes, the 
approval of labour laws in the RS and FBiH, the new healthcare and pension system, 
as well as macroeconomic policy, not only reconfigured the Bosnian economy and 
society, often with dysfunctional outcomes. They also played an important role in 
pushing socioeconomic justice concerns to the side, subordinating them to the 
                                                          
1 ‘Minority return’ refers to the return of refugees who, by going back to their homes of 
origin, would be a minority group in the new post-war institutional arrangement (for 
instance, Bosniaks and Croats in the RS, Serbs in the FBiH).  
2 Labour Law of Republika Srpska, Official Gazette of Republika Srpska 38/00. 
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priorities of the economic and political transition. Studying the development of 
justice claims in post-conflict societies, thus, requires engaging closely with the role 
played by international organisations in the transition process beyond transitional 
justice. While looking at transitional justice interventions is useful to highlight the 
limitations of these programmes, the thesis has shown how these operate within the 
constraints of economic reform.  
Understood here as a set of connected practices joining transitional justice and 
political economy, the role of the international intervention in shaping the 
development of justice claims becomes apparent when considering the experiences 
of local communities. Answering to the question of what place does socioeconomic 
injustice have in war and transition, and also to the transitional justice literature’s 
concern on the extent of its relevance for processes of peacebuilding and dealing with 
the past, Chapter 4 analysed experiences of socioeconomic injustice in the cities of 
Prijedor and Zenica. Analysing wartime experiences through the lens of 
redistribution brings to light the many instances in which interviewees suffered from 
forms of violence and injustice that were socioeconomic in nature. These range from 
ethnically-motivated dismissals in Prijedor, which were often the first experience 
people had of the war, to war-related dismissals in Zenica, to extreme deprivation 
and social marginalisation in both cities.  
Three key findings emerge from the analysis of these experiences, and the 
way in which they protracted themselves in the transition period. First, even when 
adopting the vantage point of socioeconomic justice, it is clear that experiences of 
socioeconomic injustice intersect with other forms of violence. The cases of Prijedor 
and Zenica, in particular, differ due to the nature of the war and war crimes that have 
been committed in the two cities. In Prijedor, where the Bosnian Serb military 
engaged in a systematic campaign aimed at the removal of non-Serb population, 
socioeconomic injustice intertwined with cultural injustice, whereas in Zenica this is 
not clearly evident. Moreover, in both cases we find experiences of political exclusion, 
as was the case in Zenica with respect to the environmental impact of the privatised 
steel mill. Second, these experiences and the conceptions of justice emerging from 
them are always mediated by memories of socialism, and by the contrast between the 
past and today’s difficult circumstances. The third finding emerging from this part of 
the study underscores the importance of the international intervention as a field of 
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constraints shaping local communities’ experience of the transition. Within the 
context of privatisation, deindustrialisation, and re-drawing of administrative 
boundaries, experiences of injustice are not temporally limited to the war, but 
continue to be felt in its aftermath. The transition process thus represents, for some, 
not an opportunity for social regeneration, but the further crystallisation or 
worsening of the injustice suffered. Bosnia’s post-socialist condition cannot be 
entirely extricated from its post-war status when analysing experiences of injustice at 
the local level.  
In order to understand what role socioeconomic justice plays in how societies 
deal with war and transition, the thesis has analysed the process through which 
justice claims are developed. This is based on the way in which past experiences of 
injustice and memories of the past are reinterpreted in light of the constraints and 
opportunities that characterise the operation of the international intervention in a 
specific context. On the one hand, interviewees in Prijedor and Zenica often refer to 
the Yugoslav period as a ‘socially just’ past, which acts as a point of reference for 
claims that have to do with the importance of work, the role of workers in society, 
and welfare. The past thus becomes the basis for the development of progressive 
justice claims in the present, and even the point of reference for forward-looking 
justice claims that aim at establishing a fairer society in the future. Similarly to 
experiences of injustice, conceptions of justice are also characterised by the joining of 
redistribution, recognition and representation, thus substantiating the theoretical 
claim that – in post-conflict societies too – justice should be understood as a 
multidimensional concept, and that the dualism between redistribution and 
recognition is analytical rather than substantial (Fraser 2003, 12).  
At the same time, the way in which experience develops into justice claims is 
affected by the extent to which the latter can relate to broader justice narratives, such 
as those promoted by the international community. We have seen that international 
programmes mostly adopt a conception of justice focused on remedying to the 
consequences of ethnically-based violence. While interviewees in Prijedor can partly 
relate to the transitional justice narrative of overcoming interethnic tensions (as their 
experiences of injustice featured a prominent recognition-related component), 
interviewees in Zenica experience the international intervention on justice issues 
more through economic and social policies that they oppose. In such a situation, 
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economic issues are present within justice claims in both Prijedor and Zenica, but 
interviewees in the two cities are influenced by transitional justice discourses in 
different ways. In Prijedor, the ability to relate to international understandings of 
post-war justice offers some acknowledgment, but this is partial and does not address 
socioeconomic issues. Interviewees in Prijedor tend to be focused on redressing 
injustice in the present, rather than to aim for forward-looking redistributive justice. 
In Zenica, where justice claims are more transformative, this is made possible by the 
incommensurability of the city’s dominant justice claims and the justice narrative 
promoted by the international community. This left Zenica at the margins of 
transitional justice processes, but here interviewees seem freer to develop alternative 
conceptions of justice that are more transformative and future-oriented.  
In addition to showing the relevance, once more, of the international 
intervention as a set of connected practices for understanding socioeconomic justice 
and injustice, this part of the thesis also reinforces the argument in favour of the 
relevance of socioeconomic justice issues for post-war societies. It should be noted 
that justice claims are often expressed by groups on a socioeconomic basis in addition 
to an ethnic or cultural one. It is as part of a socioeconomic group – workers or the 
working class – that interviewees experience exclusion, marginalisation, and 
dismissals, and that they developed corresponding conceptions of justice. Workers 
are also able to experience injustice linked to misrecognition in class (rather than 
ethnic) terms, as when citizens of Zenica feel that the character of their hometown as 
a strong industrial centre has been cancelled by the war and the neoliberal transition. 
Economically-based justice claims, emerging from experiences of socioeconomic 
injustice, feature prominently among local communities’ concerns and definitely 
deserve attention within the study and practice of transitional justice.      
The last set of findings has to do with how these experiences of injustice and 
socioeconomic justice claims are effectively put in play, or expressed through 
different forms of agency. Trying to answer the question of what type of social 
mobilisation (if any) is prompted by these claims, the thesis has investigated the 2014 
protests as a key moment during which socioeconomic justice became part of the 
public debate in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In tracing the origins of the protest, 
Chapter 6 found that the workers of the Yugoslav period might not necessarily be as 
active in social mobilisation based on their experience of socioeconomic justice. Due 
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to generational factors, and the preoccupation of making ends meet, they address 
their personal situation of socioeconomic injustice by relying on a set of survival 
strategies: subsistence agriculture, debt, and remittances. However, the analysis of 
the origins of the 2014 protests show that, as a collective, workers and their grievances 
were at the centre of the mobilisation. Moreover, if we look at the demands put 
forward by the protesters, organised in ‘Plenum’ assemblies, it becomes evident that 
they draw from the experiences of dismissal, privatisation, social marginalisation and 
exclusion emerged from the interviews conducted for this project. Similarly to the 
development of justice claims among local communities in Prijedor and Zenica, 
protesters also see ‘social justice’ as a set of overlapping claims where political 
representation is given prominence alongside redistribution. Protesters link 
economic themes such as unemployment, accountability for failed privatisation, and 
the marginal position of workers in the Bosnian society to the institutional system 
that perpetuates these problems, often with the support of international 
organisations. By addressing what they perceive as the root of injustice, and by 
adopting forms of social mobilisation (civic and anti-nationalist, participatory) that 
reject the societal divisions ascribed to the Bosnian society as much as the formal 
organisation of the civil society sector promoted through the peacebuilding effort, the 
2014 protests constituted a transformative critique of the course of the country’s 
transition, and a demonstration of the willingness to change it – at least for a brief 
political moment.  
Two more elements are worth highlighting with respect to the relationship 
between socioeconomic justice claims and social mobilisation. Firstly, while the scope 
of the research broadens – when it comes to social mobilisation – to Bosnia as a whole, 
the comparison between Zenica and Prijedor might still be worth discussing. In this 
case, the varying level and type of mobilisation has been commonly explained 
through the different institutional set up of the two entities and social control 
exercised on the population. The political environment and legacy of the war could 
also be playing a role. Despite the fact that protests were more common and larger in 
Zenica than in Prijedor, in both cities informal groups working on social justice 
themes were established (the Plenum in Zenica, and the Informal Group for Social 
Justice in Prijedor), and both became part of the Austrian Initiative aimed at 
supporting non-registered organisations that were established around the time of the 
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protests. Secondly, the international reaction to the protests further demonstrates that 
internationally-sponsored policies and the principles underlying them do not 
accommodate the concept of socioeconomic justice.  
The ‘bracketing’ of socialism in the post-war reconstruction effort effectively 
delegitimised justice claims based on redistribution. When faced with the protesters’ 
focus on economic problems and social justice, international organisations 
understood these sets of issues through their compartmentalised view that places 
justice within the remit of transitional justice or rule of law programmes, and 
socioeconomic issues within programmes for economic reform and liberalisation. In 
the aftermath of the protest, the EU and IFIs pushed for the adoption of new labour 
laws, as well as for the completion of the privatisation process (themes that are now 
part of the Reform Agenda subscribed by Bosnian governments at different levels). 
The interaction between local conceptions of justice and the international 
intervention is thus characterised, even in the presence of social mobilisation, by the 
constraints imposed by the economic and political transition.  
 
 
Rethinking the meaning of justice for societies in transition 
By developing an approach that incorporates socioeconomic concerns more 
systematically within transitional justice, the thesis has contributed to ongoing 
academic debates on the relevance of socioeconomic issues in war and transition. The 
transitional justice literature has now been debating the socioeconomic dimension of 
justice and injustice for several years, yet the discussion has often seemed informed 
by confusing assumptions. While many scholars consider socioeconomic justice as 
the type of remedy to be offered for violations that are not necessarily of a 
socioeconomic nature (as is the case in Bosnia with reparation payments), others have 
recently pointed at the underexplored relationship between socioeconomic wrongs 
and justice processes in post-conflict and transitional societies (Arbour 2007; Chinkin 
2009). It is the latter aspect that poses the most challenges to the transitional justice 
field, as arguments have been raised against its expansion to socioeconomic violence 
and injustice, warranted as unrealistic and excessive (McAuliffe 2014). As this thesis 
demonstrated through the analysis of this Bosnian case, however, there is a strong 
empirical basis for claiming that socioeconomic violence is important to fully 
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understand (and deal with) the consequences of war. From the theoretical point of 
view which is the subject of this section, this thesis began by taking a step back, and 
exploring how socioeconomic justice can be conceptually incorporated within a 
broader conception of justice for post-war and transitional countries.  
The theoretical approach guiding this research thus contributes to our 
understanding of the relationship between socioeconomic and transitional justice by 
advancing a definition of socioeconomic justice for transitional societies that is based 
on redistribution. Nancy Fraser’s work on the nature of justice claims, informing the 
theory, shows that justice is a multidimensional concept, covering cultural as well as 
socioeconomic issues, and that these are not necessarily in tension with one another 
but can coexist in justice claims emerging from society, and in the strategies adopted 
to seek redress. By addressing the question of how we can conceptually define the 
place of socioeconomic issues in transitional justice processes, the thesis has thus 
contributed a new lens to the study of post-war societies and how they deal with 
injustice.  
The major implication of this contribution is that it prompts us to rethink the 
meaning of justice for societies in transition. Scholars have already engaged in such a 
process from a feminist or more generally critical perspective (Ní Aoláin 2009; Sharp 
2015). What this thesis does, though, is pointing towards two novel ways through 
which we can better assess or understand justice issues in post-war and post-
authoritarian countries. First and foremost, the thesis shows that justice issues are 
understood in a much more comprehensive way than transitional justice mechanisms 
usually envisage. Injustices that are commonly considered from the perspective of 
interethnic violence, as the case of Prijedor shows, often include important 
socioeconomic components. A narrow definition of injustice can thus lead to 
superficial forms of redress: the returnees interviewed in Prijedor, who regained their 
homes (a cornerstone of the international community’s policy to address the 
consequences of ethnic cleasing), but not their former jobs or alternative ways of 
reintegrating within the city’s socioeconomic life, are a case in point. Socioeconomic 
or cultural injustice, moreover, can also be aggravated by the misframing of justice 
claims and by other forms of exclusion from the process of democratic deliberation, 
such as those that characterise the political configuration of post-war Bosnia. 
Precisely because of the specificity of each post-war context, adopting a 
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multidimensional perspective to analyse justice claims seems also necessary in order 
to capture the way in which different types of injustice can overlap, and to better 
understand what strategies can be adopted to address them in such a way that does 
not perpetuate the tension between ‘politics of equality’ and ‘politics of difference’ 
(Fraser 2003, 8-9). This approach also warns against the establishment of a priori 
hierarchies of justice issues, especially when set by international organisations 
involved in post-war justice processes. Ultimately, such a multi-faceted approach 
could be easily extended and adapted to the study of other post-conflict contexts.  
Secondly, the thesis contributes to revealing a tension between universalising 
narratives of justice to which transitional justice refers, and particular justice claims 
emerging from local contexts. Much of the transitional justice literature dealing with 
how justice norms are accepted and internalised by post-conflict states and societies 
focuses on the notion of individual accountability for crimes. This is for instance the 
case for debates on the ‘justice cascade’ (Sikkink 2011), including in their application 
to the cases of the former Yugoslav countries, where the process of norm diffusion 
seems to be much more challenged (Subotić 2009, Lamont 2010). Subotić (2015) has 
indeed suggested that studies on the former Yugoslavia contribute to the transitional 
justice and human rights literature with a sort of ‘cautionary tale’ on the power of 
norms. Other scholars have also noted the possible gap formed between local 
attitudes or preferences on the one hand, and the ‘sort of activism identified by 
Sikkink as central to the justice cascade’ (Vinjamuri and Snyder 2015, 318). On the 
other hand, these arguments should be balanced against the findings of the law and 
society literature, which has shown how local communities are not only subject to the 
influence of international norms such as individual accountability, but are also 
capable of re-working them and adapting them for their own use (Nettelfield 2010).  
The thesis, however, shows another aspect of this tension between 
universalising notions of justice and local expectations, between the content of 
locally-produced justice claims, which incorporates redistributive components, and 
the internationally-promoted transitional justice narratives that marginalise this 
aspect. The gap becomes quite visible if we consider Bosnians social conceptions 
about the places where the process of experiencing injustice and developing justice 
claims belongs. Justice is not understood – at least not exclusively – as a matter 
pertaining to the courtroom (as commonly thought by international actors 
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intervening in the country). Interviewees’ accounts of injustice are nested within the 
social spaces they inhabited before the war. The places of justice and injustice are, in 
practice, the factories, workshops, offices, and public spaces from which people were 
evicted, in many different ways, as a result of the war, and that they could not re-
occupy during the transition. This is the case for Bosnian Muslims and Croats in 
Prijedor when they were fired from their jobs in 1992, then socially marginalised and 
made identifiable in public through a white armband. For the most part, minority 
returnees never went back to work, and often live private lives and socialise in 
private. In Zenica the state, with its complex institutional set up that many people 
oppose, has taken over work spaces such as the RMK building (now the offices of the 
Zenica-Doboj Canton), and sold off others such as the steel mill. The 2014 protests 
themselves used the disruption of this privatisation of space as a weapon, by 
occupying streets, holding public assemblies in theatres and youth centres, and 
seeking active citizen participation in public life. The thesis thus shows the 
importance of alternative spaces for understanding the nature and emergence of 
justice claims in post-war societies.  
The thesis does not resolve the tension between particular justice conceptions 
and international norms of justice. This tension is, however, acknowledged and used 
as a source for productive reflection. While it is not possible to reconcile particular 
and universal, it is possible to make an effort at formulating a more inclusive concept 
of justice, one that does not necessarily envisage the primacy of individual criminal 
accountability for justice processes in post-war societies. Can socioeconomic justice, 
though, effectively be included within the transitional justice framework? Some 
might suggest that local communities are better off by dealing with socioeconomic 
injustice outside of the constraints posed by transitional justice. However, this does 
not address the crucial issue of why the terms and conditions of transitional justice 
should still be set by external actors with little local participation. Perhaps local 
communities would benefit more from contributing to reshaping our understanding 
of transitional justice. Moreover, while the incorporation of socioeconomic concerns 
poses challenges, it is not clear whether local communities would be able to work 
towards redistributive justice without taking into account economic or institutional 
reforms promoted by international organisations in post-conflict countries. As we 
have seen in the Bosnian case, political-institutional as well as economic reforms 
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significantly affect the conditions within which justice claims develop, and some sort 
of interaction between the international and local in shaping the process of dealing 
with socioeconomic injustice appears almost inevitable. 
Lastly, the thesis reinforces calls for considering local circumstances carefully. 
The specific experiences of injustice, references to the past as a benchmark for a just 
society, and the way in which the international intervention prompts a 
reinterpretation of these issues into justice claims, are specific not only to Bosnia as a 
country but to the city context of Prijedor or Zenica. The presence of the iron ore 
mines in Prijedor shaped the city’s history and development, the war – when workers 
were fired and one of the mines was used as a prison camp – and the 
deindustrialisation phase during the post-war transition. A similar role is played by 
the steel mill in Zenica. The thesis thus opens up the question of how, in different 
contexts, locally-relevant claims can be articulated with reference to a more general 




Accountability and the role of international actors in peace and justice processes  
This thesis’ analysis of the links between justice issues and different ways in which 
the intervention of international actors might affect them makes another important 
contribution to the literature on interventions in post-war and transitional countries. 
This thesis shows that a large part of local justice conceptions actually deviates from 
internationally-sponsored norms, and traces their development and struggle to 
emerge. In order to do this, though, it is necessary to consider the context of 
intervention more broadly. While international interventions in the justice field are 
usually understood as those relating to the establishment of tribunals, facilitating the 
work of courts, or even commissions, the thesis shows that it is necessary to consider 
how other aspects of the transition constrain and bound the operation of justice 
processes and the emergence of justice claims.  
Studies on different aspects of a country’s transition, and on how changes in 
the political, social and economic field are guided by international policies, have for 
a long time been more isolated than fruitfully connected. While from the 1990s 
transitional justice has been increasingly seen as part of peacebuilding processes, the 
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nexus between the latter and transitional justice programmes has long remained 
underexplored, and the scholarship is now trying to address this point (Baker and 
Obradović-Wochnik 2016). Save for a few notable exceptions (Nagy 2008, Sriram 
2007), these literatures rarely overlapped (Millar and Lecy 2016). What is still under-
researched, and addressed in this thesis, is the way in which other parts of the 
international intervention also operate as a set of connected practices. Transitional 
justice programmes are linked through multiple threads to peacebuilding, but they 
also operate within the constraints set by the political economy of the transition.  
Transitional justice incorporated socioeconomic concerns half-heartedly, with 
a focus on the consequences of physical violence and ethnic cleansing that would be 
affirmatively redressed through compensation. In addition to operating in a 
dysfunctional way, the possibility to disburse sums to victims has been constantly 
put in question by the pressure exerted by IFIs concerned about budgetary stability, 
which have generally considered these payments as part of welfare support rather 
than as reparations for wartime violence. On the other hand, the economic reforms 
promoted by international actors reflected market concerns rather than social justice 
principles. This led them, for instance, to lobby for labour legislation that overlooked 
the rights of those unjustly dismissed (and the importance work had in the refugee 
return process), and to divert financial support away from the industrial sector and 
towards small or micro enterprises that failed to generate sustainable employment in 
cities like Zenica. The empirical analysis of Chapters 4-6 further illustrates the extent 
to which the economic transition is important for understanding how people 
experience injustice and construe the very concept of justice.  
The thesis thus reinterprets justice processes as embedded not only within 
peacebuilding, but also within the political economy of the transition, and this has 
three implications that are discussed here. Firstly, this can represent the basis for 
developing further insights into the notion of accountability. In post-war contexts, 
this is inevitably shaped by the particular conditions of the conflict, the ensuing 
transition, and the particular transitional justice mechanisms adopted. In many cases, 
including the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia, a legalistic approach to transitional 
justice has dominated, based on the establishment of individual accountability for 
war crimes. Alternative processes, led by civil society organisations, have been 
initiated to complement the work of tribunals and courts. The Coalition for the 
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establishment of a Regional Commission (RECOM/REKOM) and the Women’s 
Court in Sarajevo are relevant examples (Jeffrey and Jakala 2012; Bonora 2013; 
O’Reilly 2016). The literature has also recognised that individual criminal 
responsibility might not address the collective and systematic dimensions of crimes 
such as genocide or crimes against humanity (Drumbl 2007), and developed 
alternative models for understanding societal responsibility and denial (Gordy 2013).  
This research on socioeconomic justice has pointed towards the relevance of 
such questions on accountability, especially in relation to the role of international 
actors involved in the political-economic process of reform. The analysis of 
experiences of injustice in Prijedor and Zenica shows that such reforms contributed 
to creating an environment within which socioeconomic issues could not be resolved, 
and were often aggravated. The study of justice claims and social mobilisation makes 
clear that local communities hold (public and private) international actors, as well as 
domestic political elites, accountable for their conditions. As refugees began 
returning to Prijedor, it was the labour law sought by the international community 
that did not grant them rights with respect to their previous employment. In Zenica, 
the acquisition of the steel mill was supported by international loans, and Mittal was 
allowed to renege on their commitments on the number of workers to be employed 
after the privatisation. Most importantly, citizens and environmental NGOs have 
since held ArcelorMittal responsible for the deadly levels of air pollution in the city, 
with their cries falling on the deaf hears of international officials. Post-socialist 
economic reform, detached from justice-related matters, relied on policy choices that 
were ultimately flawed, such as the decision to privatise firms before restructuring 
them, leading to widespread asset stripping and corruption. From the vantage point 
of this thesis, a transformative attempt to redress social injustice as depicted by 
interviewees cannot exclude international financial institutions and private 
companies from a discussion about accountability.  
Secondly, the thesis’ contribution to the literature on international 
interventions also has implications for the relationship between the latter and local 
justice processes. We have already seen in the previous section that international 
justice norms do not necessarily conform to the expectations of local populations, 
which in the case of Bosnia resulted in the marginalisation of redistribution claims. 
In addition to this, the international intervention interacts with the development of 
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justice claims by promoting policies that, voluntarily or not, limit the possibility of 
citizens to frame their grievances as justice claims.  As discussed in Chapter 2, Fraser 
notes that political issues of representation constitute second-order questions of who 
are the ‘subjects entitled to a just distribution or reciprocal recognition in the given 
case’ (Fraser 2005, 72), and furthermore ‘how such claims are to be mooted and 
adjudicated’ (Ibid., 75). Throughout the empirical chapters, we have stressed how 
experiences of socioeconomic injustice and conceptions of justice are reinterpreted on 
the basis of the way in which the international intervention interacted with a specific 
context. In the city of Prijedor, non-Serb citizens that had been victim of 
socioeconomic and cultural injustice could relate the latter experience to the 
international narrative – something that was not possible in Zenica. The international 
community’s role in promoting one version of justice (judicial accountability) and in 
pushing forward economic reforms might have thus contributed to misframing, by 
drawing the boundaries of the community (of victims of injustice) ‘in such a way as 
to wrongly exclude some people from the chance to participate at all in its authorised 
contests over justice’ (Fraser 2005, 76). While the international intervention is 
conceived and presented as a support to the country’s transition, some of the 
priorities and modes of operation of the intervention itself might call into question 
such supportive role. At the same time, local communities still refer to, and make use 
of, internationally promoted justice narratives aimed at achieving some form of 
cultural recognition. The relationship between emerging justice issues at the local 
level and the international actors is much more complex and characterised by 
‘frictions’ (Hinton 2010) than what is often allowed.  
There is another, crucial way in which international policies can have an 
ambivalent impact on justice processes which go beyond the role of norm-promotion 
often discussed by the literature. The explicit link between different aspects of the 
intervention, indeed, also becomes clear in the constraints it poses to parts of the 
Bosnian society and the opportunities it offers to others.  It appears from the findings 
of the thesis that the workers were victims not only of the war that destroyed much 
of the infrastructure and productive assets of the country, but also of the transition 
that never employed them to rebuild these assets. While not the focus of this thesis, 
deindustrialisation and rising unemployment are also gendered phenomena. To give 
one example, during the transition female participation in the labour market has been 
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significantly lower than that of men in Bosnia.3 On the other hand, individuals with 
good political connections during the war and in the post-war period could benefit 
from favourable conditions for acquiring privatised companies. They often profited 
from asset stripping rather than contributing to restart the Bosnian economy. 
Additionally, the political settlement reached at Dayton put political elites in the 
advantageous position of managing an institutional system where employment could 
be easily used to build client networks, and nationalism mobilised to gather the 
additional support needed to remain in power.  
The attempt to bring other issues ‘from the margins’ within conventional 
understandings of transitional justice has been questioned on the grounds that 
transitional justice does not have the capacity to address everything (Duthie 2010). 
Arguments based on efficiency and capabilities, however, leave us wondering who 
should be the arbiter of what justice issues are, in each context, addressed through 
transitional justice mechanisms and which not. After the previous section has warned 
against imposing a hierarchy of justice issues on local communities, this one raises 
the issue of whether international actors are best placed to do this, given that – 




Escaping the post-war condition: linking Bosnian agency with international 
movements for social justice  
This thesis has sought to tell a different story about Bosnia and Herzegovina, one that 
escapes from the ethnic and national categories through which the conflict and 
transition are often interpreted. It has adopted a different perspective to the study of 
justice issues that emphasises their socioeconomic dimension. The different account 
of justice issues from a socioeconomic perspective is carried out through fieldwork 
conducted among communities of Bosnians, especially former workers from Zenica 
                                                          
3 World Bank Agency for Statistics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, FBiH Institute for Statistics 
and RS Institute for Statistics, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Gender Disparities in Endowments, 
Access to Economic Opportunities and Agency, May 2015, available at 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/754241467992483659/pdf/97640-ESW-
P132666-and-P152786-Box385353B-PUBLIC-BiH-Gender-Disparities-in-Endowments.pdf>, 
accessed 1 November 2016. 
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and Prijedor. The close observation of the city context and the interviews carried out 
with citizens constitute the backbone of the material upon which the empirical 
contribution of the thesis relies. In brief, the analysis of socioeconomic issues in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina is conducted in four steps, corresponding to the empirical 
Chapters 3-6. First, transitional justice programmes dealing with potentially relevant 
socioeconomic issues and political economic reforms were analysed to highlight the 
role of the international intervention in Bosnia in creating the context for the 
continuation of socioeconomic injustice after the war. Second, the change of 
perspective in the analysis of wartime injustice, moving from recognition to 
redistribution, showed the importance of socioeconomic injustice for local 
communities. It also pointed to the blurred temporal dimension of injustice, which is 
often protracted during the transition period, and to the overlap of different justice 
issues covering redistribution, recognition and representation. Chapter 5 then 
showed how pre-existing conceptions about socioeconomic issues, developed during 
socialist times, also contribute to explaining how justice conceptions are formed. 
Lastly, research into the themes and forms of mobilisation adopted by the 2014 
protest movement also reveal the importance of socioeconomic justice issues for 
social mobilisation.  
The empirical findings of the thesis can be developed further into three points. 
From a research-related and policy-related perspective, there is more to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina than the ethnic divisions that are too often regarded as a default 
explanatory variable. There is also more to Bosnia, from a justice perspective, than 
the war crimes trials that still serve an important function in establishing individual 
accountability and uncovering evidence about wartime events. The thesis has shown 
that socioeconomic injustice affects Bosnian society in an immediate and dramatically 
relevant way. Ethnic divisions are sometimes relevant to explaining how such 
injustice developed from the war, but are not always relevant for understanding how 
this continued through time, and how the international intervention has attempted 
(and mostly fallen short of) addressing the emergence of grievances in this respect. 
The separation between those who have been disempowered by the war and the 
transition (such as workers), and those who have been empowered by it – especially 
political elites and entrepreneurs with political connections and capital acquired with 
the fall of the socialist system and through the conflict itself – is instead a key element 
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in the analysis of experiences of socioeconomic injustice and conceptions of justice in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
From the point of view of the development of justice claims in the Bosnian 
context, there are two relevant issues to be raised. The research presented here has 
adopted a grassroots perspective on society and attempted to give a voice to local 
Bosnian communities that are mostly informally organised. They are removed from 
the formal civil society sector, in Bosnia populated by thousands of non-
governmental organisations registered in the post-war period. In many cases, 
established NGOs dealing with transitional justice issues (often based in Sarajevo) 
have counted on the support of the international community in order to pursue their 
activities. The peacebuilding agenda promoted by international organisations largely 
relied on NGO work to support the sustainability of institutional effort, with the aim 
of promoting tolerance, justice and democratic values in the broader society. Scholars 
have noted that the activities of NGOs have, to a certain extent, been modelled 
around the priorities of international funders (Belloni 2007). With time, this has 
resulted in a gap between the professionalised project work of NGOs and the 
grievances of the Bosnian society. Activists agree that the perception of NGOs among 
the local population is often compromised by this, regardless of whether or when it 
holds true. While much research has been devoted to the study of the NGO sector, 
this thesis shows that the Bosnian society outside of the organised civil society is 
crucial for explaining how justice claims emerge based on experiences of injustice, 
memories of the past, and how these interact with the transition context. Alternative 
forms of organisation, such as those emerged in the 2014 protests, are just as 
important and have continued to develop after the partial dissolution of the plenum 
movement. In Sarajevo, left out of the circuit of funding provided by the Austrian 
Initiative, informal groups such as Jedan grad Jedna borba (One city One fight/struggle) 
have emerged to campaign on issues including the management of the water supply 
network and access restrictions to the former public library Vijećnica. 
As a result, socioeconomic justice issues as analysed in this thesis seem to 
belong more to processes of political contention (Tilly and Tarrow 2015), rather than 
related to the ‘conventional’ transitional justice actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
such as organised civil society groups, international organisations, and state 
authorities. Socioeconomic justice is fruitfully analysed, as done in this thesis, from 
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the point of view of ‘claims’ which inherently pertain to the world of political struggle 
and social mobilisation. The 2014 protests gave an illustration of how these claims 
can lead to the emergence of a protest movement, but – as the lives of workers in 
Prijedor and Zenica show – the struggle is also present on an individual level in the 
everyday experiences of affected communities.  
The 2014 protests bring us to the last point to be discussed here in relation to 
the empirical findings of the thesis, which has to do with Bosnia’s position with 
respect to broader, transnational phenomena. The mobilisation inspired by the 
grievances of former workers, brought up by activists from different cities, organised 
in open and informal groups, gives us yet another representation of Bosnia that is 
different from the ethnonationalist narrative. The socioeconomic and civic character 
of the mobilisation again show that a different story can be told about Bosnia, from a 
social perspective that accounts for much of the discontent felt by Bosnians today. 
The 2014 protests also help inscribe Bosnia within broader dynamics of scepticism 
and social opposition towards neoliberalism and austerity that characterised 
movements in other parts of Europe and the world in the aftermath of the 2008 
financial crisis. While the study of justice issues in Bosnia has over the past years 
contributed to our understanding of the legacy of the war, the impact of war crime 
prosecutions, and so on, this thesis’ findings connect Bosnian movements with their 
counterparts not only in other post-Yugoslav states like Croatia and Serbia, but also 
throughout Europe or North America. In the Bosnian case, we can trace the 
development of such mobilisation from different types of overlapping injustice felt 
during the war, through the transition period during which there was an attempt to 
steer the political economy of the country towards market capitalism, and to the 2008 
crisis that put public finances and banks under strain, similarly to other contexts.  
 
 
Implications for further research and for the practice of dealing with the past  
The thesis concludes with a short section that proposes, based on the extended 
findings discussed in this chapter, three questions worth pursuing in future academic 
research. The same questions bear relevance for policy makers, NGO workers, 
activities and more in general practitioners involved in the field of transitional justice. 
Each of them tries to develop thoughts emerging from the previous three sections. 
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Does transitional justice inherently limit the scope for socioeconomic justice? One of 
the pressing question emerging from the thesis, and potentially relevant for further 
research, is whether transitional justice is somehow limited by default. In other 
words, is transitional justice inevitably linked to other parts of the intervention that 
make socioeconomic justice impossible, such as economic reforms that are conceived 
based on market criteria and pose constraints to justice programmes? This questions 
touches onto the very nature of what transitional justice is, and what priority different 
justice issues should be given in the aftermath of war. It might be argued that this 
problem is not posed by the process of dealing with the past itself, but by the way in 
which transitional justice has been actually implemented in transitional societies over 
the past decades. This entails a possible research agenda for transitional justice 
scholars interested in understanding to what extent transitional policies might have 
facilitated or stifled attempts at achieving socioeconomic justice in other contexts, 
beyond the Bosnian case discussed in this thesis. From the perspective of policy 
makers, being aware of the possible tensions emerging between transitional justice 
goals and political or economic reforms would be essential in order to avoid 
marginalising legitimate concerns raised by the local population. This is even more 
important for international actors involved in peacebuilding and supporting 
transitions in post-war and post-authoritarian countries, as their role and legitimacy 
have often been questioned.  
Who are the actors involved in post-war socioeconomic justice processes? This thesis 
has specifically focused on the interaction between local actors and international 
processes. It has done so by highlighting the relevance of communities that are still 
under-researched by transitional justice scholars, those who have been affected by 
the conflict in a different way compared to the commonly considered consequences 
of war crimes and crimes against humanity. The research analyses the role of workers 
as post-Yugoslav communities disrupted by the war. These were only partly 
reconstructed during the transition, as workers turned into unemployed persons or 
pensioners, and into representatives of an old order requiring deep change in the eyes 
of the international interveners. A second set of actors involved in socioeconomic 
justice processes, then, is the ensemble of organisations and individuals affecting the 
country’s process of democratisation and economic reform. As suggested above, the 
role of large private corporations and the type of corporate social policy they should 
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adopt in post-war settings is something to be further explored. A limitation of this 
thesis, due to the scope of the research, is that the role of the state and domestic elites 
is only marginally analysed in relation to the justice claims expressed by local 
communities on the one hand, and with respect to the implementation of 
internationally-sponsored reforms on the other. The importance of justice in its 
political dimension, as fair representation, that emerges from the research conducted 
in Bosnia suggests that this intermediate level, situated between the society and the 
international, constitutes a topic of interest in its own right. Future research on this 
topic will therefore need to address the important question of the role of domestic 
political elites and institutions in the process of development and adjudication of 
socioeconomic justice claims. At the same time, practitioners would benefit from 
recognising the value of re-assessing the boundaries of the community belonging to 
post-war justice processes based on local experiences of injustice, justice claims, and 
their interaction with national and international authorities.  
What can we learn from the study of particular experiences of injustice and local 
articulations of justice claims that can be applied to other contexts? This questions 
somehow reformulates the tension between general conceptions of justice that guide 
transitional justice interventions and the locally-dependent nature of justice claims. 
It does so in a way that can be of interest to policy-makers developing plans for post-
conflict interventions. On the one hand, the case of Bosnia shows that that the way in 
which socioeconomic injustice was experienced, and expectations of justice formed, 
were essentially connected to the way in which cities developed economically 
through time, which in turn affected the course of the war and the following 
transition process. On the other hand, the thesis has proposed an understanding of 
justice that envisages the interaction of different elements and possible claims, 
including socioeconomic ones that struggle to fit within mainstream understandings 
of transitional justice. If we take justice into account as a multi-dimensional process, 
the challenge for scholars and practitioners is not to find a fixed meaning of justice 
for societies in transition, but to understand – in each separate context – how these 
dimensions give rise to mobile, temporary and contested conceptions of justice and 
justice claims. Relying on a methodological approach that attempts to link local 
observations to macro-processes shaping the context seems particularly promising in 
this respect. For policy makers, taking into account the multi-dimensional character 
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of justice as well as its local articulations will be essential in defining how it is possible 
to learn something from one context and apply it to another, which is often an 
objective of international organisations working in post-conflict contexts. This 
approach to justice issues as a mix of redistribution, recognition and representation, 
coupled with the blurred temporal nature of experiences of injustice (developing 
during war but continuing in the transition period), also invites scholars and 
practitioners to avoid drawing strict boundaries between transitional justice and 
‘ordinary’ justice, and avoid locking countries in a post-war transitional condition 
that does not reflect the broad scope of social claims and their potential contribution 
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